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1 
Study on the labour market in the United Kingdom 
Executive Summary 
The UK Government's labour market reforms since 1979 have 
often been described as constituting a policy of 'deregulation' 
designed to foster a more 'flexible' labour market. The UK 
already had a less regulated labour market than many other 
European countries in 1979 and it is by no means obvious that all 
labour market policy since then has been in the direction of 
'deregulation'. 
The experience of the UK labour market is perceived to be 
out of line with the experience of other member states of the EU, 
as such this study may be particularly illuminating with regard 
to the debate in the EU over the directions in which labour 
market policy should go. 
I. Labour market analysis and forecasts 
Employment trends 
Employment and unemployment in Britain have fluctuated 
markedly since 1979 with two major recessions in the early 1980s 
and early 19 9 0s punctuated by a sharp upturn in employment in the 
late 1980s. On a peak-to-peak basis (1979-90) employment rates 
rose marginally. Employment-population ratios are significantly 
higher in the UK than in most of the other member states of the 
EU. However, this was already apparent in 1979. 
Labour force participation rates for women have been on a 
strongly rising trend over the whole post-war period. The 
increase in female participation rates between 1979-96 did not 
represent any sharp change in trend. Male participation rates 
have been on a declining trend over the post-war period, but the 
decline since 1979 has been somewhat faster than in earlier 
decades. Since 1993 employment has been rising at a slightly 
faster rate for men than for women. 
Growth in 'atypical' employment? 
It is frequently asserted that a distinctive feature of the 
post-1979 UK labour market is the growth in so-called 'atypical' 
or 'flexible' forms of employment. This is usually defined as 
any kind of job which is not full-time and permanent. 
The share of part-time employment in the UK has been rising 
steadily since 1951, when it stood at just four per cent of total 
employment. The fastest rate of growth in part-time employment 
occured in the 1960s when its share in total employment rose by 
seven percentage points. Between 1984 and 1996 the share of 
part-time employment increased by just over four percentage 
points. The steady increase in the share of part-time employment 
over the post-war period largely reflects the growth in female 
labour force participation. Most part-time work in the UK is 
voluntarily entered into although the incidence of involuntary 
part-time work has increased since 1990. Part-time employment 
has long represented a higher share of total employment in the 
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UK than in most other EU countries, but the incidence of 
involuntary part-time employment as a proportion of the labour 
force has not been higher. 
Between 1984 and 1991 there was no increase in the 
proportion of employees in temporary jobs. Between 1991 and 1996 
there was an increase in the share of temporary employment. The 
share of temporary employment in the UK in the mid-1990s was 
still low in comparison with other EU nations despite the UK 
having a relatively deregulated labour market. Firms may have 
the incentive to employ workers on non-standard contracts if the 
regulations covering standard contracts are perceived as 
burdensome. The fact that the share of temporary employment is 
so low in the UK and has not increased significantly is indirect 
evidence that the burden of employment protection on regular 
forms of employment in Britain is not heavy. 
One break in trend in the structure of employment in Britain 
after 1979 was the sharp increase in the share of self-
employment. This share had been broadly flat over the post-war 
period, but between 1979 and 1989 the share of self- employment 
rose from 7.3 per cent of total employment to 13.1 per cent. 
However, in the recession of the early 1990s the share of self-
employment fell slightly and has been flat since. 
The shift from manufacturing to services 
Between 1979 and 1984 there was an unprecedented and 
precipitous decline in the share of manufacturing employment. 
However, this is the only example of a significant acceleration 
in the pace of change in the structure of employment by industry. 
In more recent years the decline in the share of manufacturing 
employment has slowed down markedly. Within the 'service' sector 
it is the business and financial services and the public and 
social services which have increased their shares of total 
employment rather than distribution, hotels and catering. This 
means that the growth in service sector employment has been 
concentrated in those sectors where relatively well paid 
managerial, professional and technical jobs are concentrated and 
not in the sector where less skilled and lower paid service jobs 
are concentrated. 
Over the whole post-war period there has been an ongoing 
decline in the share of manual jobs in total employment and a 
rise in the proportion of jobs falling into the managerial, 
professional and technical category. The only less skilled 
occupations to have increased their share more recently have been 
the personal services. The decline in the share of skilled 
manual employment has been as rapid as the decline in the share 
of unskilled manual employment. The share of semi-skilled manual 
occupations has declined more slowly. It is strictly incorrect 
to talk about the decline in unskilled employment rather than the 
decline in manual employment. 
Trends in unemployment 
In 1979 the unemployment rate in Britain, as measured by the 
number of people registered for unemployment benefit, consistent 
with current coverage, stood at four per cent of the workforce. 
In the first half of 1996 the claimant unemployment rate stood 
at just under eight per cent of the workforce. The difference 
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between the ILO unemployment rate derived from the Labour Force 
Survey and the unemployment rate as measured by the claimant 
count seems to move over time in a predictable fashion consistent 
with an added/discouraged worker effect. 
When aggregate unemployment as measured by the claimant 
count or the ILO measure, is on a firmly downward (upward) trend 
all other measures of un- or underemployment are also on a firmly 
downward (upward) trend. Most significantly, when aggregate 
unemployment is on a firmly downward trend the unemployment rates 
for all the most disadvantaged groups in the labour market also 
fall, at rate which is at least as fast. The argument that there 
is some asymmetry in that unemployment rates for disadvantaged 
groups rise sharply in recessions but do not decline in the same 
way during recoveries is not borne out by the evidence in the UK. 
This applies to youth unemployment, ethnic unemployment and most 
notably to long-term unemployment. If we could be confident that 
aggregate unemployment could be reduced to a reasonably low level 
we could be reassured that unemployment rates amongst these 
disadvantaged groups would also fall significantly. 
In the first half of the 1990s regional differences in 
unemployment rates in the UK were narrower than at any time in 
the last 70 years. There is also no clear sign that the relative 
unemployment rates of the less well qualified have deteriorated 
significantly. 
Greater employment insecurity? 
There is little evidence to sustain the assertion that there 
has been a significant decline in permanent or 'lifetime' 
employment. Since 1975 there has been a decline in the average 
job tenure of men, but a slight increase in the average job 
tenure of women, with much of the secular change for men 
associated with the effects of the 1979-83 recession which saw 
the elimination of many long-tenure manual jobs in manufacturing. 
By contrast, the early 1990s recession did not see any further 
decline in average job tenure. There is also no obvious trend 
towards a greater proportion of the working age population 
experiencing spells of unemployment. 
Wage inflation 
The experience of the early 1980s in the UK when wage 
inflation was steady with unemployment at over 10 per cent, and 
the experience of the late 1980s when wage inflation began to 
creep up as the unemployment rate fell rapidly below 10 per cent, 
led to considerable pessimism about the nature of the trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation. The increase in unemployment 
required to reduce wage inflation by a given amount was the same 
in the early 1990s as it was in the early 1980s. However, the 
subdued rate of wage inflation in the recovery of the mid-1990s 
has lead to a degree of optimism that the nature of that trade-
off might have improved. 
The rapid fall in unemployment between 1986 and 1990 
produced only a modest upward creep in wage inflation. During 
the first six months of 1990 there was little direct evidence 
that unemployment (then below six per cent) was below the level 
at which inflation might accelerate. The upward creep in 
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inflation in the late 1980s may have been a response to too rapid 
an expansion in demand and fall in unemployment with capacity 
constraints and skill shortages leading to some inflationary 
pressure. 
Wage inequality 
One unambiguous trend in the labour market in Britain since 
the late 1970s has been the ongoing increase in wage inequality, 
following a short period in the mid- to late 1970s when overall 
wage inequality narrowed modestly. Although real wages grew for 
all groups of workers after 1979, the dispersion of wages 
increased dramatically in a fashion which was out of line with 
historical experience and with the experience of other European 
countries, though not the United States. This increase in wage 
inequality is ill-understood. Two main hypotheses have been put 
forward, one focusing on changes in the demand for labour biased 
against unskilled workers and the other on changes to the 
institutions which determine pay and the attitudes which underlie 
that institutional framework. 
The causes of unemployment 
Much discussion of the causes of unemployment revolves 
around the concept of the natural, equilibrium or non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment which is determined 
by structural factors. 
The average and the range of estimates for the natural rate 
of unemployment in Britain in the mid-1990s are almost identical 
to the average and the range of estimates in the late 1980s. 
This illustrates that there is still no consensus amongst 
economists that the Government's structural reforms have 
improved the trade-off between unemployment and inflation. There 
is also no agreement amongst economists over the weight to be 
given to different labour market and other factors which might 
lead to a high natural rate. This lack of consensus in turn 
leads to widely diverging forecasts for the future path of 
unemployment and other macroeconomic variables. 
The UK and the Maastricht criteria 
The UK Government has reserved the right to opt-out of the 
single currency. The UK seems likely to meet the convergence 
criteria with respect to inflation and interest rates. However, 
it seems unlikely that the budget deficit in 1997 will be below 
three per cent of GDP and Britain will not have rejoined the ERM 
before 1997. The UK Government's fiscal objectives are in 
principle actually tighter than those in the Maastricht criteria. 
For the UK the Maastricht criteria represent quite sensible rules 
of thumb for the stance of fiscal policy during an upturn. 
However, since Autumn 1992 the British Government has been able 
to offset a significant tightening of fiscal policy with a 
loosening of monetary policy including a significant depreciation 
of the exchange rate. Concerns about the possible negative 
impact of the Maastricht fiscal criteria on growth and employment 
are misplaced provided that monetary policy is available as an 
instrument to maintain growth in aggregate demand. 
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II Se III Labour Market Institutions and Legislation 
There have been four specific aspects to Government reforms 
since 1979 in the area of collective and individual employment 
rights : 
1) Reforms have proceeded incrementally. The legal framework 
governing unions and collective bargaining was changed over the 
period from 1980-93 in specific legislative steps. The scope of 
minimum wage regulation through the Wages Councils was first 
reduced in 1986 and the Councils were not abolished until 1993. 
2) In the field of collective industrial relations and 
collective bargaining there have been very significant changes 
which might be described as a decisive shift towards a more 
'deregulated' labour market. However, in relation to collective 
institutions it would be more accurate to say that the law now 
plays a more significant role, with the legislation seeking to 
limit some of the legal immunities which traditionally covered 
trade union activities, to erode some of the union institutions 
which promote or consolidate union influence, to reform the 
internal organisation of the unions with the perceived aim of 
increasing the rights of individual members, and to undermine the 
role of collective wage-setting. Union membership has fallen 
significantly from covering nearly three-in-five employees in 
1979 to just one third in 1994. The number of working days lost 
through strikes has fallen significantly in the UK as it has 
elsewhere in the industrialised world. 
3) In the field of minimum wage regulation there has been almost 
complete deregulation which has matched the attempt to reduce the 
role of collective bargaining in wage determination. Collective 
pay setting by the early 1990s affected a smaller proportion of 
employees than at any time since before the second world war. 
However, it would not be correct to say that wage determination 
in the UK has become completely decentralised, rather the sharp 
decline in collective bargaining and pay-setting at an industry 
level has been matched by firms taking a much tighter grip on pay 
at the centre. 
4) In the field of individual employment rights there has been 
no overall shift to greater deregulation. The relationship 
between the individual employee and the employer was relatively 
less regulated in the UK in 1979, but with a strong trend towards 
codifying rights. This trend continued after 1979, often in 
response to EU Directives and the Courts' interpretations of EU 
Treaties. The only significant act of deregulation in this field 
was the lengthening in the required period of employment from 6 
months to two years before individuals could qualify for rights 
to redundancy pay and protection against unfair dismissal. 
However, in the fields of health and safety and equal 
opportunities the UK labour market is as regulated as any in 
Europe. 
Working time, however, has never been subject to significant 
regulation in the UK which has a very wide distribution of hours 
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worked. There is also no legislative backing for institutions 
to promote greater employee involvement in UK firms. This 
explains the hostility of the UK Government to EU Directives in 
these fields. 
In terms of the impact of the reform agenda we can make 
three points: 
i) There is evidence that the rate of growth in productivity, 
especially in manufacturing, has improved and this may in some 
part reflect the reforms in the field of collective industrial 
relations. However, it was probably the recession of the early 
1980s which provided the most important shock to management and 
lowered the ability of labour to resist attempts to eliminate 
over-manning and restrictive practices. Increased product market 
competition may also have played an important supporting role. 
ii) Unambiguously the decline in union density and collective 
bargaining and the abolition of the Wages Councils have been one 
set of factors associated with the significant increase in wage 
inequality. 
iii) There is no consensus that the reforms have improved the 
overall trade-off between unemployment and inflation as reflected 
in the wide range of estimates for the natural rate of 
unemployment which continue to exist. 
It is worth thinking about this experience in the light of 
the wider debate in the EU over the role of labour market 
regulation and deregulation. The specific measures which have 
been brought forward under the Social Chapter of the Maastricht 
Treaty are likely to have very little effect on the UK labour 
market. The most significant aspects of 'deregulation' in the 
UK have occured in the fields of collective industrial relations 
and pay determination. In practice the European Commission has 
put forward no Directives which would materially affect these 
areas or require the UK to roll back any of the legislative 
changes made since 1979. Most EU Directives have had effects in 
the field of individual employment rights, have had nothing to 
do with the Maastricht Treaty, and have generally reinforced the 
tendency to codify these rights in the UK anyway in an area which 
has not seen any net deregulation. 
'Excessive' regulation is likely to have adverse 
consequences for employment and productive efficiency. A 
complete lack of regulation is likely to have adverse 
distributional consequences. It is always a question of striking 
the right balance and striking that balance is always an 
empirical matter. There is no evidence that the employment 
protection legislation which was in place in 1979 had any 
significant adverse impact on employment and there is no evidence 
that the modest wage rates set by the Wages Councils had a 
significant adverse impact on employment. 
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IV Labour Market Policies 
Striking the right balance between the 'assistance' role of 
the Employment Service in providing income for unemployed people 
while helping them in their attempts to re-enter the labour 
market, and the 'policing' role of checking on their eligibility 
for benefit and whether they are effectively searching for work, 
is always a difficult one. Since the mid-1980s the UK Government 
has significantly tightened the administration of benefit and 
reduced the value of benefits in relation to average earnings, 
while offering greater assistance to jobseekers through various 
Employment Service programmes. 
By the mid-1990s the Employment Service in Britain was 
administrating a battery of measures designed to improve 
placement services, assist job search and provide enhanced 
counselling for the unemployed, providing a series of nets to 
catch the unemployed as they approach different durations of 
unemployment. These measures are as extensive as anywhere in the 
OECD. 
Resources in Britain have moved away from training and work 
programmes towards the initiatives run by the Employment Service. 
This move is generally backed by the results of research in the 
UK. Simple initiatives which offer improved placement services 
or assistance with job search can be shown to significantly boost 
participants' job prospects. The evidence for the effects of 
training and work programmes is much more mixed. Work programmes 
can help tide people over while the regular jobs market improves 
but there is no evidence that they significantly improve the 
chances of participants finding regular jobs. Only small scale 
and relatively expensive training programmes seem to deliver 
clear positive results in terms of higher earnings for 
participants. Wage subsidies do not create many new jobs, but 
can tilt recruitment towards disadvantaged jobseekers. 
Given the significant tightening in the regime since 1986 
it is not clear that lax administration of unemployment related 
benefits can any longer be blamed for keeping unemployment at a 
high level in the UK. The policies introduced since 1986 have 
probably made a contribution to reducing unemployment, though how 
far this is due to the greater 'assistance' offered by the 
Employment Service and how far to the tighter 'policing' of the 
benefits system is a matter of continuing controversy. 
V Other policies 
Education and training 
Since 1986-87 the proportion of the age cohort entering 
full-time further education after compulsory schooling has 
increased significantly. This has been matched by a doubling in 
the proportion of the age group entering higher education. The 
introduction of the new GCSE examination is closely linked with 
this increase in enrolment. Very few young people now enter 
directly into jobs without training, but the quality of training 
available through Government training programmes and employers 
remains variable. 
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The Government has introduced a new set of vocational 
qualifications. The majority of National Vocational 
Qualifications have been attained at low levels and in the sales, 
clerical and secretarial and personal service occupations. 
General National Vocational Qualifications, available in schools 
and colleges, have not increased the proportion of the age cohort 
taking full-time qualifications, which was rising strongly before 
GNVQs were introduced nationally. Successful completion rates 
for GNVQs are lower than for the traditional qualifications they 
have displaced. 
There is no evidence that Britain's relatively less 
regulated labour market leads to a lower incidence of training 
compared with other countries or has prevented an increase in the 
incidence of training over the last decade. On the other hand 
the increase in training incidence does not seem linked to any 
specific government policies. In 1996 reported skill shortages 
were running at historically low levels in the UK economy. 
The tax and benefits system 
There are always trade-offs to be addressed with respect to 
any changes in the tax and benefits system as they affect low 
income households. The Conservative Government since 1979 has 
put great emphasis on containing the costs of the UK welfare 
state and on creating incentives to work. By definition these 
two objectives imply that the alleviation of poverty and income 
inequality has not been made a priority. Since 1979 income 
inequality has increased significantly in the UK. This reflects 
both changes in the labour market and in the tax and benefits 
system. 
The value of unemployment related benefits relative to 
average earnings has fallen significantly since the early 1980s. 
In practice the 'unemployment trap' (where income out of work 
might be higher than income in work) only affects a small number 
of specific groups. The main in-work benefit designed to 
alleviate the unemployment trap is Family Credit. Households on 
Family Credit and other means-tested benefits can find themselves 
in the 'poverty trap', where extra earnings produce only limited 
gains in net income. The actual impact of the poverty trap on 
hours worked is hard to discern, but may be small. Given that 
some of the changes in the primary distribution of income are 
ill-understood, a strategy of attempting to offset these changes 
through in-work benefits may be the only viable, second best, 
option. 
The difficulties posed by the ever present trade-offs, the 
complexity of the system, and the uncertainty about the causes 
of the trends in the primary distribution of income, all argue 
for an incremental approach to reform. Uncertainty about the 
exact scale of the disincentive problems also counsels caution. 
In addition there is an argument for not allowing this debate 
over the possible impact of work disincentives to crowd out the 
more fundamental issue for the UK of ensuring that those who are 
not expected to work - the elderly and disabled - and who are 
dependent on state benefits do not get left further behind as 
their benefits are indexed only in line with inflation while the 
real incomes of most of the population increase over time. 
IX 
Industrial policy 
Government policy since 1979 can best be characterised as 
consisting of a clear commitment to the promotion of private 
ownership, product market competition and free trade, tempered 
by a pragmatic approach to providing direct assistance to firms 
when such assistance can be shown to work and provided it does 
not cost too much. It is very difficult to find measures which 
can show how far product market competition has increased since 
1979 but it is possible to infer from the evidence that the UK's 
productivity performance has improved since 1979 that increased 
product market competition has played a role and some limited 
direct evidence exists of the beneficial effects of certain 
policies. 
VI Conclusions 
Given the very wide range of estimates of the natural rate 
of unemployment it would seem unwise to base macroeconomic policy 
on any one estimate of where the NRU might be. Rather 
macroeconomic policy has to be robust to different estimates of 
where the NRU is. In addition the rate at which unemployment 
falls towards the NRU may be important. Rapid reductions in 
unemployment may result in short term capacity constraints or 
skill shortages emerging which can put upward pressure on 
inflation. Putting these two factors together suggests the case 
for a modestly expansionary macroeconomic policy which pushes the 
actual unemployment rate down slowly towards whatever the NRU 
might be. Since 1992 Britain has had just such a modestly 
expansionary policy. 
Even when it is difficult to assess directly the impact of 
some of the supply side reforms, all the structural factors 
relevant to UK economic performance have been moving in the right 
direction. It may be that the combined contribution of some of 
the Government's supply side reforms has been greater than the 
measurable contribution of the individual parts. It is hard to 
believe that the NRU is not lower than in 1979, but it is not 
possible to judge how low it might be. In terms of further 
supply side reform, the uncertainty about where the NRU might be 
coupled with the analysis that all the factors have been moving 
in the right direction should counsel a cautious approach. There 
seems little rationale for further drastic changes. 
A market based economy on its own will almost certainly not 
deliver a desirable outcome in terms of the overall distribution 
of income. The main objective of the tax and benefits system is 
to ensure that those households which have little or no market 
income can nevertheless enjoy a standard of living acceptable to 
society as a whole, and can enjoy rising real incomes along with 
the rest of society. Given the ill-understood nature of the 
increase in wage inequality and the relative weakness of the 
instruments available to directly affect the primary distribution 
such as a minimum wage and training, a strongly redistributive 
tax and benefits system is the only sure instrument available to 
offset these changes in the primary distribution and is the only 
instrument of any relevance to the elderly and disabled on state 
benefits. 
The UK's experience of falling unemployment since 1993 is 
the product of the success of some supply side reforms and of a 
macroeconomic policy which since the end of 1992 has been 
supportive of an expansion in employment. A reasonably 
optimistic assessment would be that by the year 2 000, in the 
absence of any shocks, a continuation of such policies may see 
unemployment in the UK fall on a sustainable basis to around 5-6 
per cent of the workforce. This would be approximately half the 
unemployment rate in 1993, when the European Commission's White 
Paper advocated the objective of halving unemployment in Europe 
by 2000. The UK may well come close to fulfilling that 
objective. One of the main unresolved issues in the UK will be 
how to address the widening gap in the distribution of income 
which emerged in the 198 0s. 
1 
Study on the labour market in the united Kingdom 
Introduction 
This study is one of 15 looking at the labour markets of the 
member states of the EU. The report is structured in order to 
make it comparable with the others. The first section presents 
descriptive material on the evolution of the UK labour market 
since 1979 and an analysis of trends in employment, unemployment 
and earnings. It includes an analysis of estimates of the 
'natural rate of unemployment' and of the role of macroeconomic 
policy. The second section looks at labour market institutions 
in the UK, and at the Government's agenda for the reform of 
industrial relations and the impact of those reforms. The third 
section looks at the impact of legislation relating to individual 
employment rights and minimum wage regulation. The fourth 
section looks at active and passive labour market policy and the 
fifth section at other policies which have an impact on the 
labour market, specifically education and training, the tax and 
benefits system and industrial policy. The final section 
presents some conclusions and discusses the position of the 
'social partners'. 
Three key dimensions of economic performance will be 
influenced to a large extent by the performance of the labour 
market: 
a) The rate of productivity growth (which in turn is a major 
determinant of the underlying rate of economic growth). 
b) The rate of unemployment which can be sustained without 
accelerating inflation. 
c) The distribution of wages (which in turn is a determinant 
of the final distribution of income). 
In practice the first two dimensions of performance are 
often confused in the debate by references to the need to 
maintain 'international competitiveness'1. However, it is 
vitally important to be clear about the precise measurable 
objectives at which policy is aimed, especially given that there 
might well be trade-offs between those objectives, as this study 
makes clear. 
The priority given to these different dimensions of economic 
performance will vary across the political spectrum. Since 1979 
the UK Government has given greatest priority to improving 
productivity growth and to the reduction of inflation. It has 
believed that achieving a low and stable inflation rate will in 
itself lead to a better outcome for the real economy, including 
unemployment. The UK Government has not believed that inequality 
should be addressed through direct intervention in the labour 
market. 
In terms of the instruments of policy, macroeconomic policy 
has in principle been geared solely to the achievement of a low 
rate of inflation. Supply-side policies have been geared to 
improving the efficiency of the labour market with the aim of 
boosting productivity growth on the one hand, and also of 
lowering the sustainable rate of unemployment. A commitment to 
free trade and increased product market competition has been 
geared to the same two objectives. 
The labour market reforms have often been described as 
constituting a policy of 'deregulation' designed to foster a more 
'flexible' labour market. However, it is by no means obvious 
that all labour market policy since 1979 has been in the 
direction of 'deregulation', and the term 'flexibility' is 
frequently used in such a wide context as to render its meaning 
unclear. It should be stressed that in 1979 the UK already had 
a less regulated labour market than many other European 
countries. 
The experience of the UK labour market is perceived to be 
out of line with the experience of other member states of the EU. 
In some respects this is indeed the case and as such this study 
may be particularly illuminating with regard to the debate in the 
EU over the directions in which labour market policy should go. 
The European Council meeting in Essen in December 1994 came 
to a set of conclusions about the action which EU countries 
needed to take if the objective set out in the European 
Commission's White Paper of 1993 to halve unemployment in Europe 
by the year 2 000 was to have any chance of being met2. Five 
areas for action were outlined: 
- promoting investment in vocational education 
- increasing the employment intensity of growth 
- reducing non-wage labour costs 
- improving the effectiveness of labour market policy 
- improving measures to help groups particularly hard hit 
by unemployment. 
In this study public policy in the UK in these areas is 
addressed and in the concluding section some lessons are drawn 
about the appropriateness of these recommendations for policy in 
the UK and indeed in the rest of the EU. 
Labour market analysis and forecasts 
I.1 Demographic and labour force trends 
Demographic trends 
In a strict arithmetic sense labour market outcomes such as 
the rate of unemployment will be affected by demographic trends, 
at least in the short run. It may take time for the labour 
market to react to and absorb a sharp increase in the rate of 
growth of the adult population or changes in the make up of that 
population. However, over time the labour market should adjust 
to such demographic changes.Countries with fast population 
growth (such as the United States, Canada and Australia) tend to 
have more rapid growth in aggregate employment to match. 
The post-1979 recession in Britain coincided with a period 
of quite high natural growth in the adult population (Table 1). 
Between 1979-84 the adult population increased by over 1.5 
million. Employment was falling sharply at this time. In a 
strict arithmetic sense it might seem possible to 'blame' part 
of the increase in unemployment in the early 1980s on these 
demographic trends, though this would be a diversion from asking 
the more fundamental questions to do with why the labour market 
and economic policies were not delivering employment growth. 
The natural rate of increase in the adult population has 
been slowing. In contrast to the annual increase of 0.77 per 
cent between 1979-84, in the period 1990-95 the adult population 
has been growing at only one quarter of that rate (Table 1). 
Women have represented a slightly declining proportion of 
the adult population. Of more interest is the changing age 
distribution, with the sharp decline in the share of the younger 
age groups. In 1984 18.7 per cent of the adult population was 
aged between 16-24. By 1995 the share of the younger age groups 
had fallen to 14.4 per cent. In the late 1980s this so-called 
'demographic time bomb' excited great concern. One fear was that 
the fall in the supply of young labour might push up their wage 
rates and lead to a higher proportion entering directly onto the 
labour market at the age of 16. However, as will be discussed 
in section V.l, the exact opposite happened and educational 
enrolment rates increased sharply. 
It should be noted from Table 1 that it is the prime age 
category (25-49) with the highest attachment to the labour market 
which has seen its share of the total adult population steadily 
rise. 
The trends in Table 1 overwhelmingly reflect changes in the 
natural population. Net migration plays little role in 
explaining demographic trends in Britain (Table 2). Between 
1981-87 there was a positive net migration into the UK of some 
30,000 people annually, equivalent to about 0.05 per cent of the 
total population. Net migration rates ran at half this level 
between 1988-92, though this masks an increase in gross migration 
rates. In terms of destinations, gross flows between Britain and 
the countries of the EU (excluding Ireland) remain only about a 
quarter of the total and are not increasing their share of total 
flows to any great extent. These flows with the rest of the EU 
are still strongly outweighed by those between the UK and the 
Commonwealth. 
Labour force trends 
The strong rate of increase in the adult population in the 
early 1980s meant that the labour force was growing strongly at 
this time when employment was shrinking (Table 3) . In the period 
1984-90 the labour force grew at a slightly faster rate 
reflecting higher labour force participation rates. Between 
1990-93 the labour force actually fell reflecting declining 
labour force participation rates. Since 1993 the growth in the 
labour force has remained muted. 
The proportion of the labour force which is female has been 
on a steadily rising trend over the whole post-war period and 
this continued in the 1980s and 1990s. The fall in the labour 
force share of the younger age groups is more significant than 
their fall in the share of the total adult population reflecting 
increased educational enrolment. 
Labour force participation rates are reported in Figures 1 
and 2. In terms of the overall participation rate there was 
little change between 1979-96. In 1979 about 78 per cent of the 
adult population was active in the labour force and in 1996 this 
figure was largely unchanged. It should be noted that after 1984 
a slightly wider definition of labour force activity was in use. 
This flat overall trend disguises the pro-cyclical nature of 
labour force participation rates. Between 1979 and 1983 the 
overall participation rate fell by just under two percentage 
points. Between 1990 and 1994 the fall in the overall 
participation rate was almost identical. Between 1984 and 1990 
labour force participation rates rose by 2.6 percentage points. 
Comparing peak-to-peak (1979-90) and bearing in mind the slightly 
different measurement of labour force activity in these two 
years, overall labour force participation rates were on a 
slightly upward trend. 
Of course these overall trends also mask significant 
differences by gender. Labour force participation rates for 
women have been on a strongly rising trend over the whole post-
war period. The increase in female participation rates between 
1979-95 reported in Figure 1 does not represent any sharp change 
in trend3. Male participation rates have been on a declining 
trend over the post-war period, but the decline since 1979 has 
been somewhat faster than in earlier decades. 
Both male and female participation rates are pro-cyclical. 
The small decline in female activity rates between 1990-93 is in 
slight contrast with the flat trend between 1979-83. Moreover, 
by 1996 female activity rates had not yet shown any strong signs 
of recovery from their cyclical trough, whereas female activity 
rates were on a firmly rising trend after 1983. The decline in 
male economic activity rates between 1990-94 was slightly less 
than the decline between 1979-83. 
By age group the clearest trend is the sharp decline in the 
participation rates for the younger age groups (Figure 2). This 
started before the recession and mirrors the rise in enrolment 
in full time education which started in 1987-88 at the height of 
the recovery and which is discussed in section V.l. 
Table 4 presents labour force projections covering the 
period 1996-2006. On the critical assumption of no change in 
unemployment, the labour force is projected to grow at a rate of 
0.5 per cent per annum between 1996-2001. This will largely 
reflect growth in the working age population. The overall labour 
force participation rate is expected to increase only marginally 
over the period, masking a further slight fall in male 
participation rates and a modest rise in female activity rates. 
Of course if unemployment fell significantly over this period, 
labour force growth would be higher. Overall these projections 
do not represent any significant change in the underlying trends 
in labour force participation, which is not surprising as by 
definition there are merely extrapolations of past trends. 
I.2 The structure of the workforce 
Employment - Overall trends 
According to the Labour Force Survey (LFS) total employment 
fell by 1.27 million during the recession of 1979-83 (Figure 3). 
Between 1990-93 the fall in absolute employment was even sharper 
at 1.47 million. However, the same source showed an increase in 
employment of 3.32 million between 1983-90. 
These sharp fluctuations in employment are starkly 
illustrated in Figure 3, which also shows the trends in 
employment from the Workforce in Employment series derived from 
employers. Between 1983 and 1992 the aggregate figure from these 
two series matched each other closely, but diverged after 1992, 
with the LFS showing a sharper recovery in employment. The two 
series were also not closely aligned before 1983. Moreover, the 
differences between the two series with respect to aggregate 
levels of employment mask considerable discrepancies with respect 
to various categories of employment. The analysis which follows 
focuses mainly on the LFS as the likely more accurate source, 
except for consideration of regional employment trends where the 
small sample size of the LFS poses problems. 
In itself a measure of total employment is less interesting 
than a focus on employment rates, that is the proportion of the 
adult population in employment, often referred to as the 
employment-population ratio (Figure 4). This allows one to look 
at employment trends in the light of the demographic trends 
discussed in the last section. 
Between 1979-83 the employment rate for all adults of 
working age fell by nearly six percentage points. Between 1990-
93 the fall was just under five percentage points. So on this 
employment measure the early 1990s recession was slightly less 
severe than the early 1980s recession. Over the period 1983-90 
the employment-population ratio rose by over seven percentage 
points, so that peak-to-peak (1979-90), employment rates rose 
marginally. 
Again this masks significant differences by gender. Peak-
to-peak the employment-population ratio for men was on a 
declining trend and the employment-population ratio for women on 
a sharply rising trend. Employment-population ratios are 
significantly higher in the UK than in most of the other member 
states of the EU, with Denmark and Sweden the only clear 
exceptions4. However, this relatively higher employment-
population ratio in the UK was already apparent in 1979. 
Between 1993 and 1996 the employment-population ratio for 
those of working age recovered modestly from 70.4 per cent to 
71.8 per cent. Interestingly this masks a slightly faster 
recovery for men, from 7 5.0 to 7 6.5, than for women, from 65.4 
to 66.7. This means that the female share of total employment 
fell slightly over this period (Table 5). This is in contrast 
to the trend over the period between 1979-93, when the female 
share of total employment rose steadily, though again it must be 
emphasised that this was a continuation of a more or less steady 
post-war trend5. 
Table 5 also shows the sharp decline in the share of the 
younger age groups in total employment after 1988-89. This is 
better illustrated in Figure 5, which shows employment rates by 
age over the period 1984-96. Employment rates rose most sharply 
for the younger age groups between 1984-89, an illustration that 
traditionally employment for these age groups is especially pro-
cyclical, declining most rapidly during recessions but also 
rising most rapidly during recoveries. 
Table 6 shows employment trends in the 11 standard regions 
of the UK. This points out a sharp contrast in the regional bias 
of the recession of the early 1990s when compared with the early 
1980s. Between 1990 and 1993 employment in the South East region 
(including London) fell by over 10 per cent compared with a fall 
of less than four per cent between 1979-83. Employment also fell 
more sharply in the latter recession in the other southern 
regions (the South West and East Anglia) and in the East 
Midlands. By contrast all the other regions saw much sharper 
falls in employment in the early 1980s recession. However, the 
southern regions have seen greater increases in employment again 
since 1993, which is a reversion to the pattern of 1983-90. 
Employment - changes in structure 
It is frequently asserted that a distinctive feature of the 
post-1979 UK labour market is the growth in so-called 'atypical' 
or 'flexible' forms of employment. This is usually defined as 
any kind of job which is not full-time and permanent. As such 
the categorisation is applied to a wide range of disparate forms 
of employment which show different trends over time. Such a 
categorisation is unhelpful and in this section each of the main 
types of 'flexible' employment is assessed separately. 
Figure 6 shows the trend in part-time employment. Over the 
period 1984-96 the share of part-time employment in total 
employment increased from 2 0.5 per cent to 2 4.9 per cent. Nearly 
all of this growth in share occured during the recession, 1990-
93, and reflected the loss of full-time jobs. During the period 
1984-9 0 the share of part-time employment rose by only one 
percentage point. In the early stages of recovery between 1993 
and 19 9 6 the share of part-time employment showed a modest upward 
movement. 
The increase in the share of part-time employment over the 
period 1984-96 was not out of line with post-war experience6. 
The share of part-time employment has been rising steadily since 
1951, when it stood at just four per cent of total employment. 
By 1961 this had risen to nine per cent, by 1971 to 16 per cent, 
and 19 per cent by 1981. The fastest rate of growth occured in 
the 1960s when the share rose by seven percentage points, 
compared with the increase of just over four percentage points 
shown in Figure 6 over the period 1984-96. 
This steady increase in the share of part-time employment 
over the post-war period largely reflects the growth in female 
labour force participation. Figure 6 shows that between 1984-96 
the proportion of all women working part-time did not change 
significantly. However, the proportion of all men working part-
time more than doubled, with most of this occurring since 1991. 
Overall then, the increase in the share of part-time employment 
between 1984-96 is a function of more women entering employment, 
but with no change in the propensity of women to work part-time, 
and a rising incidence of part-time working amongst men, with the 
first of those factors being of more importance. 
Most part-time work is voluntarily entered into, with only 
13 per cent of those in part-time employment in 1996 saying that 
this was because they could not find full-time work. However, 
the incidence of involuntary part-time work has increased since 
1990 and this is discussed further below. Part-time employment 
has long represented a higher share of total employment in the 
UK than in most other EU countries, but the incidence of 
involuntary part-time employment as a proportion of the labour 
force has not been higher7. 
Between 1984 and 1991 there was no increase in the 
proportion of employees in temporary jobs (Figure 7). Between 
1991 and 1996 there was an increase in the share of temporary 
employment, from 5.3 per cent of all employees to 7.1 per cent. 
There is no information on temporary employment before 1984, so 
that it is not possible to know whether there was a similar 
increase in the share of temporary employment in the early 1980s. 
It is also not possible to know whether this trend will continue 
or is a one off, though by 1996 the growth in temporary 
employment appeared to be slowing down. 
The increase since 1991 has been particularly sharp amongst 
men (Figure 7) where the share of temporary employment has 
increased from 3.9 per cent of all employees in 1991 to 6.0 per 
cent in 1996. The growth in temporary employment for female 
employees came later and has been more muted. As a result 
whereas in 1991 there was a much higher incidence of temporary 
employment amongst women employees, by 1996 the gender gap was 
much narrower. 
The growth in temporary employment which occured between 
1991-96 was concentrated in manufacturing, business services and 
especially the public services sector of the economy. 
Manufacturers may have responded cautiously to the economic 
recovery, preferring to recruit workers on fixed term contracts 
rather than take on permanent staff. Within the public sector, 
schools and health service trusts have been given greater freedom 
to determine their own recruitment practices at a time of budget 
constraints. Many seem to have responded by expanding their use 
of fixed term contracts. In business services the increase 
reflects the greater use of agencies to provide clerical staff. 
The share of temporary employment in the UK in 1994 was 
still low in comparison with other EU nations despite the UK 
having a relatively deregulated labour market8. The United 
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States too has a relatively deregulated labour market and also 
has a very low incidence of temporary employment. This apparent 
paradox is discussed further in section III.2. 
The only sharp break in trend in the structure of employment 
in Britain after 1979 was the sharp increase in the share of 
self-employment (Figure 8) . This share had been broadly flat 
over the post-war period, but between 1979 and 1984 the share of 
sei f-employment rose from 7.3 per cent of total employment to 11 
per cent. This share had increased further to 13.1 per cent by 
1989. However, in the recession the share of self-employment 
fell slightly and has been flat since. It is too early to say 
whether the rise in the share of self-employment has come to a 
halt, though 1989-90 may represent another break in trend. 
It is not clear that the rise over the period 1979-89 was 
largely the result of Government policies designed to encourage 
'enterprise' (see section V.3). The biggest increase occured 
during the recession between 1979-83 before specific Government 
policies could have had any significant effect. 
A more fruitful avenue of approach might be to look at the 
sectors where self-employment has increased. The construction 
industry accounted for about one-third of the increase in self 
employment in the 1980s and more than two-fifths of the decline 
between 1990-93. The relatively depressed state of the 
construction industry in the period from 1993-96 may help account 
for the flat trend in sei f-employment in that period. The 
decline after 1990 was also disproportionately concentrated in 
the distribution, hotels and catering sector. In the 1980s the 
incidence of seif-employment rose in nearly all industries. 
Since 1990 the incidence of self-employment has stopped rising 
in nearly all industries. 
Table 7 shows the changes in the industrial structure of 
employment since 1979, utilising the Labour Force Survey from 
1984, but the workforce in employment series before this . The 
distinguishing feature of the period from 1979-84 was the 
unprecedented and precipitous decline in the share of 
manufacturing employment from 29.5 per cent of the total to 23.5 
per cent. It was this sector which suffered disproportionately 
from employment loss during the early 1980s recession. Between 
1984-90 manufacturing continued to lose share but at a much 
reduced rate and, significantly, this rate of decline did not 
pick up in the period after 1990. This less sharp fall in 
manufacturing employment in the early 1990s is another sharp 
contrast between the two recessions. It is the construction 
sector which lost share in this last period when compared with 
the 198 0s. The share of employment in the primary industries has 
been declining steadily. 
The 'service' sector has increased its share of employment 
from under 60 per cent of all employment in 1979 to over 70 per 
cent in 1996. However, this sector is so diverse that to refer 
to it as a whole is not very illuminating. It is the business 
and financial services sector which has increased its share most 
sharply with the share doubling between 1979 and 1996. There has 
also been strong growth in the share of the public and social 
services. However, the share of the distribution, hotels and 
catering and the transport and communications industries, having 
grown modestly between 1979-84, has been flat since. 
Critically then the growth in service sector employment has 
been concentrated in those parts of the services sector where 
relatively well paid managerial, professional and technical jobs 
are concentrated (business and financial and public and social 
services) and not in the sector where less skilled and lower paid 
service jobs are concentrated (distribution, hotels and 
catering). For example, within the public and social services 
sector (including health and education) three-fifths of the net 
gain in employment between 1981-91 was in the managerial, 
professional and technical occupations. So the shift from 
manufacturing to 'services' has been associated overall with a 
net gain in employment in the higher occupations. 
This is illustrated in Table 8 which outlines changes in the 
occupational structure of employment. This analysis is 
complicated by the change to the occupational classification of 
employment in 1991. A consistent time series covering the period 
1984-96 can be constructed, but the data from 1979 can only be 
partially matched to the new classification. 
The overall pattern is easy to discern. A decline in the 
proportion of jobs falling into the manual category and a rise 
in the proportion of jobs falling into the managerial, 
professional and technical category. The share of employment 
falling into the middle 'service' category shows a modest rise, 
with some decline in the share of routine clerical and 
secretarial jobs offset by a significant increase in the share 
of the personal services sector covering such jobs as care 
assistants and hairdressers. These are the only less skilled 
occupations to have increased their share, and mainly since 1990. 
It is not the case therefore that less well paid 'service' jobs 
have dramatically increased their share of total employment. 
Rather the main trend is the sharp increase in the share of the 
top managerial, professional and technical occupations. 
Within the manual occupations the three categories in Table 
8 roughly coincide with the distinction between the skilled 
manual (craft), semi-skilled manual (operatives) and unskilled 
manual (other) occupations. Table 8 shows that the decline in 
the share of skilled manual (craft) employment has since 1984, 
and especially since 1990, been more rapid than the decline in 
the share of unskilled manual (other) employment. The share of 
semi-skilled manual (operatives) occupations has declined more 
slowly. Observers often talk about the decline in 'unskilled' 
employment. In occupational terms this is strictly incorrect. 
Rather there has been a decline in the share of 'manual' 
employment with skilled manual employment declining at least as 
fast as unskilled manual employment. 
This is part of an ongoing trend. The share of manual 
employment has been on a declining trend and the share of 
managerial, professional and technical employment on a rising 
trend over the whole post-war period10. There is no evidence 
that this shift has accelerated. Neither is there any evidence 
that the shifts in the industrial structure of employment have 
accelerated, with the exception of the one-off shock to 
manufacturing employment in the early 1980s. In 1979 it could 
have been argued that Britain was out of line in having an 
abnormally high share of employment in manufacturing, reflecting 
over-manning. With employment in this sector having by the early 
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1990s converged on the OECD average there was less scope for 
further dramatic shifts in the industrial structure of 
employment. 
Employment - the implications of changes for the demand for 
qualifications 
The ongoing shift in employment away from the manual 
occupations primarily to the managerial, professional and 
technical occupations unambiguously implies an increase in the 
demand for skills, for which in most occupations, education 
qualifications provide the necessary formal basis. Manual jobs 
have a much lower demand for formal qualifications than the 
managerial, professional or technical jobs which have largely 
been replacing them. How has the increase in the attainment of 
qualifications by the adult population compared? 
Table 9 reports the highest qualifications held by the 
population of working age in 1984, 1989 and 1995. Over time the 
working age population becomes better qualified primarily as 
older less well qualified people leave this population and are 
replaced by younger age groups which increasingly hold better 
formal qualifications. The changes over a decade outlined in 
Table 9 are very substantial. Between 1984 and 1989 the 
proportion of the working age population without any 
qualifications fell from 40 per cent of the total to 32 per cent. 
Over the next six years the proportion fell more sharply to just 
21 per cent. The proportion of the working age population 
lacking any qualifications approximately halved in the space of 
about one decade. 
Between 1984 and 1989 most of the growth in the holding of 
formal qualifications occured for various types of intermediate 
qualifications, including lower level and intermediate vocational 
qualifications and 0 level and A level qualifications. These 
different qualifications are discussed in section V.l. In the 
second period, 1989-95, there has been much stronger growth in 
the share of higher education qualifications. Over the whole 
period the share of these higher qualifications has increased by 
over three-fifths. 
Table 10 reports the highest qualifications held by employed 
people of working age. The better educated groups make up a much 
higher proportion in this table reflecting the lower labour force 
participation rates and higher unemployment rates amongst the 
less well qualified. The same trends over time are observed in 
terms of the growing share of those with higher and a range of 
other qualifications and the very sharp fall in the proportion 
of the employed workforce who are unqualified, down from 3 5.2 per 
cent in 1984 to 15.6 per cent in 1995. 
Table 11 presents the results of a simple shift-share 
analysis designed to see how far this increase in the share of 
better qualified people in the employed workforce reflects the 
changes in the occupational structure of employment outlined in 
Table 811. This is done by holding constant the share of 
different qualifications within each occupation at their 1984 
levels and then multiplying these shares by the change in the 
structure of employment over the period 1984-94. The growth in 
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the managerial, professional and technical occupations would in 
itself have required only an extra three percentage points of the 
workforce to hold higher qualifications by 1994 (compare the 
first and second columns of Table 11). In fact the proportion 
increased by eight percentage points. The decline in the manual 
occupations would have required only three percentage points less 
of the workforce to be unqualified. In fact the proportion fell 
by 18 percentage points. 
This analysis makes the point that only a small part of the 
increase in the holding of formal qualifications can be accounted 
for by changes in the occupational structure of employment. Most 
of the increase in the holding of qualifications has occured 
within each occupation. Moreover, this increase in the holding 
of qualifications within each occupation has occured in a very 
predictable fashion, with the growth broadly proportionate to the 
holding of qualifications within each occupation in 1984. 
Table 11 leaves the impression that the increased holding 
of qualifications within the UK workforce has more than kept pace 
with changes in the demand for qualifications brought about by 
the changing occupational structure of employment. This seems 
to contrast with the messages coming from some analyses of trends 
in unemployment and wage inequality and these contrasts are 
explored in the next section and in section 1.4. 
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Unemployment - measurement and overall trends since 1979 
In 1979 the unemployment rate in Britain, as measured by the 
number of people registered for unemployment benefit, consistent 
with current coverage, stood at four per cent of the workforce 
(Figure 9) . In the first half of 1996 the claimant unemployment 
rate stood at just under eight per cent of the workforce, double 
the level 17 years earlier. 
Between these two dates the claimant unemployment rate has 
fluctuated from a peak of 11 per cent in 1986 to a trough of just 
over 5 per cent in 1990 to another peak of just over 10 per cent 
at the start of 1993. These fluctuations in unemployment (and 
the associated fluctuations in output) have been sharper than in 
most other industrialised countries, reflecting the UK experience 
of two very sharp recessions punctuated by a very sharp recovery 
in the second half of the 1980s. 
Figure 9 also contains an alternative measure of 
unemployment drawn from the Labour Force Survey. Since 198 4 this 
measure has conformed with the ILO definition of unemployment, 
that is anyone who is not employed, has searched for work in the 
last four weeks and is ready to start employment within two 
weeks. 
This measure of unemployment has been consistently above the 
claimant count measure for the whole of this period, with the 
exceptions of the peaks in unemployment in 198 6 and 1993 when the 
two measures were almost identical. 
In fact the two series seem to follow a stable pattern 
between these two dates consistent with an added worker/ 
discouraged worker effect. During the upswing between 19 8 6 and 
1990, the claimant count fell faster than the ILO measure, 
because the sharp improvement in employment prospects brought 
more people back into active job search in the labour market thus 
swelling the ILO measure. During the recession, 1990-93, the 
deteriorating employment situation resulted in some discouraged 
jobseekers giving up active job search so that the ILO measure 
rose less sharply than the claimant count. The assessment of the 
relationship between these two measures in the early 1980s is 
problematic because of the different measure of unemployment used 
in the LFS before 1984. However, the differential between the 
two series appeared to narrow between 1979 and 1984 in a manner 
consistent with the pattern observed between 1990 and 1993. 
Since 1979 a number of changes have been made to the 
calculation of the claimant count which have undermined 
confidence in it as an accurate measure of the level of 
unemployment12. The claimant count series used in Figure 9 
represents the attempts of Government statisticians to produce 
a consistent series which takes all the changes into account. 
As its relationship with the ILO measure appears consistent and 
as both measures show the same trend in unemployment through time 
the adjusted claimant count seems to remain a perfectly useful 
measure from the point of view of analysing labour market trends. 
Giving greater prominence to a measure of unemployment based 
on the LFS would raise a very important policy issue. During the 
immediate post-war period the level of frictional unemployment 
considered compatible with full employment was often said to be 
in the range of 2-3 per cent, as defined by the claimant count. 
However, Figure 9 makes it clear that a claimant count figure at 
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this level would be compatible with an unemployment rate as 
measured by the LFS which was much higher, at perhaps 4-5 per 
cent or so, reflecting the fact that at full employment the LFS 
measure would be swelled by many non-claimants attracted by 
better employment prospects to engage in active search in the 
labour market. In 1979 a claimant unemployment rate of four per 
cent was accompanied by an LFS unemployment rate of 5.7 per cent. 
At the cyclical peak in 1990 the gap between the two figures was 
also in the order of 1.5 percentage points. Giving greater 
prominence to the LFS measure of unemployment would alter the 
acceptable benchmark for the full employment rate of 
unemployment. 
A great deal has been made of what appears to be a much 
shorter lag between the recovery from recession in 1992 and the 
fall in unemployment after 1993, when compared with the recovery 
from the recession of the early 1980s when it was not until 1986 
that the claimant count began falling. This has been ascribed 
to the enhanced 'flexibility' of the UK labour market. Between 
1994 and 1996 employment increased at an annual rate of one 
percent, compared with a annual rate of increase of 1.7 per cent 
between 19 8 3 and 1985, so that in employment terms the recovery 
in the 1990s has been weaker not stronger (Table 5 and Figure 3). 
However, between 1983-85 the labour force was on a strongly 
upward trend with labour force participation rates rising, 
compared with muted labour force growth and a rather flat trend 
in participation rates between 1994-96 (Table 3 and Figure 1). 
It is these differences in labour force trends which seem to 
account for the earlier downturn in unemployment after 1993. 
There is some evidence that employment does now respond more 
quickly to output, with the lag down to one year or less13. 
This again is explained rather vaguely by reference to greater 
labour market 'flexibility'. More plausibly the longer lag in 
evidence before 1979 was probably related to the expectations of 
employers that recessions were generally short-lived, so that 
hoarding labour in expectation of an upturn made sense. The 
early 1980s recession blew away the rationale for such behaviour. 
Employers now adjust labour more quickly to changes in output 
possibly out of fear of holding on to labour when a recession 
could last for many quarters. As a response to the experience 
of two sharp recessions this does not seem irrational. However, 
it means that employers have to recruit again a little more 
quickly when a recovery does arrive. 
Unemployment - incidence across groups 
The claimant count and Labour Force Survey measures of 
unemployment have different strengths and weaknesses. One 
advantage of the LFS measure is that it gives a clearer picture 
of unemployment rates by gender, as the claimant count excludes 
a large number of women who are actively searching for work but 
who are not entitled to claim benefit. Figure 10 is complicated 
by the discontinuity introduced in 1984 by the shift to the ILO 
criteria for determining the level of unemployment as reported 
in the LFS. Nevertheless, a striking fact is that in 1979 the 
LFS measure of unemployment showed the female unemployment rate 
to be higher than the male unemployment rate. 
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The early 1980s recession lead to disproportionate job 
losses in the male dominated industries, especially 
manufacturing, so that by 1984 male rates of unemployment were, 
on the new ILO measure, marginally higher. However, the 
differences between the male and female unemployment rates were 
modest up until 1990, at which point they diverged significantly. 
The pattern of job loss in the early 1990s was again concentrated 
in male dominated industries such as construction. However, the 
very modest rise in female unemployment rates in the early 1990s 
seems to have much to do with the different demographic and 
labour force trends discussed earlier. That is to say that a 
high rate of increase in the female labour force in the context 
of falling employment was a key factor leading to the sharp 
increase in female unemployment rates in the early 1980s. These 
demographic and labour force trends were of lesser importance in 
the early 1990s. 
Figure 11 reports unemployment rates by age. The main point 
to note is the higher unemployment rates experienced by the 
younger age groups, but also the pronounced cyclicality of 
unemployment rates for these age groups. Their unemployment 
rates decline most quickly during recoveries (1984-89) but rise 
most quickly during recessions (1990-93). However, the 
reliability of the ILO unemployment rate as a measure of the 
unemployment rate for the youngest age group (16-19) is 
questionable. In Figure 2 it was observed that the labour force 
participation rates for this age group had declined sharply since 
the late 1980s as a result of increased educational enrolment. 
Thus the denominator for the calculation of the ILO unemployment 
rate has shrunk, which for any given proportion of the total age 
group out of work will imply an increase in the ILO unemployment 
rate. Moreover, by Spring 1996 one-third of those 16-19 year 
olds classified as ILO unemployed were full-time students looking 
for part time jobs, which does not perhaps represent the same 
social problem as individuals who are not involved in any kind 
of further education, training or employment. This issue is 
explored further in section V.l. 
Long-term unemployment (typically defined as a duration of 
unemployment of over one year) is a particularly important issue 
across the European Union. This is motivated by obvious concern 
for the social and personal costs associated with long periods 
of joblessness. It is also motivated by a belief that the long-
term unemployed face particular problems in re-gaining access to 
employment. It has been argued that a period of prolonged 
joblessness results in an individual losing motivation and 
skills. The long-term unemployed may also face discrimination 
in the recruitment process. As a result the long-term unemployed 
may become disconnected from the labour market and play no role 
in terms of placing downward pressure on wage inflation. A high 
level of long-term unemployment can then have adverse 
macroeconomic consequences worsening the trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation14. 
Figure 12 reports the trend in the long-term unemployment 
ratio, that is the proportion of all the unemployed who are out 
of work for over one year, from the LFS and the claimant count 
over the period since 1979. The long-term unemployment ratio is 
generally higher on the LFS measure, though between 1987 and 1991 
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the two measures are very close. 
What is striking is the clear cyclical nature of this ratio. 
During the first year of a recession (1979-80 and 1990-91) the 
ratio falls as large numbers of people flow into unemployment 
thus swelling the ranks of the short-term unemployed. However, 
after this first year the long-term unemployment ratio climbs 
steeply. It continues to climb during the first year of the fall 
in unemployment (1986-87, though not for the LFS measure, and 
1993-94) and then falls quickly. Or to put it another way, 
during periods of sustained falls in unemployment long-term 
unemployment falls faster than short-term unemployment so that 
the long-term unemployment ratio falls. 
Figure 13 plots the long-term unemployment rate as a 
proportion of the labour force against the aggregate unemployment 
rate. In 1986-87 and again in 1993-94 the long-term unemployment 
rate fell just as soon as the aggregate unemployment rate fell. 
There was no significant lag and the long-term unemployment rate 
was on a firmly downward path as soon as there was any 
improvement in the aggregate labour market. In fact the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the long-term 
unemployment rate reported in Figure 13 is almost a linear one. 
When unemployment rises long-term unemployment rises. When 
unemployment falls long-term unemployment falls. It does not 
seem that long-term unemployment represents any special case in 
the sense that a recovery in employment passes the long-term 
unemployed by. 
The sharp fall in unemployment and in long-term unemployment 
in the late 1980s took many people by surprise. The fall in 
long-term unemployment was the result both of a reduced inflow 
into long-term unemployment as fewer people became long-term 
unemployed and also a sharply increased outflow from long-term 
unemployment15. Part of this fall might have been the result of 
certain labour market measures (discussed in sections IV. 2 and 
IV. 3) introduced from 198 6, though the main part of it reflected 
the improvement in the aggregate labour market. The consistency 
of the relationship between the unemployment and the long-term 
unemployment rates before and after 1986 outlined in Figure 13 
argues for the importance of the aggregate labour market in 
determining long-term unemployment16. 
Unemployment amongst the ethnic minority population in the 
UK has generally been much higher than for the majority 
population (Figure 14) . Like youth unemployment it is also much 
more pro-cyclical. During recessions (1974-76, 1979-84, 1990-93) 
ethnic unemployment rates rise faster than unemployment rates for 
whites and the two series in Figure 14 diverge significantly. 
But during recoveries (1976-79, 1984-90) ethnic unemployment 
rates fall faster and the two series converge. This may now be 
happening in the current recovery (199 3-96). Ethnic unemployment 
rates respond especially sensitively to the aggregate 
unemployment rate. At times of full employment (197 3-74) the 
differences in unemployment rates disappear and racial 
disadvantage is manifested in other ways, most notably in the gap 
in earnings between men of ethnic origin and their white 
counterparts17. 
In the 1980s there was much concern about the uneven 
regional spread of unemployment (Table 12) . This not only 
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reflected concerns over equity but the fear that there might be 
consequences for inflation if unemployment rates fell to low 
levels in some regions while in other regions unemployment 
remained high. Historically, the ranking of the regions in the 
UK by unemployment rates has been stable, with unemployment lower 
in the southern regions of England and higher in the northern 
regions and in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
It is not clear whether an assessment of the size of the 
differences in regional unemployment rates should focus on the 
absolute differences in the unemployment rates between regions 
or the ratio of unemployment rates. Table 12 reports both the 
absolute differences between the unemployment rates of the two 
regions with the highest and lowest unemployment rates 
respectively and the ratio of those rates. Comparisons between 
years with a similar national unemployment rate are most useful, 
so the regional unemployment rates in 1981 and 1988 are reported 
to compare with 1995. 
Between 1979 and 1986 absolute differences in unemployment 
rates widened but the ratio fell. By 1990 it seems clear that 
regional unemployment rate differentials had widened. This is 
seen most clearly by comparing 1981 with 1988 when the national 
unemployment rates were almost identical. In 1988 on both 
measures regional unemployment differentials had widened. 
However, in the early 1990s recession these differentials 
narrowed significantly as the recession impacted especially hard 
on the southern regions of England. A comparison of 1995 with 
1988 or 1981 reveals a much narrower dispersion of regional 
unemployment rates. Of particular note is the fall in 
unemployment in Northern Ireland between 1990 and 1995, and the 
rates in Scotland and Wales being close to the national average 
by 1995. In the first half of the 1990s regional differences in 
unemployment rates were narrower than at any time in the last 7 0 
years18. 
This focus on regional unemployment is not necessarily very 
helpful. Intra-regional unemployment rates are much more uneven 
than inter-regional rates and a more useful concept than any 
'North-South' divide is the urban-rural divide between those 
local labour markets in urban areas where unemployment is heavily 
concentrated and the local labour markets away from the major 
conurbations where unemployment is relatively lower19. This 
division occurs within all regions. Moreover, the high 
unemployment areas are not correctly described as 'inner-city' 
as many of the heaviest concentrations of unemployment occur on 
the peripheries of major conurbations. 
There is considerable concern about the position of less 
well qualified people in the labour market, following on from the 
decline in manual employment outlined earlier. It is believed 
that unemployment has become much more concentrated on the less 
well qualified. Table 13 reports the distribution of 
unemployment by qualification group over the period 1984-95. 
Whereas in 1984 nearly half the unemployed were wholly 
unqualified, by 1995 this had fallen to just over one quarter. 
At the same time the proportion of the unemployed holding some 
form of higher education or Α-level or equivalent qualifications 
increased from just under one quarter in 1984 to over one third 
in 1995. 
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These changes of course mirror the changes in the 
qualifications held by the working age population outlined in 
Table 9. Table 14 reports unemployment rates by highest 
qualification held. Looking at either the ratio of the 
unemployment rates between those with no qualifications and those 
with higher education, or the absolute differences in the 
unemployment rates, there is no sign of any significant 
deterioration in the relative unemployment rates of the 
unqualified over this period. 
Table 15 reports the results from a slightly longer time 
series drawn from the General Household Survey. An assessment 
of the relative position of the less well qualified is sensitive 
to the time period chosen, to the database used, to how 
qualification categories are arrived at, and to whether one looks 
at the ratio of unemployment rates or the absolute differences. 
Comparing 1983-86 with 1991-93 in Table 15 reveals no 
deterioration in the relative position of less well qualified 
men. Whether their position has deteriorated between the mid-
1970s and the early 1990s depends on whether one focuses on the 
ratio of, or the absolute differences between, the unemployment 
rates of the different qualification groups. 
Unemployment - Its adequacy as a measure of labour market 
slack. 
There is some concern that regular measures of unemployment, 
whether the claimant count or the ILO measure derived from the 
LFS, may understate the true amount of un-utilised or under-
utilised labour. 
Figure 15 shows the trend in the ILO unemployment rate over 
the period 1984-96 along with two extra indicators. These are 
the number of discouraged workers (defined as those who say they 
want a job but have not looked for one in the last four weeks 
because they believe none are available) and the number of part-
time workers who say that they are working part-time because they 
are unable to find a full-time job. Both are expressed as a 
proportion of the total labour force. 
The incidence of discouraged workers in Britain is low by 
international standards at consistently less than one per cent 
of the labour force20. The incidence of discouraged workers has 
declined over the period. It is also counter-cyclical in the 
same way as the ILO unemployment rate. The incidence of 
involuntary part-time employment in the UK is significantly 
higher than the incidence of discouraged workers though not out 
of line with the experience of other countries. Its incidence 
is also counter-cyclical but the level of involuntary part-time 
employment has risen over the period, from just over one-and-a-
half per cent of the labour force in 1984 to nearly 3 per cent 
of the labour force in 1996. However, the addition of these two 
measures does not alter the trend in unemployment/underemployment 
over this period. 
A key factor in assessing the problem of involuntary part-
time (or temporary) employment is to consider where these forms 
of employment lead. If they are stepping stones to more 
acceptable forms of employment, voluntarily entered into, then 
this makes their existence less troublesome than if individuals 
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fail to escape this status and remain in forms of employment 
which they do not consider optimal, or indeed proceed from part-
time or temporary jobs back into unemployment. The OECD has 
suggested on the basis of research in other countries that 
involuntary part-time employment is often a stepping stone to 
more acceptable forms of employment21. Research on these issues 
in the UK is still at an early stage. However, the OECD has 
reported data from the British Household Panel Survey which 
suggests that of those employed on a temporary basis in 1991, by 
1993 only 29 per cent were still in temporary jobs while 39 per 
cent had moved into permanent jobs22. 
Many observers have argued for looking at the non-employment 
rate, which is the obverse of the employment rate reported in 
Figure 4, as a better measure of labour slack. Others have 
argued for looking at the pattern of work across households 
rather than focusing solely on individual employment and 
unemployment rates23. 
Figure 16 brings together three series - the standard ILO 
unemployment rate, the non-employment rate and the workless 
household rate. The last is a measure of the proportion of all 
households where no adult is in work. 
The workless household rate fell between 1987 and 1990 in 
the context of a significant tightening of the aggregate labour 
market. However, the increase in the workless household rate 
between 1987 and 1993, when the ILO unemployment rate was 
approximately the same at these two points in time, might suggest 
that the distribution of work has become polarised between these 
'work-poor' households and the growing number of 'work-rich' two-
earner households. In fact this rise in the incidence of 
workless households between these two dates is largely a 
compositional effect to do with the rise in the proportion of 
single adult households which have an especially high incidence 
of joblessness. The rise in the incidence of worklessness 
amongst different types of households was largely confined to the 
period between 1979 and 1983 and is thus coincidental with the 
recession. The rise in the proportion of two-earner households 
is ongoing and reflects the growing rate of female labour force 
participation over the post war period. However, this focus on 
workless households does put a spotlight on the role of the 
possible disincentives created by the benefits system for the 
partners of unemployed people and this is explored further in 
section V.2. 
Those who focus on the non-employment rate, which brings 
together the unemployed with the inactive, appear to be 
suggesting that all the inactive should be considered to 
represent a form of unutilised labour equivalent to those 
recorded as ILO unemployed. This is in spite of the observation 
that most of the inactive in the LFS report that they do not want 
a job. Most inactivity is voluntary, whereas by definition ILO 
unemployment is involuntary in that people have reported that 
they want a job and are looking for one. There is a large 
intermediate category of inactive individuals who say that they 
want a job but are not looking for one. Discouraged workers, 
defined above, are only a small part of this category. The 
largest group are women who say that they are looking after the 
home and would like a job but have not looked for one. The 
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second largest group are men and women who say that they are long 
term sick and disabled and would like a job but have not looked 
for one. 
This latter group has received considerable attention24. A 
significant part of the trend fall in labour force participation 
rates amongst men reported in Figure 1 is due to an increase in 
inactivity due to sickness or disability. Table 16 shows this 
increase in inactivity for men aged 25-54 between the dates of 
the Censuses of 1971, 1981 and 1991. Between 1981-91, three-
quarters of the increase in male inactivity was due to sickness 
and disability. However, Table 16 also reveals a similar 
increase in inactivity due to sickness and disability amongst 
women, a trend disguised by the overall rise in female labour 
force participation rates. How far this increased inactivity is 
a response to changes in labour market conditions, easier 
entitlement to benefits and a more relaxed interpretation of the 
rules on what defines long term sickness and disability, and a 
genuine increase in sickness and disability, is discussed further 
in section IV.1. 
As discussed earlier, during periods of declining 
(increasing) aggregate unemployment inactivity rates fall (rise) 
as workers are added to (discouraged from) participation in the 
labour market. The overall non-employment rate follows the 
aggregate unemployment rate in a very predictable manner across 
the cycle (Figure 16) . This suggests that looking at the overall 
non-employment rate adds little to our understanding of the trend 
in the overall level of joblessness. As to the level of 
unemployment it does not seem helpful to add to ILO unemployment 
every form of economic inactivity. The virtue of the ILO 
unemployment rate is that it is based on an internationally 
agreed definition of unemployment and conforms closely to the 
notion of involuntary unemployment. Many categories of 
inactivity are voluntary states and others represent only 
marginal attachment to the labour force. On the other hand 
investigation of inactivity amongst certain sub-groups, such as 
the long term sick and disabled, do raise legitimate issues of 
social concern. 
Unemployment - conclusions 
The ILO unemployment rate derived from the LFS seems an 
adequate measure of involuntary unemployment, though analysis of 
some forms of inactivity are complimentary to a focus on the ILO 
measure. This measure and the claimant count (consistent with 
current coverage) seem to move over time in a predictable fashion 
consistent with an added/discouraged worker effect. 
When aggregate unemployment as measured by the claimant 
count or the LFS measure, is on a firmly downward (upward) trend 
all the other measures of un- or underemployment are also on a 
firmly downward (upward) trend. Most significantly, when 
aggregate unemployment is on a firmly downward trend the 
unemployment rates for all the most disadvantaged groups in the 
labour market also fall, at rate which is at least as fast. The 
argument that there is some asymmetry in that unemployment rates 
for disadvantaged groups rise sharply in recessions but do not 
decline in the same way during recoveries is not borne out by the 
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evidence in the UK. This applies to youth unemployment, ethnic 
unemployment and most notably to long-term unemployment. If we 
could be confident that aggregate unemployment could be reduced 
to a reasonably low level we could be reassured that unemployment 
rates amongst these disadvantaged groups would also fall 
significantly. If aggregate unemployment does not fall then 
further special assistance would be required for these groups. 
I.3 Main trends in job creation and job loss 
The main trends in employment and the issue of job 
insecurity 
Table 17 presents a summary of the changes in the 
composition of employment in Britain over the period 1979-96. 
Data from 1979 is incomplete. Table 17 illustrates the rapid 
growth in the share of self-employment in the early 1980s and the 
more modest trend since. It shows the steady rise in the share 
of part-time employment, with most of the increase since 1985 
consisting of permanent part-time employment. It shows the 
decline in the share of full-time employees which was 
concentrated in the early 1980s, with some growth in the share 
of full-time temporary employment in more recent years. Most 
importantly it shows that the decline in the share of employment 
for full-time employees was sharpest in the early 1980s, since 
when the rate of change has been more modest. 
In the public debate in the UK a great deal of attention is 
placed on the alleged widespread 'collapse' of permanent or 
lifetime employment. The evidence does not really sustain this 
assertion. Table 18 reports the length of time that employees 
of working age had spent in their job at the time of interview 
over the period 1975-93. Over this period of time there has been 
a decline in the average job tenure of men, but a slight increase 
in the average job tenure of women. Much of the secular change 
for men is associated with the effects of the 1979-83 recession 
which saw the elimination of many long-tenure manual jobs in 
manufacturing. By contrast, the early 1990s recession did not 
see any further decline in average job tenure. This evidence 
from the Labour Force Survey is backed up by evidence drawn from 
the General Household Survey25. Although the changes in the 
average tenure of employment have been modest, this average 
conceals a deterioration in the stability of employment for low 
paid men in the labour market. 
The changes which have occured in the duration of employment 
are connected to the changing composition of employment outlined 
in Table 17. Table 19 reports the duration of different forms 
of employment. All forms of employment other than full-time 
permanent jobs have a shorter average duration. Within any 
particular type of employment the differences in average job 
tenure between men and women are modest, with the exception of 
part-time permanent employment where women have a significantly 
higher average tenure, and full-time seif-employment where the 
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reverse is true. The shorter average duration of employment for 
women is primarily a function of their greater concentration in 
part-time jobs. Figure 6 showed that the proportion of all women 
in employment working part-time had not increased and this is 
consistent with the absence of any significant change in the 
average duration of employment for women. 
The analysis presented so far does not seem to provide much 
evidence for why there was in Britain in the mid-1990s so much 
commentary about the existence of greater job insecurity when 
compared with the mid-1980s or earlier periods. Many of the more 
traumatic changes in employment took place in the early 1980s and 
the changes since this time have been more modest. Greater 
instability in employment seems confined more to the bottom end 
of the labour market. 
Table 2 0 presents estimates of the proportion of the working 
age population who made at least one claim for unemployment 
related benefits over the period 1985-95. It thus gives some 
idea of the proportion of the population touched by some direct 
experience of unemployment. Again there is no obvious trend 
towards a significantly greater proportion of the working age 
population experiencing spells of unemployment. The direct 
experience of unemployment remains confined to just over one 
quarter of the working age population. 
The relationship between unemployment and vacancies 
The number of unfilled vacancies is often taken as an 
indicator of the level of labour demand and the relationship 
between vacancies and unemployment as an indication of the level 
of structural unemployment. This is formalised in terms of a 
'Beveridge curve' and the relationship between unemployment and 
vacancies for the UK over the period 1979-95 is shown in Figure 
17. 
This Figure is hard to interpret. In the early 1980s 
recession the vacancy rate (the number of unfilled vacancies 
expressed, like the unemployment rate, as a proportion of the 
workforce) fell sharply as unemployment increased rapidly. As 
soon as output began to recover (1982-83) so did the vacancy 
rate. By 1986 the vacancy rate had risen significantly even 
though unemployment remained on an upward trend. It was 
suggested that the 'Beveridge curve' had shifted outward so that 
a given level of unfilled vacancies (said to proxy labour demand) 
was now consistent with a much higher level of unemployment. 
Most of this unemployment had to be structural in nature as 
vacancies (labour demand) had recovered almost to 1979 levels26. 
The fall in unemployment after 1986 was initially associated 
with a further rise in the vacancy rate. However after 1988 
unemployment continued to fall even as the vacancy rate fell. 
Between 1990-92 the relationship is similar to that between 1979-
82. After 1993 the unemployment rate began to fall at a much 
lower level of vacancies than after 1986. In the conventional 
analysis this might indicate an inward shift in the 'Beveridge 
curve' and thus an improvement in the 'structural' rate of 
unemployment. 
An alternative perspective might be that changes in the 
vacancy rate proxy changes in the rate of growth of output and 
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labour demand. Most vacancies occur as a result of job-to-job 
moves and this voluntary quitting of one job to move to another 
is heavily pro-cyclical, as are unfilled vacancies. Between 1988 
and 1990 the rate of output growth was slowing down, though it 
was still above the trend rate of growth in productivity so that 
a continued fall in unemployment was consistent with a falling 
vacancy rate. 
It has been argued that historically periods of demand 
driven inflation have been associated with vacancies well in 
excess of 200,000 which would correspond to a vacancy rate well 
above 0.7 per cent of the workforce27. In 1987-88 output was 
growing and unemployment was falling at a fast enough rate to 
push the vacancy rate to such levels and at this point there was 
some upward creep in wage inflation (section 1.4 below). 
However, by 1990 unfilled vacancies were well below this level 
so that, with the unemployment rate at just over five per cent, 
at this time there was no indication of any excess demand for 
labour. 
One issue of concern is whether the vacancies which are 
available to unemployed people look significantly different from 
the vacancies which are available to those moving from job-to-
job28. Table 21 shows the composition of the types of 
employment which are entered by people moving from unemployment 
and can be contrasted with Table 17 showing the overall stock of 
employment. A much higher proportion of the employment openings 
available to unemployed people are part-time and temporary. This 
is the flip-side of the pattern reported in Table 19: part-time 
and temporary jobs last for a shorter period of time and are 
therefore over-represented in the flow of vacancies to which the 
unemployed have access. The proportion of all 'entry jobs' which 
are for full-time permanent employees has declined since 1979, 
though much more slowly than their representation amongst the 
stock of all jobs (Table 17). The slack has been taken up by a 
greater proportion of the unemployed entering self-employment. 
The proportion of the unemployed entering part-time and temporary 
jobs has altered little. However, the nature of the vacancies 
open to unemployed people again raises the question of how far 
the benefits system might disadvantage people from unemployed 
households in taking up the vacancies which are available, 
discussed further in section V.2. 
I.4 Wage and salary trends 
Wages, inflation and unemployment 
The British economy has suffered from two episodes when wage 
inflation has risen above an annual rate of 20 per cent. These 
episodes coincided with the two oil shocks in the mid- and late 
1970s. 
Figure 18 shows the nature of the relationship between 
unemployment and wage inflation over the period 1981-96. By 1981 
inflation was already falling rapidly as unemployment increased 
sharply. By 1983 the underlying rate of wage inflation29 had 
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plateaued out at an annual rate of around 7.5 per cent, a rate 
which was to persist over the next three years as unemployment 
continued to creep up to 11 per cent by early 1986. With wage 
inflation stable it was possible to argue that the UK was at its 
natural rate of unemployment at this time, with the natural rate 
at around 11 per cent of the labour force. 
Between 19 8 6 and 19 9 0 the rate of growth in output and 
employment accelerated and claimant unemployment halved from 11 
per cent to nearly 5 per cent. Wage inflation began to creep up 
in 1987 when unemployment fell rapidly below 10 per cent. Wage 
inflation peaked at an annual rate of just over 10 per cent in 
1990 just after the economy slid back into recession and 
unemployment began to increase again. By 1993 the claimant 
unemployment rate had risen back to over 10 per cent and wage 
inflation had fallen to just four per cent. Between 1993 and the 
first half of 1996 the claimant unemployment rate had declined 
to under eight percent but wage inflation did not pick up at all. 
The experience of the early 198 0s when wage inflation was 
steady with unemployment at over 10 per cent, and the experience 
of the late 1980s when wage inflation began to creep up as the 
unemployment rate fell rapidly below 10 per cent, led to 
considerable pessimism about the nature of the trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation. The subdued rate of wage inflation 
in the recovery of the mid-1990s has lead to a degree of optimism 
that the nature of that trade-off might have improved. 
The data in Figure 18 refer to nominal earnings growth. 
Figure 19 shows the movement in real earnings growth, with the 
trend in nominal earnings compared with the British Government's 
target measure of consumer price inflation, the Retail Price 
Index minus mortgage interest payments. In the mid-1980s real 
earnings grew very strongly, at an average annual rate of over 
three per cent between 1983 and 1989. With the onset of the 
recession in 1990 the growth in real earnings fell to an annual 
rate of 1.5 per cent between 1990 and 1992. Real wage growth 
averaged less than one per cent over the initial period of the 
recovery from 1993 to 1996. By contrast between 1983 and 1985 
real wage growth was an average two percentage points faster. 
So nominal earnings restraint in the mid-1990s has been matched 
by real earnings restraint. 
The restraint in real take-home pay in the mid-1990s has 
been even more significant. 1995 was the first year since 1982 
that average real take home pay (as measured by average earnings 
deflated by the tax and prices index) actually fell (Figure 20). 
In the period 1983 to 1989 average real take home pay rose at an 
annual rate of around four per cent, with the rate of increase 
accelerating to nearly six per cent between 1986 and 1988. In 
1992, at the trough of the recession, people in work saw gains 
in average real take home pay of over three per cent. In sharp 
contrast in each year of the recovery after 1992 the rate of 
growth in real take home pay decelerated as a result of subdued 
growth in average earnings and increases in taxation designed to 
reduce the budget deficit. 
Figure 2 0 might represent more striking evidence for why 
feelings of 'insecurity' might exist in the British labour market 
in the mid-1990s. These feelings may be as much a function of 
stagnation in average real take home pay as to alleged dramatic 
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recent changes in the composition of employment or an increased 
risk of unemployment for which there is little evidence, as 
suggested in the last section. 
Aside from the restraint in nominal and real earnings and 
in real take home pay, the share of income from employment in GDP 
has also been on a declining trend (Figure 21) . This Figure 
presents a slightly longer time series so as to illustrate the 
sharp increase in the share of employment income in GDP following 
the first oil shock. However, the share of employment income 
fell very sharply after 1975 during the period of the 'Social 
Contract' (the last example of concerted action involving the 
'social partners' in Britain) , so that by 1977 it had fallen back 
to its 1973 level. Both subsequent cycles have seen an increase 
in the share of employment income during the recession followed 
by a fall in the recovery, with this cyclical pattern occurring 
around a steady downward trend in the share of employment income 
in GDP. Between 19 9 2 and 19 9 5 the share of income from 
employment in GDP fell by four percentage points. However, this 
fall is in fact similar to the fall of around four percentage 
points in the share of employment income which took place between 
1981 and 1984, and is less sharp than the fall which occured 
between 1975 and 1978 when the share of employment income fell 
by nearly six percentage points. So the decline in the share of 
income from employment from the trough of the early 1990s 
recession is not out of line with the experience of recoveries 
from previous cyclical troughs. 
Rather what is clear from Figure 21 is the trend decline in 
the share of income from employment in GDP from its unprecedented 
spike in 1975 following the first oil shock. This trend decline 
is also apparent if income from seif-employment is added in 
(Figure 22), though in this case the decline after 1991 is 
slightly steeper than the decline after 1981, though not as sharp 
as the decline after 1975. 
In the mid-1970s and into the early 1980s the 'excessive' 
share of labour in GDP and the associated 'depressed' share of 
profits were often the focus for concern and were held to be part 
of the explanation for the growth in unemployment following the 
two oil shocks. However, the trend decline in the share of 
income from employment (and self-employment) in GDP from 1975 
makes this focus of increasingly less relevance. By the mid-
1990s the share of employment income had fallen to levels lower 
than in the 1960s and the share of gross trading profits had 
recovered to the levels of the 1960s. This also implies that the 
advice given in the European Commission's White Paper that the 
growth in real earnings be kept at one percentage point below the 
growth in whole economy productivity so as to allow for a 
recovery of the share of profits seems to have little relevance 
for the UK in the mid-1990s30. 
In the early 1980s significant increases in unemployment 
appeared to be required to bring down inflation. Between 1981 
and 1983 an increase of two percentage points in unemployment was 
required to shave four percentage points off the rate of increase 
in average earnings. This gives a 'sacrifice ratio' of 0.5, that 
is to say an extra 0.5 per cent on the unemployment rate was 
required to reduce wage inflation by one per cent. 
In the early 1990s the process of disinflation was just as 
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painful. Between 1991 and 1993 an increase of two percentage 
points in unemployment was again required to shave four 
percentage points off the rate of increase in average earnings. 
So the sacrifice ratio was unaltered at 0.5. There was no sign 
that any increase in labour market 'flexibility' had made the 
process of reducing inflation any less costly in the early 1990s 
when compared with the early 1980s. 
Figure 2 3 graphs the same data which was used to construct 
Figure 18 but this time plots a Phillips curve. One can confirm 
from comparing the slope of the Phillips curve between 1981 and 
1983 with the slope between 1991 to 1993 that the experience of 
disinflation in these two periods was similar in terms of the 
cost of higher unemployment. By 1993 both unemployment and 
inflation were lower than in 1983, but this is because the 
inflation problem which had to be dealt with in the early 1990s 
was much less serious than in the early 1980s. 
The rapid fall in unemployment between 1986 and 1990 
produced only a modest upward creep in wage inflation. A 
reduction in the unemployment rate of nearly six percentage 
points added less than three percentage points to wage inflation. 
During the first six months of 1990 there was little evidence 
that unemployment (then below six per cent) was below the level 
at which inflation might accelerate. If this had been the case 
then forecasters would have been projecting either a rapid 
acceleration of inflation or a sharp increase in unemployment to 
contain wage inflation31. In fact none of the forecasters were 
predicting this and other labour market indicators, such as the 
vacancy rate (see section 1.3), were not providing conclusive 
evidence that the labour market was in a state of excess demand. 
The sharp blip in headline consumer price inflation in 1990 had 
much to do with increases in mortgage rates and indirect taxes 
feeding directly into retail prices, which serves as a reminder 
that inflation can increase temporarily due to factors which are 
nothing to do with the labour market. 
The upward creep in inflation in the late 1980s may have 
been a response to too rapid an expansion in demand and fall in 
unemployment. Capacity constraints and skill shortages did lead 
to some inflationary pressure even though unemployment was almost 
certainly still significantly above its natural rate32. A more 
steady, balanced recovery in employment might have placed fewer 
strains on the economy. Arguably such a steady recovery is 
precisely what the British economy experienced between 1993 and 
1996 and this explains why there was no real additional 
inflationary pressure at all at this time. Over the period 1993-
96 the Phillips curve is basically flat as the reduction in 
unemployment brought about no increase in wage inflation. 
The underlying rate of growth in whole economy productivity 
in the British economy over the last complete economic cycle 
(1979-90) was 1.9 per cent. So real wage growth of around two 
per cent per annum would be consistent with a constant share of 
income from employment in GDP. Growth in average earnings of 
around 4.5 per cent would be consistent with a target for 
underlying inflation of 2.5 per cent. With average earnings 
growth running at around 3.5 per cent in the first half of 1996, 
some modest upward creep in wage inflation could be tolerated 
without placing the British Government's inflation target at 
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risk. 
The growth in wage inequality 
So far the discussion of wage trends has focused on wages 
as a macroeconomic variable. However, one unambiguous trend in 
the labour market in Britain since the late 1970s has been the 
ongoing increase in wage inequality, following a short period in 
the mid- to late 1970s when overall wage inequality narrowed 
modestly. 
This is shown in Figures 24 and 25 which report the growth 
in real hourly earnings at the median and the highest and lowest 
deciles for men and women respectively over the period 1973-93. 
In the period 1973-79 the real wages of all men were 
relatively stagnant, though the real wages of all women rose 
significantly. There was a modest narrowing in wage inequality. 
The most striking feature of this period was the narrowing male-
female wage gap associated strongly with the equal pay and sex 
discrimination legislation of the mid-1970s. 
After 1979 significant real wage growth resumed for male 
workers but the dispersion of wages increased dramatically in a 
fashion which was out of line with historical experience and with 
the experience of other European countries, though not the United 
States. Real hourly wages for men at the lower decile did 
increase over the period from 1979-93 but at a significantly 
slower rate than for men at the median and at the higher decile. 
The increase in wage inequality amongst women was just as great. 
However, the male-female wage gap narrowed further, so that the 
real hourly wage gains for women at the lower decile were higher 
than the wage gains for men at the lower decile. It is 
noticeable that wage inequality continued to grow in the late 
1980s even when aggregate unemployment fell sharply. 
Between 1974 and 1992-93 the female/male wage gap for full-
time workers narrowed significantly33. In 1974 full-time women 
were on average receiving 66 per cent of their male counterparts' 
wage. By 1992-93 the female/male earnings ratio was 80 per cent. 
Of this narrowing of the wage gap only three percentage points 
was due to the narrowing of the gap between men and women in 
terms of their skills and employment characteristics. The rest 
was due to a reduction in 'discrimination'. On the other hand 
there had been little reduction in the earnings gap between male 
and female part-timers with the low pay of female part-timers 
being to a much greater extent the result of their skill and 
employment characteristics. 
The modest real wage gains for men at the lower decile are 
matched by limited increases in real wages for those jobs entered 
by the unemployed34. This means that the trend in 'replacement 
ratios' calculated using average earnings may understate the 
problems associated with the 'unemployment trap', an issue 
discussed further in section V.2. 
The growth in wage inequality in the UK (and the US) has 
produced a large literature35. Two main hypotheses have been 
put forward, one focusing on changes in the demand for labour 
biased against unskilled workers and the other on changes to the 
institutions which determine pay and the attitudes which underlie 
that institutional framework. Amongst those who have focused on 
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changes in the demand for labour there is a further sub-division 
between those who blame skill-biased technological change and 
those who blame increased competition from developing countries. 
This latter division of opinion is of second order importance as 
both put the focus on the problems faced by the less skilled and 
make the same recommendations about the need to enhance skills. 
One problem is that the term 'skills' is a very widely 
defined term covering all aspects of an individual's personal 
characteristics, including their motivation and personal skills, 
as well as their qualifications. Most of these characteristics 
cannot be measured directly. Rather variables such as 
educational qualifications, experience or the occupational 
classification of an individual's job are used as a proxy for 
whether that individual is 'skilled' or not. 
Table 2 2 shows the ratio of hourly wages for men with higher 
educational qualifications to men without qualifications over the 
period from 1974 to 1994. This shows that the modest increase 
in the 1980s in the pay premium attached to holding higher 
qualifications just matched the decline in the 1970s, leaving the 
ratio largely unchanged over the two decades. The equivalent 
ratio for women did increase modestly over this period. However, 
these changes in the premia attached to qualifications appear to 
explain only a small part of the increase in inequality since 
1979. Growing returns to experience have been a far more 
important feature and there has been significant growth in the 
dispersion of wages between manual and non-manual workers36. 
However, most of the literature on the problems faced by the 
unskilled refers to the increased return to 'unobserved' skills, 
that is the return to personal characteristics which cannot be 
measured. This may be a correct interpretation of the causes of 
increased wage inequality but it seems to beg more questions than 
it answers and offers no clear policy implications. 
There is little doubt that institutional changes have played 
a role. The decline in unionisation in the UK might account for 
about 20 per cent of the increase in wage inequality in the 
19 8 0s37. Other changes in labour market institutions, which are 
discussed in sections 11 and 111, such a reduction in minimum 
wage rates and the eventual abolition of most minimum wage 
protection in 1993, the abandonment of incomes policies for the 
private sector after 1979, and the increased decentralisation of 
pay bargaining, will all have played a role. However, there is 
no full accounting for the increase in wage inequality. In 
particular one of the most difficult features of the growth in 
wage inequality to explain is that the greater part of that 
growth has occured within occupational or educational groups. 
The increase in wage inequality has played an important role 
in the overall growth in income inequality since 1979 (see 
section V.2) . It might be argued that this increase in wage 
inequality if driven by market forces could bring with it 
efficiency gains. An increase in the returns to 'skills', for 
example, might lead individuals to invest more in education and 
training. However, as has been noted, in practice in the UK 
little of the increase in wage inequality is explained by 
increased returns to qualifications. Internationally there 
appears to be little solid evidence that countries where earninqs 
inequality is lower have lower levels of employment or higher 
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levels of unemployment for more vulnerable groups in the labour 
market38. It is not obvious, therefore, that the increase in 
wage inequality has enabled the UK to 'buy' higher levels of 
employment of lower levels of unemployment. 
1.5 Analysis of the principal causes of the trend in unemployment since 1980 
Estimates of the natural rate of unemployment in the UK 
Much discussion of the causes of unemployment revolves around the distinction between 'structural' and 'cyclical' unemployment. This distinction is based on a model of the labour market centred around the concept of the existence of a level of 
unemployment which is consistent with stable inflation - the natural, equilibrium or non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. If unemployment is above this level inflation will be on a downward path and with a given rate of growth in nominal demand, real demand will increase and unemployment will fall 
until the natural rate is reached. If unemployment is below the 
NRU, inflation will accelerate, real demand will be squeezed and 
unemployment will rise. More precisely the proposed relationship 
is between the level of unemployment and the rate of wage inflation, making it clear that it is the labour market which is the primary focus for analysis. 
The excess of unemployment above the NRU is referred to as 
'cyclical' unemployment. The NRU is not the same as the full 
employment rate of unemployment (FERU). Full employment exists 
when the only unemployment is frictional in nature. The term 
'structural' unemployment is often used to refer to the 
unemployment which exists between the NRU and the FERU. 
The speed of adjustment of unemployment to the natural rate 
might also have consequences for inflation. If unemployment 
falls too fast this might generate inflationary pressure even if 
unemployment is above the natural rate, as a result of short-term 
bottlenecks arising due to constraints relating to shortages of 
capital or skilled labour. 
Related to this is the concept of hysteresis. A rise in the 
actual rate of unemployment might in turn lead to an increase in 
the NRU, at least in the short run. This is because a recession 
might lead to the scrapping of capacity and the unemployed might 
lose skills or motivation. This could make it more likely that 
any significant recovery might run into capacity or skilled 
labour shortages which in turn might cause upward pressure on 
prices and pay. However, the corollary of this is that the 
recovery will eventually lead to an expansion of capacity and the 
unemployed who find jobs will recover their motivation and 
develop their skills. So the short run NRU will fall back again. 
The natural rate itself can only be reduced through supply 
side reforms designed to overcome the structural problems in the 
labour or product markets which are held to be responsible for 
the adverse trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 
This model of analysis has dominated policy making in 
Britain since the mid-1970s and seemed to carry with it 
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straightforward policy prescriptions. Macroeconomic policy 
should aim to keep the growth in nominal demand steady allowing 
unemployment to fall gradually to its natural rate if 
unemployment is above the NRU. At the same time microeconomic 
reforms have to be instituted to eliminate the structural 
problems which lead to a high natural rate in the first place. 
The clarity of the economic debate is sometimes spoilt by 
the tendency to conduct the discussion in terms of estimates of 
the 'output gap' rather than estimates of the NRU. The term 
'output gap' may be preferred because it sounds like a more 
technical and neutral term which does not carry with it the 
emotive connotations of the term the natural rate of 
unemployment. 
In fact the two concepts are intimately linked. Depending 
on the value of the 'Okun coefficient' linking the growth rate 
in output to the change in unemployment, one should be able to 
infer from any estimate of the output gap what the associated 
level of the NRU is. Saying that the output gap is four per 
cent, with an Okun coefficient of 2, is equivalent to saying that 
the actual rate of unemployment is two percentage points above 
the NRU. So when an economist remarks that they think that the 
output gap is close to being eliminated, it is equivalent to 
saying that unemployment is close to the natural rate. 
Table 2 3 presents a range of estimates for the NRU in 
Britain in the mid-1990s drawn from six of the seven original 
members of the UK Treasury's panel of independent forecasters. 
The wide range of estimates illustrates the division of opinion 
between the pessimists and optimists in relation to Britain's 
medium term prospects. 
At one extreme in Table 23 is Minford's estimate that the 
NRU in Britain has now fallen to just 3.5 per cent of the 
workforce, or about the one million mark. In the late 1970s 
Minford argued that the high NRU in Britain at that time was a 
consequence of excessive trade union power, over-generous 
unemployment benefits and high levels of taxation. As in the 
1980s all of these structural problems are seen to have been 
effectively tackled by Government supply side reforms, Minford 
has argued consistently for many years that unemployment could 
continue to fall without any acceleration in inflation provided 
that monetary policy was relaxed sufficiently. The upward blip 
in inflation in the late 1980s is put down to an excessively 
rapid decline in unemployment running into short term capacity 
constraints. 
At the other extreme are the inflation pessimists (Davies 
and Brittan) who in 1995-96 were still concerned that the NRU was 
in the range of 7-8 per cent. At the end of 1995 claimant 
unemployment fell below eight per cent so that the actual rate 
of unemployment was not far from the estimated natural rate. 
However, it is worth noting that in 1993 these two economists 
plus a third (Currie) were talking about a natural rate of nine 
or ten or even eleven per cent. They expected inflation to begin 
accelerating soon after any fall in unemployment from its 
cyclical peak. 
These economists have been deeply sceptical that any of the 
Government's supply side reforms have succeeded in significantly 
lowering the natural rate. As an ad-hoc response to the fall in 
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unemployment without any sign of accelerating inflation there may 
have subsequently been an acceptance of at least partial success 
on the part of the structural reforms of the 1980s. 
Other economists have consistently stuck to 7-8 per cent as 
their best estimate of the NRU and so in 1996 were also waiting 
to see if wage inflation would indeed accelerate if unemployment 
fell through this barrier39. 
A fifth member of the original panel (Congdon) has held 
views similar to those of Minford over the necessity for and the 
success of Conservative supply side reforms in the 1980s. 
However, his estimate of the natural rate is significantly higher 
than Minford's. 
A former panel member (Sentance) holds the view that the NRU 
probably never rose as sharply in the 1970s as others have 
claimed, but that some supply side reforms have helped to bring 
it down. However, the main feature of his analysis is that a 
series of inflationary shocks and the subsequent sharp 
disinflations have appeared to deliver an adverse trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation. With these shocks out of the 
way there is no reason why unemployment could not decline at a 
modest and steady rate to levels significantly lower than were 
experienced in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The final original panel member (Godley) has specifically 
rejected the natural rate hypothesis as a framework for analysis, 
a reminder that this orthodox approach is not universally 
accepted. In common with some other traditional Keynesians he 
sees Britain's economy as facing a fundamental balance of 
payments constraint. This group of economists are therefore even 
more pessimistic about the future path of unemployment than are 
those who believe in the NRU. They come to the same conclusions 
about the inability of any significant increase in aggregate 
demand to in itself bring about a sustained reduction in 
unemployment, not because the increase in demand might reduce 
unemployment below the NRU and result in accelerating inflation, 
but because the increase in aggregate demand would quickly run 
into capacity constraints and lead to an unsustainable increase 
in the current account deficit. 
One feature of the debate over unemployment in Britain is 
that the most clear advocate of the natural rate hypothesis is 
the most sanguine about the scope for further significant falls 
in unemployment, while an economist who rejects the natural rate 
hypothesis is amongst the most pessimistic. Another economist 
closely associated with the hypothesis also remained pessimistic, 
believing that the NRU was higher in the 1990s than in the late 
1970s40. His estimate of 8.9 per cent (on the LFS measure) 
would imply that the UK in 1996 faced an imminent acceleration 
of inflation as unemployment had fallen below that level in late 
1994. 
Official bodies such as the Bank of England and the OECD 
tend, unsurprisingly, to be cautious about estimates of the NRU 
and therefore the scope for monetary policy to reduce 
unemployment. The OECD has revised down its estimate of the NRU 
in Britain to seven per cent41. The Bank of England concluded 
that the unemployment rate in Britain in early 1996 (at 7.9 per 
cent) was above the NRU on the unobjectionable grounds that the 
rate of growth in average earnings was still stable42. However, 
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over the period from 1993 the Bank was consistently worried about 
the re-emergence of wage inflation. The UK Treasury makes no 
comment about the level of the NRU, consistent with its position 
that it makes no specific comment about the prospects for 
unemployment at all. 
The six estimates of the NRU derived from the six original 
members of the Treasury's panel of independent forecasters, plus 
the OECD's estimate, the estimate of one further set of 
economists43 plus the most pessimistic estimate44, give an 
average estimate for the NRU in the mid-1990s in Britain of 6.7 
per cent, with a range from 3.5 to 8.9 per cent (Table 24). 
These estimates are placed alongside estimates of the NRU 
covering the period from 1969-73 to 1988-90. 
The average and the range of estimates for the NRU in the 
mid-1990s are almost identical to the average and the range of 
estimates in the late 1980s. The fact that the estimates of the 
NRU for the mid-199 0s are no different from those arrived at 
during the Lawson boom seems to signal that there is still no 
consensus that the Government's structural reforms have in fact 
improved the trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 
Estimates of the NRU are pro-cyclical. Estimates of the NRU 
appear to go up when actual unemployment rates rise and then fall 
again when actual unemployment falls. This seems to indicate 
hysteresis at work, at least in the models of the forecasters. 
The average mid-1990s estimate of the NRU is little 
different from the average estimate from the early to mid-198 0s, 
when pessimism over the performance of the British economy was 
at its height. The mid-1990s estimate is still higher than the 
average estimate of the NRU for the late 1970s. Despite 
significant supply side reforms since 1979 only one economist 
(Minford) clearly believes that the sustainable rate of 
unemployment is lower than that inherited by the Conservative 
Government in 1979. 
The NRU and 'cyclical' and 'structural' unemployment 
The wide range of estimates for the NRU also implies a wide 
range of estimates for the 'cyclical' and 'structural' components 
of unemployment. In early 19 9 6 the actual rate of unemployment 
in the UK economy stood at just under eight per cent. Most or 
all of this unemployment in excess of the level associated with 
full employment could be considered structural in nature, which 
would be consistent with the views of Davies, Brittan and Currie. 
Alternatively most or all of this unemployment could be regarded 
as cyclical, which would be consistent with the views of Minford. 
Causes of the trend in the NRU 
Given that there is no consensus as to the level of or the 
trend in the NRU and therefore the division of unemployment into 
its 'structural' and 'cyclical' components it is not surprising 
to find little consensus over the possible causes of the rise in 
the NRU from the late 1960s onwards outlined in Table 24 or the 
possible causes of any subsequent fall in the NRU, if indeed any 
fall has occured. 
The main causal factors which have been put forward to 
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explain the path of the NRU include: 
1. The oil and commodity price shocks of the 1970s. 
2. Labour market mismatch in terms of skills or the regional 
distribution of unemployment. 
3. Excessive trade union power. 
4. Forms of pay determination which are either not fully 
decentralised of fully coordinated. 
5. Minimum wage regulations. 
6. Employment protection legislation 
7. High levels of taxation, including taxes on employment. 
8. The benefits system. 
9. Demotivation and loss of skills amongst the long-term 
unemployed. 
10. Lack of product market competition. 
11. Lack of effective industrial capacity. 
The first nine of these factors relating primarily to the 
labour market are extensively discussed in one of the most 
influential contributions to the debate, with the conclusion that 
the oil/commodity price shocks, trade union power, lack of 
coordinated pay determination, the benefits system and the 
demotivation and loss of skills of the long term unemployed were 
the factors to be blamed for the rise in the NRU through the 
1970s and the early 1980s45. Clearly many of these causes had 
been reversed to a greater or lesser extent by the early 1990s, 
but the authors of that influential contribution to the debate 
still emphasise the lack of coordinated pay determination, the 
operation of the benefits system and the demotivation and lack 
of skills of the unemployed as key determinants46. The focus on 
the benefits system and on the characteristics of the unemployed 
is also common to many other interpretations of why the NRU might 
have increased. These interpretations concentrate on the labour 
market. 
An alternative hypothesis is that it is the lack of 
effective productive capacity which leads to a high NRU47. High 
levels of investment in fixed capital would, by raising labour 
productivity, help to reduce inflationary pressure and allow the 
economy to operate with lower unemployment. However, such 
capital shortages are probably only a short term constraint on 
the expansion of the economy4 . If unemployment is falling too 
fast, capacity constraints will lead to upward pressure on 
inflation. Firms do, however, respond quite quickly to capacity 
constraints by investing in extra capacity. So the possibility 
of capital shortages implies that there is a limit to how far 
unemployment can adjust to the NRU, but capital shortages might 
not influence the NRU itself. 
Understanding to what extent the labour market factors 
listed above are important in explaining a high NRU will be the 
focus for much of the report. Already in section 1.2 some doubts 
about the focus on the long-term unemployed and on the 'skills' 
or rather qualifications of the unemployed have surfaced. 
Judgement on the relative importance of all the different factors 
is reserved to the conclusions in section VI. 
However, to re-iterate the main point of this section again, 
estimates of the NRU vary significantly. There is no agreement 
amongst economists over the weight to be given to different 
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factors which might lead to a high NRU. Some economists are 
increasingly doubtful about the usefulness of the concept in 
theory49, and the wide variations in estimates of the NRU 
severely qualifies the usefulness of the concept in practice. 
I.6 Macroeconomic policies and forecasts 
The current framework for macroeconomic policy in the UK 
The framework for macroeconomic policy in the UK changed 
dramatically after the events of Autumn 1992 when sterling left 
the Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary 
System. Between 1990-92 the commitment to maintain the pound's 
parity within the ERM provided the main anchor for monetary 
policy. From October 1992 the Government put in place a new 
framework for the conduct of macroeconomic policy. 
At the heart of that policy is an explicit target for the 
level of underlying inflation (as measured by the Retail Price 
Index excluding mortgage interest payments). The aim is to keep 
underlying inflation within the range 1-4 per cent and to get it 
down to the lower half of that range, that is 2.5 per cent or 
less. This inflation target is set by the Government. Monetary 
policy is the sole instrument geared to the achievement of this 
target. Monetary policy is geared only to the achievement of the 
inflation target. There is no separate target for the growth in 
output or any other real variables. As such there is of course 
no target for employment or the level of unemployment. Rather 
it is believed that the achievement of low inflation will in 
itself lead to satisfactory outcomes for the real economy. And, 
whereas the Treasury provides forecasts for the path of 
inflation, output, the current account, the budget deficit and 
many other variables, it does not provide any forecasts for the 
path of unemployment. 
Decisions over the current stance of monetary policy are 
reached following deliberations between the Bank of England and 
the Treasury. However, the Treasury has the final say over 
interest rate decisions. The Bank of England does not have 
independent control of monetary policy. 
Fiscal policy is determined by a commitment to 'sound public 
finances' defined as a balanced budget over the medium term. The 
Government's stated aim is to reduce the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR) to zero by the turn of the century. 
Discretionary fiscal policy has no role to play in demand 
management, though the automatic stabilisers would be allowed to 
function during recessions. 
Monetary policy is based on a forward looking assessment of 
the prospects for inflation. If inflation is expected to be 
above the Government's central target of 2.5 per cent over a two 
year horizon, the Bank of England will recommend a tightening of 
monetary policy. In determining the likely path of inflation the 
Bank looks at a wide range of indicators, including direct 
indicators of cost pressures such as the growth in input prices 
and average earnings, financial indicators such as the growth in 
narrow and broad measures of the money supply, the exchange rate 
and asset prices, and indicators of real activity such as 
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measures of spare capacity and skill shortages. However, there 
are no specific targets for any of these indicators. 
It should be noted that taking into account indicators of 
real activity means that in practice the Government does not 
completely ignore the real economy when determining monetary 
policy. This opens up the likelihood that pragmatic judgements 
about the compatibility of real objectives with the inflation 
target will play a role in the policy process. 
The Government has since 1992 introduced greater 
transparency into the policy making process by publishing with 
a lag the minutes of the monthly deliberations of the Chancellor 
and the Governor of the Bank of England over monetary policy. 
The Bank of England publishes an independent inflation report 
every quarter. The Government also established the panel of 
independent forecasters whose estimates of the NRU were discussed 
in section 1.5. 
Medium term forecasts for the UK economy 
Table 25 outlines the main medium term forecasts for the 
British economy to 1998 as provided by six of the original 
members of the panel of independent forecasters in November 1995. 
The forecasts for unemployment in 1998 diverge widely, ranging 
from 1.11 million (Minford) to 2.1 million (Godley) . This of 
course reflects the fundamental divergence in opinion between 
those who believe that Government supply side reforms have 
significantly reduced the NRU, those who believe that the NRU is 
still very high and those who reject the NRU hypothesis 
altogether. 
Forecasts for underlying inflation show more apparent 
consistency, with estimates for the Government's preferred 
measure of underlying inflation ranging from 2.2 per cent to 3.2 
per cent in 1998. There was also some degree of consensus 
(excluding Godley) that the current account of the balance of 
payments would not prove to be a significant constraint over the 
medium term with forecasts of the current account deficit in 1998 
at one per cent of GDP or less. However, Minford's forecast of 
low inflation and a current account balance have to be seen in 
the light of his forecast that unemployment will fall to 1.1 
million or four per cent of the labour force by 1998. The 
forecasts of Brittan, Currie and Davies of relatively low 
inflation and small current account deficits have to be seen in 
the light of their belief that unemployment will remain at around 
seven per cent of the labour force in 1998. 
Table 25 also gives forecasts for the PSBR to 1998-99. 
Again with the exception of Godley, there was a consensus at the 
time of these forecasts that the budget deficit would be below 
three per cent of GDP by 1997-98, with a range from 1.8 to 2.7 
per cent of GDP. 
Budget deficits are often broken down into their cyclical 
and structural components. This parallels the distinction 
between cyclical and structural unemployment. Estimates of the 
cyclical and structural components of budget deficits also depend 
on estimates of the NRU. As Minford believes that the NRU is 3.5 
per cent, and that by the time unemployment falls to its natural 
rate the budget deficit will have been eliminated, he believes 
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that all the current budget deficit is cyclical in nature. By 
contrast, Brittan, Currie and Davies believed that unemployment 
in Britain in early 1996 was close to the NRU, so that the budget 
deficit at this point in time was largely structural in nature. 
Estimates of the cyclical and structural components of the budget 
deficit depend on estimates of the NRU, which means that they 
vary as dramatically as estimates of the NRU. 
Regional forecasts for unemployment 
Table 2 6 gives forecasts for unemployment in the regions of 
the UK. These forecasts were made in 1994. By the end of 1995 
the forecast national unemployment rate for 2 001 had already been 
attained and the regional spread of unemployment at this time was 
close to the forecast spread in 2001. The main exceptions were 
the West Midlands and the North West where unemployment turned 
out to be slightly lower than forecast. These results serve to 
illustrate that correct regional forecasts of unemployment are 
largely dependent on correct national forecasts. No forecasters 
in 1990 were predicting any sharp increase in national 
unemployment and none forecast the significant convergence in 
regional unemployment rates which took place in the early 1990s. 
As the national forecasts for unemployment in 1998 diverge so 
widely any forecasts for regional unemployment rates by the end 
of the decade are also likely to vary widely. 
Macroeconomic targets and forecasts in relation to the 
Maastricht criteria. 
The Maastricht treaty outlined four criteria which national 
economies will have to meet in order to satisfy the conditions 
for joining the single currency. As Britain has reserved the 
right to opt out of the single currency, comparing current 
macroeconomic targets and forecasts in Britain to these criteria 
might seem academic. Nevertheless it is useful as a way of 
thinking further about the framing of macroeconomic policy in the 
UK. 
1) The Government's target for consumer price inflation is to 
hold it at or below 2.5 per cent. In November 1995 the average 
of the forecasts for inflation in 1997 offered by the independent 
forecasters was slightly above that at 2.7 per cent (Table 25). 
Inflation forecasts had not significantly changed by Spring 1996. 
The European Commission's measure of consumer price inflation 
differs slightly from the Government's target measure. So long 
as the inflation rate of the three best performing states in 1997 
is not significantly below 1-1.25 per cent the UK should just 
about satisfy the criterion of having an inflation rate within 
1.5 per cent of that benchmark. 
2) The Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) in Britain 
does not equate exactly with the European Commission's definition 
of the General Government Financial Deficit. In 1995-96 the 
outturn for the PSBR was 4.5 per cent of GDP, about half a per 
cent above the Government's target for that year. Taking this 
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slippage into account, forecasts which were available in the 
first half of 1996 for the PSBR in 1997-98 ranged from 2.1 to 3.5 
per cent of GDP. In July 1996 the UK Government forecast that 
the PSBR in 1997-98 would be three per cent of GDP. The 
Government deficit defined under the Maastricht Treaty will be 
about half a percentage point above the PSBR in that year50. It 
therefore seems unlikely that the UK will meet the criterion of 
having a budget deficit below three per cent of GDP in 1997. 
Government policy is geared towards eventually achieving a budget 
deficit which is comfortably within the Maastricht criterion, but 
this will not be achieved in 1997, though it might be in 1998. 
In 1995 the ratio of Government debt to GDP in the UK was 
54 per cent and by 1997 it is still certain to be below 60 per 
cent, so the UK will succeed in satisfying the Maastricht 
criterion in having a debt-GDP ratio below that level51. 
3) In the first half of 1996 long term interest rates in the 
UK were about 1.5 percentage points above those in Germany. This 
gap was 1.2 percentage points in the first half of 1995. 
Provided that there is no deterioration in inflation expectations 
the UK will probably meet the criterion of having long term 
interest rates which do not exceed by more than two per cent the 
rates in the three best performing countries. 
4) Britain will not rejoin the ERM before 1997 and so will not 
have maintained a normal ERM parity for at least two years before 
1999. As a result of policy decisions the UK will clearly not 
satisfy the last of the Maastricht convergence criteria. This 
could render the question as to whether or not the UK will hit 
the criterion relating to the budget deficit academic. 
It should be noted that the UK Government's fiscal 
objectives are in principle actually tighter than those in the 
Maastricht criteria. The Government's aim is to achieve a 
balanced budget by the turn of the century. There is some 
concern that the UK Government's fiscal objectives may be too 
tight just as there are concerns that the Maastricht fiscal 
criteria are too tight. With nominal demand growth at five per 
cent, maintaining a stable debt-GDP ratio of around 50 per cent 
would require a budget deficit of around 2.5 per cent of GDP 
rather than a balanced budget. 
However, the practical argument for aiming for a budget 
deficit of less than 2.5 per cent of GDP and a falling debt-gdp 
ratio when the economy is growing robustly, is precisely that the 
budget deficit can then be allowed to increase significantly 
during a recession, with the automatic stabilisers being allowed 
to operate unhindered by concerns over an unsustainable trend in 
the debt-GDP ratio. Erring on the side of caution during a 
recovery could also allow a Government to indulge in 
discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the context of 
a severe recession, though this is not part of current Government 
thinking. 
This is all tantamount to saying that for the UK the 
Maastricht criteria represent quite sensible rules of thumb for 
the stance of fiscal policy during an upturn. However, since 
Autumn 1992 the British Government has been able to offset a 
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significant tightening of fiscal policy with a loosening of 
monetary policy including a significant depreciation of the 
exchange rate. Concerns about the possible negative impact of 
the Maastricht fiscal criteria on growth and employment are 
misplaced provided that monetary policy is available as an 
instrument to maintain growth in aggregate demand. The lesson 
of UK experience in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s 
is that a combination of a tightening of fiscal policy to 
consolidate the budgetary position and a loosening of monetary 
policy including exchange rate depreciation can deliver a 
reasonable rate of growth of demand, output and employment. 
A further criticism of the Maastricht criteria is that they 
contain no reference to convergence in terms of real variables, 
specifically unemployment. If countries can only meet the 
Maastricht criteria by tolerating a high level of unemployment, 
it is not clear that their labour market institutions are 
structured in a way so as to deliver the much greater wage 
flexibility which will be necessary if the option of using 
monetary and exchange rate policy is given up. More generally 
the criticism could be levelled that the commitment of the EU to 
the objective of lower unemployment is clearly subservient to the 
goal of EMU. The single currency project involves member states 
giving up powerful instruments of policy which can have a 
significant impact on unemployment when used to complement supply 
side reforms. 
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II Labour market institutions 
II.1 Public Institutions 
The new Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) 
In 1995 the institutional framework relating to labour 
market policy in England and Wales was dramatically altered. The 
Department of Employment was merged with the Department for 
Education, with some of the labour market responsibilities of the 
Employment Department transferred to two other Departments, Trade 
and Industry and the Environment. A separate Department to deal 
with labour market issues had existed under various names through 
most of the twentieth century and the merger left Britain in a 
unique position amongst the advanced industrial countries in 
having no separate Ministry with responsibility for the labour 
market. 
The structure of the new Department for Education and 
Employment is outlined in Figure 26. There are four major policy 
Directorates, one of which has responsibility for employment (and 
'lifetime learning'). The Schools Directorate deals with all 
education matters up to the compulsory school leaving age of 16. 
The Further and Higher Education and Youth Training Directorate 
has responsibility for post-compulsory general and vocational 
education and training. This includes responsibility for the so-
called 'tripartite' system of post-16 education and training 
which is discussed in section V.l. 
The Employment and Lifetime Learning Directorate takes care 
of employment issues. This Directorate has the main link with 
the Employment Service which is responsible for the delivery of 
active labour market policy and jointly responsible with the 
Benefits Agency (under the control of the Department for Social 
Security) for administering unemployment related benefits. This 
Directorate is responsible for policy in relation to training for 
the unemployed and for employer based training. It also has 
responsibility for equal opportunities issues and for the 
agencies, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) and the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (EOC), active in this area of policy 
(see section III.l). 
Finally the Strategy, International and Analytical Services 
Directorate has responsibility for analysis, research and 
information and the development of overall strategy, and for 
links with international organisations. One key responsibility 
of this Directorate is the development of strategy in relation 
to the National Education and Training Targets discussed in 
section V.l and the associated National Advisory Council for 
Education and Training Targets (NACETT). 
With the merger of the two Departments, responsibility for 
industrial relations and pay matters, including sponsorship of 
the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), was 
passed over to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The 
DTI's central responsibilities for industrial and competition and 
trade policy are of course of key importance for labour market 
outcomes. Responsibility for health and safety matters (except 
for food safety, the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food or MAFF), including oversight of 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) was passed to the 
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Department of the Environment. This Department already had 
responsibility for urban policy. Moreover, the Government's 
programmes for boosting self-employment had also come under this 
Department's Single Regeneration Budget. 
Finally, responsibility for the collection and dissemination 
of labour market statistics was passed to a new agency, the 
Office for National Statistics, itself the amalgamation of the 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys and the Central 
Statistical Office. The agency's independent status is heavily 
emphasised and a key aim of giving it responsibility for labour 
market statistics was to try and raise public confidence in the 
reliability of those statistics, especially relating to 
unemployment, an issue discussed earlier. 
These institutional changes have been mirrored in Scotland, 
where the separate Education and Industry Departments of the 
Scottish Office have been merged. 
The merger of the Employment and Education Departments in 
England and Wales was driven primarily by the perceived need to 
overcome divisions in the delivery of post-16 education and 
training. In this sense it is the Further and Higher Education 
and Youth Training Directorate which is the most important new 
feature of the merged Department. Up until merger the Employment 
Department had responsibility for vocational education and 
training, while the Education Department had responsibility for 
general education. The education and training lobby argued 
forcefully that this division of responsibility meant that post-
compulsory education and training policy lacked cohesion and that 
the divided responsibilities mirrored an unhelpful 'academic-
vocational divide' in the provision of post-16 education and 
training. The new arrangements were held to open the possibility 
for more cohesive policy making and the bridging of the 
'academic-vocational divide'. 
Thus the merger was probably driven primarily by education 
and training issues and not labour market issues. This leaves 
open the argument that transferring responsibility for vocational 
education and training to the Education Department did not 
necessarily imply the abolition of the Employment Department 
which would still have had a considerable portfolio of 
responsibilities even with vocational education and training 
taken away. 
The Training and Enterprise Councils 
82 TECs were set up in England and Wales in 1990 as 
employer-dominated local area based private companies with 
responsibilities in five main areas of policy: 
1) Training for the unemployed (as of 1993 the Training for 
Work programme) 
2) Vocational training for young people (Youth Training or YT 
and from 1994 'Modern Apprenticeships') and some aspects of 
vocational education. 
3) Employer based training. 
4) Support for enterprises. 
5) A more general area economic development remit. 
In Scotland Local Enterprise Companies perform a similar 
range of functions under the overall umbrella of an agency, 
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Scottish Enterprise. However, Scottish Enterprise has a much 
wider remit with respect to economic development and urban 
regeneration. 
In 1994-95 the 81 surviving TECs in England and Wales (one 
having gone out of business) were responsible for about two-
fifths of the Employment Department's budget, with 90 per cent 
of this paid over to the TECs for running Training for Work and 
Youth Training. These two programmes dominate TEC funding but 
not necessarily the attention and enthusiasm of the employers 
involved who, not unnaturally, are most interested in their 
responsibilities for helping firms with their training and with 
the economic development role52. 
This potential tension is reflected in concerns over the 
procedures which accompany funding. As the vast bulk of funding 
is for the running of programmes for the adult unemployed (TfW) 
and young people (YT), it comes attached with clear rules about 
the use of such funding which to private sector organisations 
seem inflexible. However, that is inevitably the nature of such 
public programmes. Organisations which spend large amounts of 
public money for the delivery of public programmes must expect 
very tight controls on the disbursement of such funds. 
TECs used to have separate relationships with the Employment 
and Education Departments. They now have relationships with the 
various Directorates of the Department for Education and 
Employment. In addition the TECs also have links to the DTI with 
its responsibilities for programmes to assist enterprises, and 
to the Department of the Environment with its responsibilities 
'for urban policy and seif-employment. Government Offices for the 
regions provide a single point of reference for TECs contractual 
relations with these Government departments. The economic 
development function of TECs overlaps with the work of the local 
elected authorities and other central Government agencies such 
as the urban development corporations, as well as with other 
private sector organisations, notably the Chambers of Commerce 
and Enterprise Agencies. 
The Employment Service 
The Employment Service (ES) is one of the Government's most 
important executive agencies, established in 1987 to bring 
together the Unemployment Benefit and Jobcentre Services to 
create an integrated network of offices with the aim of linking 
more effectively the payment of benefit to the operation of the 
services offered to the unemployed. The costs which the ES 
incurs in administering unemployment benefits are 'reimbursed' 
by the Department of Social Security. The relationship of the 
ES to the Benefits Agency is a close one, and in the light of the 
new Jobseekers Allowance (see section IV.1), an evolving one. 
The ES integrated network of offices are responsible for the 
placement services for unemployed people and for assisting 
jobseekers with job search skills and counselling, while checking 
their eligibility to benefit. The ES can refer unemployed people 
to the Training for Work programme, though placements are 
sponsored by TECs which in turn sub-contract delivery to a range 
of private, public and voluntary organisations. The ES also runs 
itself, or contracts with providers to deliver, a number of 
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initiatives to help disadvantaged jobseekers, including 
responsibility for a wage subsidy programme (Workstart, see 
section IV. 2). The ES and the TECs therefore share 
responsibility for providing opportunities for the unemployed. 
The Employment Service does not and never has had a monopoly 
on job placement services, as is the case in some European 
countries. Private employment agencies have long existed and 
without significant controversy as part of a 'mixed' economy. 
The compulsory notification of vacancies to the ES to improve 
flows of labour market information has been suggested, but never 
taken up. It has usually been estimated that only one-third of 
vacancies are reported to the ES. 
The new arrangements - an analysis 
It can be seen from Figure 2 6 and the preceding discussion 
that the administration of labour market policies remains 
somewhat fragmented. The future of the TECs is not entirely 
clear especially given the arguments for bringing all enterprise 
support functions at area level under one umbrella, which would 
involve the merging of TECs with Chambers of Commerce. 
It has been suggested that the disappearance of a Department 
of State with sole responsibility for labour market issues is a 
response to the Conservative Government having successful pushed 
through a wide-ranging set of reforms to the labour market which 
have 'solved' many of the labour market's problems. A separate 
Department with responsibility for labour market issues is not 
seen to fit with a 'deregulated' labour market. It is noticeable 
that in the US, however, where the labour market is seen to be 
even more 'deregulated' a separate Labor Department remains. In 
the US the federal role in education is heavily proscribed, 
whereas in the UK the central state's role in education has in 
the past decade increased significantly. This section has argued 
that it is this focus on education policy which had lead to the 
setting up of a Department for Education and Employment. 
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II.2 The system of industrial relations - collective 
institutions 
The agenda of reform since 1979 
In terms of legislation this is one of the areas of the 
labour market to have witnessed the most significant changes 
since 1979. However, those legislative changes were phased in 
over the period from 1980 to 1993 with the Conservative 
Government proceeding cautiously, seeking to pass legislation 
only if there was a reasonable chance of compliance with that 
legislation. 
In 1979 the incoming administration placed a large degree 
of responsibility for Britain's economic problems on the trade 
unions. It was believed that strikes and restrictive practices 
were a major constraint on productivity. It was also believed 
that the unions played a major role in keeping wages above market 
clearing levels with adverse consequences for unemployment. 
However, the reform agenda after 1979 was influenced as much by 
political as economic considerations53. It was widely believed 
that the Conservative administration of 197 0-74 had been brought 
down by the unions. A period of industrial unrest in the winter 
of 1978-79 had also seemed to signal to the incoming Government 
that union power posed a threat to the orderly government of the 
nation. Complementary to this, the strand of Conservatism which 
emphasised individual rights saw the unions as constraining those 
rights. Thus a range of motives lay behind the Government's 
approach to the unions after 1979. It should also be stressed 
that at this time there was much popular support for this agenda, 
influenced not least by the industrial unrest of the Winter of 
1978-79. 
It is not clear that these motives for reform meant that the 
incoming Government in 1979 had any kind of 'grand strategic 
design' for the reform of collective industrial relations54. 
Rather the legislative changes proceeded incrementally, with each 
step building on the one before. In large part this was a 
response to the experience of the Conservative administration of 
1970-74 which had passed a comprehensive Act of Parliament to 
reform industrial relations in 1971, but this legislation had 
been rejected by the unions and not enthusiastically embraced by 
employers either. This in itself counselled caution the second 
time around. Thus from 1980 to 1993 six major Acts of Parliament 
were passed at intervals to slowly 'redress the balance' between 
employers on the one hand, and on the other employees acting 
collectively through their unions. This use of the language of 
'redressing the balance' does not seem to suggest wholesale 
opposition to collective industrial relations, a position which 
might have been urged by the more laissez-faire supporters of the 
Government approach. It suggests a Government view that in the 
197 0s employees acting collectively through their unions had too 
much power and that the aim was to move the balance back in the 
direction of the employers. 
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The evolving legal framework governing unions and collective 
bargaining since 1979 
The traditional system of British industrial relations has 
often been described as 'voluntaristic' in nature. This was 
meant to imply that the role of the law was circumscribed. The 
unions since 1906 had been granted a range of immunities from 
civil or criminal action arising from industrial disputes. In 
other words employers could not easily use the law to counter 
industrial action. This granting of immunities was also seen as 
necessary in order to 'redress the balance' between powerful 
employers and relatively powerless individual employees, who 
could only hope to match the power of the modern firm by acting 
collectively, relatively free from the threat of legal action. 
The set of reforms enacted by the Conservative Government 
has not overturned this basic structure55. The law has played 
a much greater role since 1979, with the legislation seeking to 
limit some of the immunities, to erode some of the union 
institutions which promote or consolidate union influence, to 
reform the internal organisation of the unions with the perceived 
aim of increasing the rights of individual members, and to 
undermine the role of collective wage-setting. However, a group 
of workers still have the right to undertake lawful strike action 
and when they do still have access to the traditional legal 
immunities from civil and criminal action by the employer. Hence 
the claim of the Government to have merely 'redressed the 
balance' . 
Another critical point to note is that the Government has 
acted to 'regulate' the relationship between the employers and 
the unions, with the law now playing a greater role in an area 
where previously its role had been circumscribed. It is strictly 
inaccurate therefore to talk about 'deregulation' in this 
respect. 
The reforms can be divided into four strands: 
1) The first group of reforms have restricted the types of 
industrial action which the unions can enter into and still enjoy 
the traditional immunities. This has been achieved in three 
ways. Firstly, by limiting the definition of a lawful trade 
dispute so that secondary action (that is action against a second 
employer not directly involved in a dispute) and any associated 
secondary picketing is outlawed. Politically motivated strikes 
are also not protected. Secondly, any other industrial action 
has to be preceded by a secret postal ballot of the union's 
membership and seven days notice must now be given to the 
employer before action proceeds. Thirdly, union funds have been 
put at risk from fines and sequestration if they undertake 
unlawful industrial action. Unions have to endorse or disown any 
unofficial action and employers can selectively dismiss employees 
undertaking unofficial action. All of these changes have made 
unions much more cautious before undertaking any action and have 
also forced them to take a much tighter grip over their 
membership. 
2) The institutions for promoting or consolidating union 
influence have been eroded. The most dramatic example is the 
eventual abolition of the closed shop, whereby individuals have 
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to join a union either before or after obtaining a particular 
job. The fate of the closed shop also best illustrates the 
incremental nature of the legislation. An Act in 198 0 had begun 
the process of restricting the operation of the closed shop but 
it was not until 1990 that the institution was effectively 
rendered unlawful. Related changes include the abolition of 
machinery designed to facilitate union recognition and abolition 
of the right of public authorities to award contracts only to 
firms which are unionised. Employers can now offer more 
favourable terms to non-union members as an incentive to 
employees to opt out of collective bargaining. 
3) Another set of reforms has sought to alter the relationship 
between unions and their individual members. Senior union 
officials must now be elected by secret postal ballot. Ballots 
also have to be held every ten years to legitimise the political 
funds which some unions hold. A Commissioner for the Rights of 
Trade Union members was established to assist individuals taking 
legal action against their unions. Unions can no longer 
discipline members who refuse to take part even in lawful 
industrial action, and members now have a right to confirm 
periodically the deduction of union dues from their pay packets. 
Individuals have a right not to be refused employment on the 
grounds of trade union membership or non-membership, and the 
right to belong or not to belong to a trade union. Individual 
employees have the right not to be dismissed or chosen for 
redundancy for being, or not being, members of a trade union. 
4) Finally the legal supports for collective bargaining and 
statutory wage setting have been removed. Of particular 
importance here is the eventual abolition of the Wages Councils 
(outside of agriculture) which until 1993 set minimum pay rates 
in a number of industry sectors. This is discussed in section 
III.3. In addition the long standing Fair Wages Resolution which 
had allowed public authorities to award contracts only to firms 
which set pay and conditions in accordance with collective 
agreements was abolished. More generally the Conservative 
Government has eschewed any role for incomes policies in the 
private sector and has instead encouraged the decentralisation 
of pay bargaining and the spread of newer forms of performance 
related pay. All of this is geared towards undermining the role 
of collective bargaining in pay determination. 
Again it needs to be stressed that these legal changes have 
occured incrementally. Their possible general impact is 
discussed below, but some specific results of the legislation are 
worth outlining. The ballots on unions' political funds did not 
result in any of these funds being abolished or the funds 
diverted away from the Labour Party. In 19 9 0 ACAS reported that 
of 1023 strike ballots held up until 1989, 908 had been in favour 
of action, with the employer usually settling the dispute soon 
after56. This probably reflects the fact that unions only hold 
ballots when they are reasonably sure of victory. Elections for 
union officials have not lead to any obvious change in the make-
up of union leadership. On the other hand the closed shop has 
collapsed and secondary action has been eliminated. 
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Trends in union membership and the evolving structure of 
union organisation since 1979 
Union membership has been in sharp decline since 1979 
(Figure 27). The peak in union membership in that year at over 
13 million was equivalent to some 59 per cent of all employees, 
though this will be an overestimate of union density as 
membership data includes the retired and unemployed57. By 1994 
union membership at over eight million was equivalent to some 38 
per cent of all employees. Separate data from the Labour Force 
Survey which excludes retired and unemployed union members would 
put union density at just 34 per cent of all employees in 1994. 
This decline in union density has been sharper than in many other 
industrial countries58. 
It would be tempting to associate this decline in union 
membership with the legislation discussed above. However, the 
role of the legislation has to be seen alongside other changes. 
These include higher unemployment, and changes in the structure 
of employment with the decline in manufacturing and the relative 
growth of female, part-time and service sector employment where 
unionisation rates have traditionally been lower. However, aside 
from the traumatic decline in manufacturing jobs in the early 
1980s, in section 1.2 doubts were cast on how far these trends 
in the structure of employment do represent significant breaks 
with the trends before 1979. Moreover, pointing to these factors 
merely begs the question as to why the unions have been less 
successful in organising workers in these growing parts of the 
workforce? Employers have been very reluctant to grant union 
recognition in new workplaces, but although changes in the law 
have made this easier, employers had always been in a position 
to limit union recognition if they felt the need to do so. It 
is the changed circumstances of a more harshly competitive 
product market environment which seem to have given them the 
incentive to do so59. 
The public sector remains much more highly unionised. In 
1990 72 per cent of workers in public sector establishments with 
more than 2 5 workers were union members, down from 80 per cent 
in 198460. The single largest union in Britain, formed in 1993 
from the merger of three unions, represents public sector 
workers. Indeed one-in-six of all union members in 1994 belonged 
to this one union and the top five unions accounted for over half 
of all union membership61. So alongside declining union 
membership there has been a trend towards the merger of unions 
so that by 1994 there were only 243 registered unions, down from 
453 in 1979. 
Many trade unions belong to the Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
which is the peak organisation for labour in the UK. However, 
the TUC has never had the authority which is invested in many of 
its counterparts elsewhere in Europe and its formal role has been 
undermined as the Government has abolished many of the 
institutions which brought together the 'social partners' for 
collective discussions. 
The decline of such institutions was best symbolised in 1992 
when the National Economic Development Council was abolished, an 
institution which had been set up in 19 62 by a previous 
Conservative Government. This serves as a reminder that the 
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institutions designed to foster 'concerted action' in the UK 
evolved as pragmatic responses under different Governments. 
However, there was never a formalisation of the role of the 
'social partners' in the manner of some continental systems. The 
'social contract' between 1974-79 was an ad-hoc Government and 
union response to the post oil shock crisis to which the 
employers were asked to contribute, but it never involved the 
establishment of any formal machinery for 'concerted action'. 
Employers' organisations 
The decline after 1979 of those 'tripartite' structures 
which had existed also undermined any role which the employers' 
main peak organisation the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) might have played in such arrangements. In the early 1980s 
the influence of the CBI was barely more substantial than that 
of the TUC and the effects of the recession on the CBI's members, 
heavily concentrated in manufacturing, lead to considerable 
friction with the Government. 
The CBI has never participated in collective bargaining. 
It has always been essentially a pressure group lobbying on 
behalf of employers. In this role it has been matched by the 
Institute of Directors (IoD), which has been more directly 
supportive of the Conservative Government in contrast to the 
perceived 'woolliness' of the CBI. The employers' industry 
organisations, such as the Engineering Employers' Federation, are 
also now essentially lobby groups, given that their role in 
collective bargaining has declined sharply. This was symbolised 
by the collapse of industry level negotiations in the engineering 
industry in 1990. By 1990 only 13 per cent of establishments 
belonged to employers' associations compared with one quarter in 
198062. 
It should be noted that the fragmentation of employer 
representation at national level is mirrored at local level where 
the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), the Chambers of 
Commerce and the Enterprise Agencies, amongst other, compete for 
employer membership and support. 
The employers' organisations and the TUC have responded 
increasingly warmly to the possible role offered to them within 
the organisations of the European Union. Their participation in 
EU-wide tripartite deliberations is partial compensation for the 
decline of such arrangements in the UK. Of particular interest 
is the role of the TUC and the CBI in discussions over the UK's 
opt out from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty and more 
generally the impact on the UK labour market of employment 
policies emanating from the EU. This is taken up further in 
section 111. 
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The impact of reforms on changes in private and public 
sector pay determination since 1979. 
Another stark trend in the UK labour market has been the 
sharp erosion of the role of collective pay setting institutions. 
In 1975 between 84 and 86 per cent of employees had their pay 
determined either by collective bargaining and/or statutory 
machinery (the Wages Councils). With the abolition of the Wages 
Councils in 1993 this proportion fell to significantly less than 
half so that collective pay setting by the early 1990s affected 
a smaller proportion of employees than at any time since before 
the second world war63. The decline in the coverage of 
collective pay setting has of course been associated with the 
decline in union density but has proceeded at a much faster pace. 
Of particular note is the sharp decline in multi-employer 
and industry wage setting, which explains the declining influence 
of industry organisations such as the Engineering Employers' 
Federation. Pay determination increasingly takes place at the 
level of the establishment. However, this does not represent 
complete decentralisation. Rather at the same time that industry 
level bargaining has declined in importance, management at firm 
level has taken a much tighter central grip on the determination 
of pay within the firm64. Even where some autonomy is granted 
to individual establishments to determine some aspects of pay and 
conditions this is in the context of tight financial controls 
exercised centrally. The decentralisation which has taken place 
has been along product market lines rather than on a geographic 
basis. Local pay bargaining is set firmly within a national 
corporate framework. 
In 1990 two-fifths of workplaces in the trading sector had 
arrangements where part of the wage bill was paid over in a 
manner linked in some way to individual performance65. This 
might if anything represent a fall over the 198 0s in the 
proportion of the workforce remunerated in ways other than a 
straightforward hourly wage or salary. This is because 
traditional forms of contingent pay such as piece rates have been 
declining sharply in importance. There has been growth in newer 
forms of contingent pay such as merit and profit related pay and 
employee share ownership schemes. However, whereas such 
arrangements are spread widely they have developed little depth, 
with such payments accounting for only a small fraction of the 
total wage bill in any firm which has introduced such schemes. 
Moreover, the growth in these kinds of schemes may have as much 
to do with the considerable tax advantages associated with them 
as with any intrinsic merits. 
Within the public sector, where unionisation rates remain 
much higher, about three-quarters of the workforce continue to 
have their pay determined by collective bargaining. The other 
quarter have their pay linked by formula to the growth in average 
earnings (the police and fire services) or determined by review 
bodies (teachers, doctors and nurses and the armed forces). 
These groups have seen much greater increases in real pay since 
1979 than the three-quarters covered by traditional collective 
bargaining66. Manual workers in the public sector have seen 
significantly lower increases in pay than their professional 
counterparts but have done better than their private sector 
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manual counterparts. There has also been little increase in wage 
inequality within the occupations dominated by the public 
sector67, in contrast with the sharp within-group increases in 
inequality outlined in section 1.4. 
The Government is obliged to have a pay policy for the 
public sector, even if it rejects having a formal policy for the 
private sector. The Government's approach to public sector pay 
mirrors the dilemma faced by the private sector over how to 
achieve a balance between promoting a greater sensitivity of pay 
to local conditions and individual performance by decentralising 
pay determination, and the need to exercise central control, 
often for financial reasons. Within the health service, for 
example, structural changes involving the setting up of health 
trusts have been accompanied by attempts to promote more local 
bargaining and performance related pay. At the same time 
national review bodies set pay increases across the board for 
professional staff and since 1993 the Government has had an 
explicit pay policy for the public sector in order to hold down 
public spending and the budget deficit68. 
Clearly then within the private and public sectors the 
agenda of promoting greater 'decentralisation' in pay setting has 
not necessarily produced the outcomes anticipated. Rather the 
balance between decentralisation on the one hand and on the other 
hand coordination at a higher level has been difficult to strike. 
However, whereas the extent and nature of the 'decentralisation' 
of pay determination since 1979 has been unclear, the overall 
decline in the influence of collective bargaining is unambiguous. 
The impact of this on actual outcomes in terms of pay 
settlements is unclear. The shift away from multi-employer and 
industry level bargaining has not lead to any increase in the 
dispersion of pay settlements in manufacturing69. Dispersion of 
settlements at a given inflation rate was similar in the early 
1990s to the early 1980s. The 'going rate' for pay settlements 
centred around the level of headline inflation still plays an 
important role in wage determination. 
In section 1.4 the issue as to whether there has been any 
improvement in the aggregate trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation was explored. There is no evidence that the experience 
of disinflation was any less painful in the early 1990s when 
compared with the early 198 0s. Many authors have reached the 
broad conclusion that there is no evidence that the decline in 
union density and in the role of collective bargaining and the 
greater 'decentralisation' of pay determination has in any sense 
significantly altered the trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation70. Unambiguously, this aspect of the 'de-regulation' 
of the labour market has, however, been associated with a sharp 
increase in wage inequality as section 1.4 made clear. 
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The impact of reforms on workplace industrial relations and 
productivity 
The evidence for an improvement in productivity growth and 
in certain indices of industrial relations outcomes such as the 
number of working days lost through strikes, is much clearer71. 
The question here is how far this can be put down to the legal 
reforms and how far they are a result of other factors. In 
particular the impact of the reforms has to be seen alongside the 
impact of two traumatic recessions and the associated sharp 
increases in unemployment, and the impact of policies designed 
to promote greater product market competition which are discussed 
in section V.3. 
Figure 2 8 plots the change in the number of working days 
lost through stoppages over the period 1975-94. The dramatic 
improvement over time is readily apparent. The upward blip in 
the figures for working days lost in 1984-85 reflects the miners' 
strike of that year. A comparison of the early 1990s with the 
early 1980s or the late 1970s clearly shows that the number of 
working days lost through strikes has declined significantly. 
The timing seems to suggest a role for the legislation which 
developed incrementally. It was only after the defeat of the 
miners' strike that employers began to use the legislation and 
its effects became apparent. It should be noted, however, that 
the Government's use of its own new legislation played only a 
modest role during the miners' strike. In 1992 60 per cent of 
all working days lost were in the public sector where the state 
is directly responsible for using its own legislation. 
A more important piece of evidence which leads to doubts 
about the weight to be given to the UK legislation in explaining 
the sharp decline in the number of working days lost through 
industrial action is to note that this decline has taken place 
in most industrial countries which have not seen the major 
legislative changes witnessed in the UK. International 
comparisons across a long timespan are difficult due to data 
limitations, but the UK ranked fourth amongst the G-7 countries 
in terms of working days lost in the late 1970s and this ranking 
had not altered by the early 1990s72. However, the UK's 
relative ranking in the OECD as a whole in the early 1990s looked 
significantly better than in the late 1980s73. 
Nevertheless the similar trends in most industrialised 
countries point to changes in the macroeconomic environment 
playing an important role. Strike activity is positively 
correlated with inflationary shocks and negatively correlated 
with unemployment, so that the environment of the early 1990s 
throughout the industrialised world of subdued inflation and high 
unemployment should have lead to a decline in industrial unrest. 
The UK's new legislative framework may play an additional role. 
The evidence for a trend improvement in the UK's productivity 
performance has become more compelling over time. Table 27 looks 
at the trend rate of growth in output per hour in manufacturing 
and in output per person employed in the whole economy over four 
time periods. In manufacturing, the rate of growth in output per 
hour of four percentage points per annum between 1979-89 (and 
1979-94) compares very favourably with the meagre growth rates 
in manufacturing productivity achieved in the 1970s and even 
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compares well with the growth rates experienced before 1973. In 
terms of growth rates in output per person employed in the whole 
economy the rate achieved since 1979 compares well with the 1973-
79 period, but is below the rate achieved before 1973. 
Britain's comparative productivity performance has improved 
significantly too. In the period after 1979 manufacturing 
productivity grew significantly faster in the UK than the average 
for 11 other major industrial economies. Indeed only Japan, 
Belgium and Italy matched the UK growth rate in manufacturing 
productivity over this period. Before 1979 manufacturing 
productivity grew at a significantly slower rate in the UK 
relative to the average for these other countries. The better 
performance since 1979 has meant a significant erosion of the gap 
in levels of manufacturing productivity between the UK and 
countries such as Germany, France and the Netherlands74. 
In terms of whole economy productivity growth rates the UK 
has done marginally better than the average for the 15 member 
states of the EU, though the relative improvement when compared 
with the period before 1979 is marked. 
How far can this productivity turnaround be attributed to 
the legal reforms, as opposed to the impact of the recessions and 
of increased product market competition? The timing of the 
productivity breakthrough is of some importance. The increase 
in productivity occured from 1980 onwards, which is before the 
legislation could have begun to have any impact. Rather the 
turnaround seems clearly associated with the impact of the 
recession, which shook up management and led to large scale 
shedding of labour, and to an assault on restrictive practices 
which in the harsh environment of the early 1980s could no longer 
be tolerated. However, the sustained improvement over the whole 
period from 1979-94 suggests that the recession did not have a 
merely one-off effect but lead to a permanent change to the way 
British firms were managed. 
Data from a panel of private sector companies showed that 
in the early 1980s and again in the period 1988-89 unionised 
firms registered faster gains in productivity than non-unionised 
firms75. However, between 1984-87 there was no differential in 
productivity growth between union and non-union firms. This is 
precisely the time frame when the legislation would have been 
expected to have had its impact in enabling management in 
unionised firms to take a tighter grip on manning. Rather the 
interpretation seems to be that in the early 1980s the recession 
enabled management to re-assert its prerogatives, with management 
moving to eliminate over-manning and restrictive practices in all 
firms, but unionised firms especially. This effect persisted for 
all firms through the mid-1980s, but increased product market 
competition in the late 1980s added a further extra spur, 
especially in unionised companies. The specific role of the 
legislation is hard to discern. There is evidence that the 
negative impact of multi-union bargaining on productivity has 
disappeared . 
This micro data seems to match an interpretation based on 
the aggregate data. It is the recession of the early 1980s which 
provided the shock to management and lowered the ability of 
labour to resist attempts to eliminate over-manning and 
restrictive practices across all companies, unionised and non-
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unionised. Increased product market competition has played an 
important supporting role in maintaining the pressure for 
improvement, and so perhaps has the legislation. 
To the extent that the industrial relations legislation has 
made a contribution to the relative improvement in productivity 
growth rates in the British economy, this suggests an 
uncomfortable trade-off, in that the decline in the coverage of 
collective bargaining and in union density has also contributed 
to the increase in wage inequality (section 1.4). If the shock 
of the early 1980s recession was the primary driving force behind 
the productivity improvements this suggests an even more 
troubling trade-off, as that recession heralded the arrival of 
mass unemployment with all the associated social costs. The 
'productivity miracle' was bought at a high price and a 
legitimate question to ask is whether more could have been done 
to assist and compensate the losers, a point which will be taken 
up in section V.2. 
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III Labour market legislation and individual employment rights 
III.l Individual employment rights 
The legislative changes introduced in Britain since 1979 in 
the field of individual employment rights have not really 
constituted a significant programme of labour market 
'deregulation'. There has been some legislation which has 
relaxed employment protection. Other legislation, however, has 
strengthened the rights of individual employees, with much of 
this legislation implemented in order to comply with European 
Union Directives and the Courts' interpretations of EU Treaties. 
The nature of the employment relationship in the UK in 1979 
was already less heavily regulated than in most other EU nations. 
Traditionally legislation played as limited a role in regulating 
relations between individual employees and their employers as it 
had in regulating collective relations between employers and 
unions. However, the modern legislative period of employment 
protection began in the 1960s and in the 1970s a number of Acts 
consolidated the piecemeal legislation which had built up in the 
fields of employment protection, provisions against 
discrimination and health and safety77. The relationship 
between the employer and the employee was becoming more codified 
in the period leading up to 1979 and it is not clear that that 
year represents any significant break in trend. 
The one major piece of 'deregulation' which has occured is 
in relation to the length of service required before an 
individual employee is covered by rights relating to unfair 
dismissal and access to redundancy payments. In 1979 an employee 
had to have six months continuous employment to gain access to 
these rights. In 1979, in the first piece of legislation 
relating to employment law passed by the new Government, this 
qualifying period was increased to one year. In 1985 it was 
further extended to two years. 
Claims for unfair dismissal can be pursued through the 
system of industrial tribunals which also deal with many other 
individual employment issues78. These tribunals have a 
tripartite composition with a legally qualified chair and two lay 
members drawn from panels appointed by the Government after 
consultation with the 'social partners'. They are more 
accessible and informal than the regular courts, though appeals 
on points of law can be taken to the higher courts. Conciliation 
is used to resolve a high proportion of cases before the tribunal 
stage is reached. This is the responsibility of the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) now under the 
sponsorship of the Department for Trade and Industry which has 
responsibility for the whole area of labour relations (see Figure 
26) . 
Other aspects of the relationship between the individual 
employee and their employer have been more clearly codified since 
1979 in response to EU directives. A 1981 Act guaranteed 
continuity of employment and existing terms and conditions where 
a change of employer occured. In 1993 the employee's right to 
receive written information on the terms and conditions of 
employment was extended, though in the UK context the 
codification of this aspect of the relationship between employer 
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and employee dates back to a 1963 Act which marked the beginning 
of the modern legislative era of statutory employment 
protection79. 
Acts to deal with equal pay and sex discrimination came into 
force in 1975, with the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) 
responsible for overseeing the impact of the legislation. The 
provisions of these Acts have been strengthened since 1979 as UK 
law has been amended on a number of occasions to conform with the 
interpretations offered by the Courts of the equal treatment 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome. In 1983 the Equal Pay Act of 
the 1970s was amended to introduce the notion of equal pay for 
work of equal value. The coverage of the sex discrimination 
legislation was extended in 1986 and again in 1989. 
The Courts' interpretations of the Treaty of Rome's 
provisions on equal treatment seem to have been particularly 
liberal in the field of indirect discrimination, whereby a 
practice can be outlawed if it impacts adversely on women even 
if that was not the intention. UK legislation had also 
recognised the concept of indirect discrimination, but the wider 
interpretation of that concept by the UK House of Lords resulted 
in one of the most significant changes in the field of individual 
employment rights from 1995. Employment protection laws had not 
applied to many categories of part-time workers before this time. 
On the grounds that part-timers were overwhelmingly women this 
was judged to represent unlawful indirect discrimination. As a 
result, from 1995 there were no longer any requirements on how 
many hours an individual had to work in order to qualify for 
protection against unfair dismissal and for redundancy pay. Only 
the two year length of service requirement remains as a 
qualification for access to these employment protection rights. 
The UK has the most comprehensive legislation outlawing 
racial discrimination of any EU member, on a par with the 
Netherlands. This is acknowledged by the Commission for Racial 
Equality (CRE) which is the statutory body responsible for 
overseeing that legislation, though the CRE has criticised many 
weaknesses which it perceives to exist in that legislation80. 
Likewise the EOC has argued for further tightening of the law 
with respect to equal opportunities across the genders and 
especially for more effective enforcement of the laws which do 
exist. In 1989 legislation was passed prohibiting discrimination 
on ethnic and religious grounds in Northern Ireland, with some 
features of that legislation going beyond what is in place in the 
rest of the UK. 
People who came from the Commonwealth to settle in the UK 
in the post-war period and their descendants have full 
citizenship rights. There is no concept in UK law of the 'guest-
worker' . Direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of 
race is outlawed in the UK, though there is evidence that the 
extent of direct discrimination had not fallen significantly 
between the late 1970s and early 1980s despite the passing of the 
Race Relations Act of 1976 which extended the legislation 
originally introduced in the 1960s81. Nevertheless, this is the 
one area of individual employment rights where the UK labour 
market is more and not less regulated than the labour markets in 
most of its EU partners. 
In 1996 the first major piece of legislation designed to 
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combat discrimination against disabled people was due to come 
into effect, though its provisions fall short of what pressure 
groups had been arguing for. This is one field where provision 
in the UK is significantly less advanced than in some other EU 
states such as the Netherlands and Sweden. 
The field of health and safety legislation is another area 
where provisions built up piecemeal were codified in a major 
piece of legislation in 1974, with the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) being set up as an inspectorate. The HSE now 
comes under the remit of the Environment Department (see Figure 
26). Health and safety legislation has not seen major changes 
since 1979, though a number of EU directives have altered and 
extended the scope of legislation. In this field too the extent 
of regulation in the UK seems in line with that seen in other EU 
countries and the UK has a relatively good safety record. 
It is in the field of the regulation of working time that 
the UK labour market was and is largely deregulated in that there 
are no statutes which directly intervene in the relationship 
between the employer and the employee. This is discussed further 
in the next section. 
There is also no legislative backing in the UK for the 
existence of Works Councils, which offer one institutional 
mechanism by which individual employment rights might be 
enforced. Only UK firms employing over 1000 people in other 
member states and with at least 150 employees in two or more of 
them are affected by the European Works Councils Directive which 
stems from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. Instead 
in the UK context there are a range of formal and informal 
methods which are used by employers to promote employee 
involvement. These include Joint Consultative Committees which 
are the nearest UK equivalents to continental works councils and 
which covered 2 9 per cent of UK workplaces with over 2 5 employees 
in 199082. More informal lines of consultation and 
communication exist in many workplaces and tend to deal with such 
issues as major changes in work methods or organisation, health 
and safety, the terms and conditions of employment, and staffing 
and manpower plans. Such informal arrangements seemed to be more 
commonplace in 1990 than in 1980, but the coverage of joint 
consultative committees has declined. 
These arrangements for consultation and communication are 
sometimes linked with other features such as contingent pay 
systems and given the label of 'human resource management' 
(HRM)83. Such HRM practices are often seen as an alternative to 
collective bargaining over workplace issues, though many of the 
institutions and practices associated with HRM are actually more 
prevalent where a union is also recognised. The number of 
workplaces with neither a union nor the practices associated with 
HRM is growing rapidly84. The 'non-unionised, non-HRM' firm is 
a relatively under-researched phenomenon. 
The diversity of such mechanisms for promoting employee 
involvement in the UK is seen as a strength by the UK Government 
and the employers' organisations such as the CBI and IoD. This 
explains their long standing opposition to attempts by the EU to 
impose Directives requiring employers to set up Works Councils. 
The trade unions have become more enthusiastic about such 
proposals as their membership and power have shrunk. As the 
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proportion of the workforce who are trade union members has 
fallen sharply the case for developing other institutions for 
securing employment rights might appear to have grown stronger. 
However, this focus on the institutions which might secure 
individual employment rights serves to divert attention away from 
what has happened to those rights themselves. The generalisation 
that the relationship between the employer and the individual 
employee in the UK has been extensively deregulated since 1979 
cannot be sustained. The list of individual statutory employment 
rights which applied in the mid-1990s was not significantly 
different from that which applied in 197985. In some areas, 
notably the legislative framework in relation to equal treatment 
across genders, there have been significant extensions to 
legislation mainly as a result of Court interpretations of EU 
law. It is important to recognise that in this field of equal 
opportunities the changes to UK law have resulted from powers as 
set out in the Treaty of Rome and not the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht Treaty from which the UK Government secured an opt-
out. These changes have built on UK law: individual employment 
rights were already in the process of being more extensively 
codified in the period leading up to 1979. 
The impact of employment protection on employment 
The one significant example of deregulation is the 
lengthening period of service required before protection against 
unfair dismissal and access to redundancy payments is available. 
The lengthening of this period from 6 months to two years was 
justified by the UK Government on the grounds that an excessive 
burden of employment protection had significant adverse 
consequences for employment. It is an empirical question as to 
whether the regime which existed in 1979 did have such 
consequences. 
In practice the effect of employment protection legislation 
on unemployment is ambiguous. It should reduce lay-offs and thus 
lower the inflow into unemployment. On the other hand 
restrictions on the ability of employers to fire workers might 
make them more reluctant to hire thus lowering the outflow from 
unemployment as well. Empirical analysis before 1979 of the 
impact of UK employment protection legislation found no 
unambiguous evidence that it significantly harmed employment86. 
The empirical case for lengthening the period of service from six 
months to one and then two years was hardly overwhelming. 
With the passing of this legislation, survey evidence 
suggested unsurprisingly that British employers by the mid-1980s 
were the least worried in the EU about employment protection 
legislation as an obstacle to employment87. 
In its opposition to the implementation of equal rights for 
part-time workers the Government argued that extending employment 
protection to part-time workers would impact adversely on their 
levels of employment. Interestingly, the UK House of Lords 
dismissed such claims as lacking any hard empirical basis. The 
equal pay legislation of the 1970s appeared to have no 
discernable impact on women's employment88. Neither the UK 
Government, nor anyone else has tried to investigate the impact 
of the many other measures of labour market regulation which 
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evolved over the period up to and after 1979. 
III.2 Nature and regulation of working time 
This is the one aspect of the relationship between the 
employer and the employee which is almost completely unregulated 
in the UK, though it should be stressed that this has always been 
the case. Before 1979 there was no regulation of working time 
outside of collective bargaining, indeed hours of work 
represented the purest example of the traditional UK model 
whereby the unions and employers collectively bargained over 
working time arrangements and the role of the state was 
circumscribed. What few restrictions did exist in relation to 
the working hours and conditions of young people and women were 
abolished in 1989. 
In common with other advanced industrial economies there was 
a steady downward trend in the average number of hours worked by 
employees in the period up to the late 1970s in the UK. However, 
this decline appeared to come to a halt in the 1980s. If 
anything the Labour Force Survey suggests that in the period 
between 19 8 4-96 the average weekly hours worked by full time 
employees may have risen modestly, especially for men. In 1984 
the average male full time employee worked for just over 38 hours 
a week. In 1996 this had increased to just over 40 hours. 
Average hours worked by full time employees in the UK are the 
highest in the EU89. 
In contrast with other EU countries the UK has a very wide 
distribution of hours worked and this distribution appears to 
have widened between 1984 and 1995 (Figure 29)90. In 1984 only 
half of the employed UK workforce worked a 'standard' working 
week in the sense that weekly hours worked fell in between 3 6-45 
hours. By 1995 the proportion working between these hours had 
fallen to 43 per cent of the workforce. By 1995 a higher 
proportion of the workforce were working both longer hours and 
shorter hours. In part this reflects the growth in the share of 
part-time and self-employment, with the self-employed on average 
working longer hours. Amongst 'part-timers' Figure 27 clearly 
shows the sharp increase in the proportion working between 2 6-3 5 
hours. Generally the UK labour market exhibits considerable 
diversity in working time patterns, with a high incidence of 
overtime and shift working. 
The UK also has no legislation governing paid holiday 
entitlement. There are eight days in the year which are 
customarily taken as public holidays, a lower number than in 
other EU states91. Traditionally the regulation of holiday time 
has been the preserve of collective bargaining. In Autumn 1993, 
according to the Labour Force Survey, employees in Britain 
enjoyed an average of 4-5 weeks paid holiday, an average which 
compares well with other EU countries and favourably with the US 
and Japan. Where unions are recognised in the workplace 
employees receive on average an extra 4.5 days paid holidays92. 
However, 11 per cent of employees had no paid holiday entitlement 
at all. Most of these were part-timers and/or had been in their 
job for less than a year. So the absence of any general state 
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regulation in this area, combined with the declining coverage of 
the unions and collective bargaining, has its impact not on the 
average worker but rather on a significant minority. 
It is in this context that the opposition of the UK 
Government to the EU Directive relating to working time should 
be seen. This Directive had suggested limits to maximum hours 
worked during the week, minimum rest periods and minimum paid 
holiday entitlements. Although the Directive offered a number 
of exemptions it will affect a significant proportion of the UK 
workforce. Its impact on the UK would be disproportionate 
because of the wider dispersion of working hours reported in 
Figure 29 and the significant proportion of the UK workforce with 
no paid holiday entitlement. 
The Directive also proposed regulating the one aspect of the 
relationship between the employer and employee which has not 
before been subject to any general state regulation in the UK. 
This is in complete contrast to health and safety or equal 
opportunities legislation where changes which have been the 
result of EU Directives and Court interpretations of EU Treaties 
have been built on the back of existing UK legislation and an 
increasing tendency to codify rights in such areas anyway. 
The Working Time Directive was introduced under the auspices 
of health and safety legislation. Directives on health and 
safety issues can be passed by qualified majority voting 
following on from the Single European Act of 1986. This also 
serves as a reminder that this legislation too has nothing to do 
with the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Temporary employment contracts have never been the subject 
of specific legislation in the UK. The only legal advantage 
acquired in the UK by offering employment on a temporary or fixed 
term contract basis is that the employee waives their rights in 
relation to unfair dismissal. As these rights for permanent 
workers have been circumscribed since 1979 and as there is little 
evidence that in 1979 they represented a significant barrier to 
employment anyway, this explains the paradox that in the 
relatively 'deregulated' UK labour market the incidence of 
temporary employment is so low. Firms only have the incentive 
to employ workers on non-standard contracts if the regulations 
covering standard contracts are perceived as burdensome. The 
fact that the share of temporary employment is so low in the UK 
is indirect evidence that the burden of employment protection on 
regular forms of employment are not in fact heavy and never have 
been. 
Surveys which ask employers why they use part-time or 
temporary staff tend to give a range of traditional reasons for 
their use, to do with the task requiring limited time or the need 
to provide short term cover. A 1987 survey of employers did not 
suggest that hourly rates of pay for part-time and temporary 
staff were significantly lower than for full-time permanent 
staff93. However, these staff did have less access to sick pay 
and membership of occupational pension schemes, so that lower 
non-wage labour costs offered some incentive for the employment 
of such staff. From 1995 discrimination against part-timers in 
access to occupational pension schemes will constitute unlawful 
indirect discrimination. However, many part-timers will not have 
access to statutory sick pay as such access is only available to 
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those with wages above the earnings threshold for payment of 
social security taxes (national insurance contributions). For 
part-timers this threshold must be an important influence on 
determining hours worked as we observe a big bunching of part-
timers at wages just below this threshold (see section V.2). 
The point can be made again that there is no evidence that 
the share of part-time working in total employment increased at 
a faster rate after 1979 so that there is no evidence here for 
a strategy of 'deregulation' having had any significant impact 
on the structure of employment. Reasons for the trends in self-
employment and the more recent increase in the incidence of 
temporary employment were discussed in section I.2. 
The employment impact of reductions in working time 
In some EU countries the possible role of reductions in 
working time in creating more employment opportunities is a 
significant feature of the debate over unemployment. This is 
less true in the UK which might seem surprising given the high 
incidence of long weekly working hours. 
Such reductions in working time would presumably have to be 
collectively bargained. A legitimate question to ask therefore 
is whether there is evidence on the extent to which employees 
would be prepared to trade-off lower hours for less pay? A 
reduction in working hours without a proportional reduction in 
pay would lead to higher labour costs which could have adverse 
consequences for employment. Firms might try to offset these 
higher costs by boosting productivity but then that would defeat 
the proposed aim of creating more employment. Many of those 
working long hours are professional and managerial staff so that 
the unemployed may not be adequate substitutes. Other workers 
might work long hours in order to offset low hourly wages so that 
the long hours are the only means by which household incomes can 
be sustained at a reasonable level. 
A 1989 survey asked respondents a question about their 
preference for working longer or fewer hours (Table 28). 1989 
was a year of strong growth in employment and real incomes and 
preferences may be different when economic activity is less 
buoyant. A striking feature of the responses is that 84 per cent 
of part-time workers were happy with their present hours 
indicating again that the incidence of involuntary part-time 
working is relatively low (see section 1.2). By contrast two-
thirds of those working over 50 hours expressed a preference to 
work fewer hours. However, the majority of these were not 
prepared to accept lower pay as a consequence. Overall only 
seven per cent of the sample were prepared to work fewer hours 
and accept lower pay as a consequence. 
If groups of workers wish to bargain for lower hours there 
is nothing to prevent them from doing so in the UK. This is a 
benign side effect of there being no state regulation of working 
hours. Between 1989 and 1991 industrial action in the 
engineering industry forced engineering employers to offer a 
lower working week. This is the dispute which resulted in the 
ending of national bargaining in this industry (see section 
II.2). Research on the impact of this reduction in working 
hours, which did not appear to result in any reductions in weekly 
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pay, suggests that reduced hours generally have no permanent 
effects on productivity94. Rather reduced hours may bring 
forward productivity improvements which had already been under 
consideration. There was also no evidence that reduced hours 
affected output or overtime so that the reduction must have lead 
to higher employment. However, this reduction in hours took 
place during a recession so that the employment affect was hard 
to observe as it mainly took the form of job retention. This 
microeconomic approach also cannot address the issue of to what 
extent increased costs might subsequently have limited the 
employment effect. 
Overall this experience suggests that collectively bargained 
reductions in weekly working hours may have beneficial 
consequences for employment at least in the sense of slowing down 
the rate of job loss, but if this is true there is nothing to 
prevent unions from pursuing such a goal. It is not clear, 
however, that a large proportion of the UK workforce would be in 
favour of lower hours if it involved reductions in weekly pay. 
III.3 Minimum wage regulation 
In 19 9 3 the UK Government abolished all minimum wage 
regulation except that applying to 250,000 employees in the 
agricultural industry. This is the one area therefore which has 
seen almost complete deregulation. Britain is now the only EU 
country without any significant minimum wage regulation, provided 
either by statute or through collective bargaining. This should 
be seen in the context of the Government's general approach to 
pay bargaining which was discussed in section II.2. 
The UK has never had a statutory national minimum wage. 
Rather in 1909 the first sectoral 'trade boards' were established 
in a number of industries. These were to become the Wages 
Councils which, by the 1960s covered some 60 specific sectors. 
In these industries the Wages Councils set a number of minimum 
wage rates differentiated by age, occupation and region. In 1982 
the number of covered sectors had fallen but Wages Councils still 
set minima for 2.7 million workers which represented 12.8 per 
cent of all employees. 
The Government argued the case for abolition of the Wages 
Councils through the 1980s, but proceeded incrementally with 
reform. This is similar to the incremental approach taken to the 
reform of collective industrial relations (see section II.2). 
The value of the minima relative to average wages in the covered 
sectors fell through the 1980s95. In 1986 legislation 
restricted the Councils to setting one minimum rate only and 
excluded workers under the age of 21 from coverage. Only in 1993 
did the Government go ahead with complete abolition, except for 
the agricultural wages board where the unions and employers 
argued successfully for its retention. 
At the time of abolition 26 Wages Councils covered 2.5 
million workers representing 11.9 per cent of all employees. 
These were mainly concentrated in the sheltered services sector 
of the economy, including retailing and hairdressing and hotels 
and catering, though an important exception was clothing 
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manufacture. Given this industry coverage the Councils mainly 
affected the pay of women and of part-time workers. It is 
important to emphasise that the minimum rates set were typically 
rather low in relation to average earnings. 
The Government put forward three reasons for abolition. It 
was argued that minimum wage rates reduced employment in the 
industries covered, did little to alleviate poverty, and that the 
Wages Councils were anachronistic. This last reason appears to 
carry with it little analytical content. The first two arguments 
are empirical ones which can be addressed by reference to the 
evidence. 
In a competitive labour market any regulations which hold 
pay rates above the market clearing level will result in some 
unemployment. However, if the labour market exhibits any 
monopsonistic characteristics this finding will no longer hold. 
If labour supply to the firm is anything other than perfectly 
elastic firms may have some power to keep wages below market 
clearing levels. In such circumstances intervention to set 
minimum pay rates will improve efficiency. However, this is only 
the case if the minimum is set at the right level. In any labour 
market model a minimum wage set at too high a level will cause 
unemployment. This discussion of a possible role for minimum 
wage regulation neatly"encapsulates the argument for any form of 
intervention in the labour market: the relationship between the 
employer and the employee is not a symmetrical one in that the 
employer is likely to hold some labour market power whereas the 
individual employee usually holds none. 
Nevertheless, the impact of minimum pay rates on employment 
is an empirical issue. Studies of the effects of the Wages 
Councils in the 197 0s produced mixed findings, though this in 
itself makes it apparent that the empirical case for their 
abolition was never clear-cut96. 
Analysis of the effects of the Wages Councils in the 1980s 
and 1990s suggested that they had no adverse effect on 
employment. Increases in minimum wages between 1978 and 1990 did 
not lead to falls in employment97. If anything there was a 
positive relationship between employment and minimum wages. A 
study of the post-war relationship between employment and minimum 
wage rates in the agricultural sector was unable to find any 
adverse employment effects associated with minimum wages98. 
Finally, an initial investigation into the impact of the 
abolition of the Wages Councils in 1993 suggested that abolition 
lead to a reduction in wages and a widening of the wage 
distribution, but could find no evidence of any positive 
employment gains, though such conclusions necessarily have to be 
tentative99. 
This empirical evidence suggests that the modest minimum 
rates set before abolition were having no significant adverse 
impact on employment and that abolition of the Wages Councils has 
not had the hoped for beneficial impact on employment. Further 
relevant evidence comes from analysis of the effects of the equal 
pay legislation of the 1970s. There is no evidence that the 
substantial increases in pay for women secured by this 
legislation significantly impacted on female employment*00. As 
the Wages Councils disproportionately benefited women workers 
this evidence can probably be read across to reinforce the 
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argument that the rates set by the Councils did not impact 
adversely on employment. 
The rates set by the Wages Councils did tend to compress the 
distribution of wages101. The reduction of their role in the 
1980s and their abolition in 1993 will therefore be one of the 
institutional changes which will have contributed to the widening 
in wage inequality discussed in section I.4. 
The second argument advanced by the Government for the 
abolition of the Wages Councils was that minimum wage regulation 
does little to alleviate poverty. This is because the main 
beneficiaries of minimum wages tend to be younger people and 
women, many of whom are secondary earners in the household. The 
1986 legislation removed young workers from the scope of the 
Wages Councils thus making this a less important objection. 
There is some evidence, however, to sustain this aspect of 
the Government's argument. Analysis of the impact of a minimum 
wage on the distribution of income across all households does 
suggest that the main beneficiaries would be in middle of the 
income distribution102. To a large extent this follows on from 
the observation that most of the households at the lower end of 
the income distribution are headed by elderly or disabled people 
or by the unemployed (and self-employed) for whom a minimum wage 
has little direct relevance. Heads of households on low pay will 
tend to receive in-work benefits. Any increase in minimum pay 
rates would lead to the loss of some of those benefits so that 
the impact of a minimum wage on its own on the net income of such 
households would be limited. 
This is tantamount to saying that minimum wage regulation 
on its own can do little to compress the household income 
distribution even if it does compress the wage distribution. 
However, this is an argument for seeing the role for a modest 
minimum wage as one possible instrument of policy whose impact 
on the household income distribution has to be considered 
alongside other instruments of policy. This interaction is 
explored further in section V.2. The evidence, however, does not 
suggest that the modest rates set by the Wages Councils had any 
significant adverse impact on employment so that their abolition 
could not be justified on employment grounds. 
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Conclusions on the role of labour market legislation and 
collective and individual employment rights 
At this point it is worth summing up the discussion of the 
role of labour market legislation and individual employment 
rights set out in this section, setting it alongside the 
discussion in section II.2 of the impact of legislative reforms 
in the field of collective industrial relations. 
There are four aspects of Government reforms worth 
summarising: 
1) Reform proceeded incrementally. The legal framework 
governing unions and collective bargaining was changed over the 
period from 1980-93 in specific legislative steps. The scope of 
minimum wage regulation was first reduced in 1986 and the Wages 
Councils were not abolished until 1993. 
2) In the field of collective industrial relations and 
collective bargaining there have been very significant changes 
which might be described as a decisive shift towards a more 
'deregulated' labour market. However, in relation to collective 
institutions it would be more accurate to say that the law now 
plays a more significant role in regulating the relationship 
between unions and employers and unions and their members thus 
significantly modifying the traditional model whereby these 
relationships were 'voluntary'. The Government itself has talked 
about 'redressing the balance' between the employer and employees 
rather than pressing for a wholesale 'laissez faire' 
relationship. 
3) In the field of minimum wage regulation there has been almost 
complete deregulation which has matched the attempt to reduce the 
role of collective bargaining in wage determination. However, 
it would not be correct to say that wage determination in the UK 
has become completely decentralised, rather the sharp decline in 
collective bargaining and pay-setting at an industry level has 
been matched by firms taking a much tighter grip on pay at the 
centre. 
4) In the field of individual employment rights there has been 
no overall shift to greater deregulation. The relationship 
between the individual employee and the employer was relatively 
less regulated in the UK in 1979, but with a strong trend towards 
codifying rights. This trend continued after 1979, often in 
response to EU Directives and the Courts' interpretations of EU 
Treaties. The only significant act of deregulation in this field 
was the lengthening in the required period of employment from 6 
months to two years before individuals could qualify for rights 
to redundancy pay and protection against unfair dismissal. 
In terms of the impact of the reform agenda we can make 
three points: 
i) There is evidence that the rate of growth in productivity, 
especially in manufacturing, has improved and this may in some 
part reflect the reforms in the field of collective industrial 
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relations. 
ii) Unambiguously the decline in union density and collective 
bargaining and the abolition of the Wages Councils have been one 
set of factors associated with the significant increase in wage 
inequality. 
iii) There is no consensus that the reforms have improved the 
overall trade-off between unemployment and inflation as reflected 
in the wide range of estimates for the NRU which continue to 
exist. 
It is worth thinking about this experience in the light of 
the wider debate in the EU over the role of labour market 
regulation and deregulation. In relation to the role of the EU 
itself, it should be emphasised that the specific measures which 
have so far been brought forward under the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht Treaty are likely to have very little effect on the 
UK labour market. The UK Government is fearful that further 
legislation could be brought forward under the provisions of the 
Social Chapter which, if Britain were a signatory, would require 
some significant re-regulation of the UK labour market. It is 
unclear how far this threat is real. The most significant 
aspects of 'deregulation' in the UK have occured in the fields 
of collective industrial relations and pay determination. In 
practice the European Commission has put forward no Directives 
which would materially affect these areas or require the UK to 
roll back any of the legislative changes made since 1979103. 
Most EU Directives have had effects in the field of individual 
employment rights, have had nothing to do with the Maastricht 
Treaty, and have generally reinforced the tendency to codify 
these rights in the UK anyway in an area which has not seen any 
net deregulation. It is also worth noting that the European 
Commission has presented evidence that the UK has one of the best 
records in terms of introducing measures to implement EU 
Directives in the employment field. 
The UK Government opted-out of the Social Chapter in part 
because of the general support given by the EU to the concept of 
dialogue between the social partners, a dialogue which the UK 
Government has heavily circumscribed. The opt-out also appears 
to pose a sharp dichotomy between the 'heavily regulated' labour 
markets of continental Europe and the 'deregulated' labour market 
of the UK. The UK labour market is relatively less regulated but 
this was already true in 1979. It really is a question of 
degree. The UK Government accepts the case for regulation in the 
fields of health and safety, equal opportunities and other 
aspects relating to individual employment rights, and regulates 
the relationship between employers and employees acting 
collectively in order to achieve the right 'balance' in that 
relationship. 
'Excessive' regulation is likely to have adverse 
consequences for employment and productive efficiency. A 
complete lack of regulation is likely to have adverse 
distributional consequences. For example, the absence of minimum 
wage regulation impacts adversely on the distribution of wages. 
Minimum wage rates which are set too high will reduce employment 
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but empirical evidence in the UK does not suggest the Wages 
Councils reduced employment or that a modest minimum wage would 
adversely impact on employment. The complete absence of 
employment protection would leave the most vulnerable workers 
open to abuse by employers. Excessively burdensome employment 
protection rules may reduce hiring, but empirical evidence in the 
UK does not suggest that the modest employment protection which 
did exist in 1979 had any significant adverse impact. It is 
always a question of striking the right balance and striking that 
balance is always an empirical matter. 
It should be noted that weak regulation does not necessarily 
harm the position of the average worker. This can be seen in 
relation to the issue of paid holiday entitlement. The absence 
of state regulation in this area in the UK does not mean that the 
average UK employee enjoys fewer paid holidays than their 
continental counterparts. Only a minority have no access to paid 
holidays. The absence of a minimum wage does not impact on the 
average worker. Indeed the true incidence of a modest minimum 
wage may fall on the average worker if the costs of minimum wage 
protection are passed on in the form of slightly higher product 
prices. 
In the past the absence in the UK of state regulation with 
respect to certain individual employment rights has been 
justified on the grounds that the trade unions were able to 
deliver those rights. As the coverage of the unions has declined 
significantly since 1979 a greater proportion of the workforce 
may be in a position of having no countervailing power to match 
that which may be in the possession of the employer. This would 
suggest a greater role for the state in guaranteeing certain 
minimum individual employment rights. That role has been 
developing anyway over the post-war period, including after 1979. 
The trend towards codifying minimum individual employment rights 
is likely to continue with or without further stimulus from the 
EU. 
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IV. Labour Market Policies 
IV.1 Passive labour market policy 
The distinction is frequently made between passive and 
active labour market policies, where passive measures refer to 
the payment of unemployment and other related benefits, and 
active measures to work, training or other programmes designed 
to help the unemployed move back into employment. In practice 
the distinction is blurred. The administration of unemployment-
related benefits involves checks on the eligibility of the 
recipient including whether they are seeking work, an activity 
which quickly meshes with programmes designed to help individuals 
with their job search, which in turn leads to consideration of 
other programmes designed to help individuals secure work. It 
would seem better to consider passive and active support for the 
unemployed as running along a continuum rather than being 
separate aspects of public policy. 
The Employment Service in the UK is responsible both for the 
administration of unemployment related benefits and for providing 
placement and other assistance for the unemployed (see section 
II.1). Striking the right balance between the 'assistance' role 
of the Employment Service in providing income for unemployed 
people while helping them in their attempts to re-enter the 
labour market, and the 'policing' role of checking on their 
eligibility for benefit and whether they are effectively 
searching for work, is always a difficult one. Since the mid-
1980s the UK Government has been embarked on a strategy designed 
to significantly tighten the administration of benefit, believing 
that lax administration was contributing to a higher level of 
unemployment. 
Two aspects of passive labour market policy can be 
distinguished, The first is the generosity of the benefits 
themselves, often presented in terms of the replacement ratio 
where income out of work is expressed as a percentage of income 
in work. The second relates to the eligibility conditions for 
receipt of benefit. 
In the period between 1979 and 1986 two conflicting 
developments were at work. Measures were introduced to reduce 
the generosity of unemployment related benefits. The earnings 
related supplement to unemployment benefit was abolished. Most 
importantly all benefits were now indexed to the rate of price 
inflation rather than to the rate of increase in average 
earnings. This decision has had huge consequences across the 
welfare system, but in the labour market it has of course meant 
that as real earnings have risen sharply (see section 1.4), the 
ratio of unemployment related benefits to earnings has fallen 
significantly (see section V.2 for some estimates). 
However, at the same time the administration of the benefits 
system was relaxed during this early period. Most notably, as 
an economy measure, the requirement to register at a Job Centre 
in order to receive unemployment related benefits was removed in 
October 1982, though a requirement on the recipient to more 
clearly demonstrate that they were available for work was also 
introduced. At the same time the Government persisted with 
programmes which had been inherited with the aim of reducing 
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labour supply by encouraging various forms of labour market 
withdrawal, which runs against the grain of active labour market 
policy one of whose aims is to maintain labour market attachment. 
This element of Government strategy was common to many other OECD 
member states104. 
In 1986 the direction of Government policy underwent a 
significant shift. From this date a number of initiatives have 
been introduced to tighten eligibility for unemployment related 
benefits. At the same time the reduction in the value of those 
benefits in relation to average earnings has continued. These 
reforms culminated in the introduction of the Jobseekers 
Allowance due to come into effect in Autumn 1996. 
Table 29 outlines some of the key changes in the regulations 
affecting the receipt of unemployment benefits since 1979. The 
change in regime was signalled in 1986 by the introduction of 
compulsory Restart interviews where individuals availability for 
work and the steps they were taking to find work were assessed 
and positive assistance offered to help with job search. The 
'assistance' and 'policing' roles were thus combined in one 
initiative. Restart is also of enormous significance because it 
has been the most carefully evaluated of all labour market 
measures (see section IV.3). 
Initially Restart interviews were for people reaching their 
twelfth month of unemployment, but since 1988 they have been held 
every six months. Over this same time frame the maximum period 
for which benefit can be disallowed for leaving a job voluntarily 
or turning down a job offer without good cause was extended from 
6 to 26 weeks. Also in 1988 the right of 16-17 year olds to 
claim unemployment related benefit was withdrawn entirely, the 
consequences of which are discussed in section V.l. From 1989 
new claimants were invited to complete a 'Back to Work Plan' 
outlining the steps to be taken to find work and specifying a 
period, usually 13 weeks, after which an individual would have 
to widen their job search to include employment outside of their 
normal occupation and previous rate of pay. Claimants were also 
required to show that they were actively seeking work. 
In 1995 legislation was passed to introduce the Jobseekers 
Allowance (JSA), though its introduction was delayed with the 
intention to bring it in by the Autumn of 1996. This allowance 
replaces unemployment benefit and income support for unemployed 
people. Prior to the JSA, an unemployed individual who satisfied 
the contribution requirements could claim unemployment insurance 
benefits for up to 12 months, before transferring to means-tested 
income support payments. In practice because unemployment 
insurance benefits were set at a low level, most unemployed 
people claimed income support well before the 12 month time limit 
at which unemployment insurance benefits were exhausted. The 
practical impact of the introduction of the JSA is to lower to 
six months the maximum period for which people who satisfy the 
contributions requirements can draw non-means tested benefits. 
The Government has estimated that this should reduce spending on 
unemployment related benefits by about £240 million by 1997-98 
as against total projected spending on the JSA of £5,600 million 
(excluding administrative costs) in that year, a saving of about 
four per cent. 
At the same time in order to be eligible for the JSA an 
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unemployed person will be required to enter into a Jobseeker's 
Agreement which will include details of action they will 
undertake in order to find work. The JSA thus brings together 
the two strands of passive labour market policy in relation to 
reducing the generosity of the benefits themselves while 
tightening up on the eligibility requirements for the receipt of 
those benefits. This approach to passive labour market policy 
is in turn matched by a greater emphasis on active labour market 
policy and by changes to other aspects of the tax and benefits 
system designed to encourage greater labour market participation 
(see section V.2). 
A second major piece of recent legislation has also 
signalled a clear break with past policies of facilitating labour 
market withdrawal. This was the introduction of Incapacity 
Benefit in 1995 to replace Sickness and Invalidity Benefit for 
people with long term health problems which mean that it is 
unreasonable to expect them to participate in the labour market. 
This legislation has to be seen in the context of the significant 
increase in the numbers of men and women inactive due to long 
term sickness and disability (see section 1.2). Between 1989-90 
and 1994-95 there was an increase in the numbers drawing 
Invalidity Benefit from 1.2 million to 1.8 million. 
This increase was the result not of a higher inflow of 
people onto Invalidity Benefit but of people staying on the 
benefit longer. Older claimants appear to have used this benefit 
as a bridge from work to retirement. There is a complex 
relationship between genuine sickness and disability and labour 
market changes, with the medical profession using a wide range 
of medical and non-medical criteria to determine eligibility for 
benefits. Once an individual develops a long term illness their 
attachment to the labour market can deteriorate. Similar trends 
can be observed in other OECD countries where mechanisms have 
been found to facilitate early labour market withdrawal, even if 
the precise social security benefits involved differ105. 
One significant feature of the administration of the new 
benefit is that the ordinary General Practitioner no longer plays 
such a key role in determining access to benefits on the grounds 
of incapacity. Instead a more 'objective' test of incapacity is 
carried out by a medical practitioner with only medical factors 
being used to assess an individual's ability to perform work-
related activities. Previously GPs were also using their 
judgement of local labour market conditions as a criterion for 
access to the benefit. The stated aim was to reduce public 
spending by £1720 million by 1997-98, an indication that this was 
seen as a much more important reform in expenditure terms than 
the Jobseekers Allowance. 
The new Incapacity Benefit was to be balanced by a much 
greater emphasis on active labour market measures designed to 
help individuals who 'fail' the new medical test find employment. 
The benefit should also be seen in the light of legislation 
introduced in 1995 to prohibit discrimination against disabled 
people (section III.l). In common with the JSA, in the 
Government's terms the emphasis has been on balancing the tighter 
eligibility criteria with additional assistance made available 
through the Employment Service. Interestingly, early indications 
were that far fewer people have been making claims for 
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unemployment benefit than was originally planned for106. 
The outlines of the shift in Government strategy since 1986 
are clear. Reductions in the generosity of unemployment related 
and other benefits have worked alongside a significant tightening 
of eligibility for these benefits, with this in turn balanced by 
greater emphasis on active labour market policy. 
IV.2 Active labour market policy 
Active labour market policy is a term which covers a number 
of programmes designed to improve the efficiency with which the 
labour market works, and to promote greater equality of 
opportunity in the labour market. The scale and cost of the main 
employment and training programmes in operation in England and 
Wales in 1994-95 is outlined in Table 30. 
It is helpful to divide these labour market programmes into 
four different types: 
1) Employment Service programmes. 
At the heart of active labour market policy in the UK is the 
Employment Service, with responsibility for matching jobseekers 
to notified vacancies, counselling those looking for work, 
enhancing the extent and quality of job search, placing some 
jobseekers in relevant employment programmes, and checking the 
eligibility of the unemployed to benefits. 
By the mid-1990s the Employment Service in Britain was 
administrating a battery of measures designed to improve 
placement services, assist job search and provide enhanced 
counselling for the unemployed (Table 30) . This battery of 
measures is designed to provide a series of nets to catch the 
unemployed as they approach different durations of unemployment, 
and are as extensive as anywhere in the OECD. 
The first set of specific measures come into play after 13 
weeks of unemployment. Job Search Seminars offer advice on 
preparing CVs and completing application forms, improving 
interview skills and assistance with job search. Job Review 
Workshops offer two-day courses for unemployed people from a 
managerial or professional background with the aim of broadening 
the range of jobs applied for and the jobsearch methods used. 
A new programme is being developed to replace the Job Search 
Seminars and Job Review Workshops. The Travel To Interview 
Scheme provides financial assistance for people attending job 
interviews beyond normal daily travelling distance. 
A second set of measures comes into play after six months 
of unemployment. Jobclubs offer help with jobsearch similar to 
the Job Search Seminars. The Job Interview Guarantee programme 
offers an enhanced job placement service, including job 
preparation courses which prepare clients for a guaranteed 
interview with a particular employer. The main element of the 
JIG programme involves employers guaranteeing to interview 
clients identified by the ES as being particularly suited for the 
job. Work Trials encourage employers to take on people for a 
trial period of up to three weeks while participants continue to 
receive benefits as well as work expenses. 
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After one year's duration jobseekers can be referred to the 
'1-2-1' programme which involves up to six interviews with an ES 
advisor while undertaking guided jobsearch activity. Jobplan is 
a mandatory programme for those who do not take up help through 
other programmes and is designed to provide assistance with 
jobsearch and with 're-motivating' participants. Workwise is a 
four week jobsearch programme for 18-24 year olds most of whom 
will have attended the '1-2-1' interviews. 
People unemployed for over two years who do not take up 
other programmes are referred to Restart Courses which require 
attendance and offer assistance with jobsearch activity. 
Jobfinder's Grants offer financial assistance of between £100 and 
£400 to cover the initial costs of returning to work for very 
long-term unemployed people who might otherwise not be able to 
start a job. Jobmatch pilots started in April 1995 and offer 
participants an allowance of £50 per week for six months when 
they take a part-time job as a stepping stone to full-time 
employment. The idea is that the participant might at some point 
be able to take a second part-time job or increase their hours 
of work. Training vouchers of up to £300 are available and 
participants who remain in employment after the allowance 
finishes are paid a bonus. Jobmatch is being piloted in four ES 
districts and by two TECs. 
2) Training programmes 
In the UK the Employment Service shares with the Training 
and Enterprise Councils (TECs) the responsibility for providing 
training places for the unemployed under the Training for Work 
Scheme (see section II. 1). TfW actually includes both training 
places and work (or project based) placements often with 
voluntary organisations, usually for people unemployed for over 
six months. Between the first quarter of 1994 and the last 
quarter of 1995 the number of filled places at any one time on 
Training for Work was nearly halved. The primary objective of 
the programme has since 1995 been focused securely on helping 
participants into regular jobs. 
Career Development Loans worth between £200 and £8000 can 
be used to help pay for vocational training and are available 
through four banks. The DfEE pays the interest on the loans for 
the period of the training and for one month afterwards. If 
unemployed one month after completing the training the borrower 
can apply to defer repayments for up to a further five months. 
From September 1995 a pilot scheme has allowed eligible trainees 
to defer repayment for up to 18 months. Only 75,000 loans have 
been taken out since 1988 so that this is quite a small 
programme. Also only just over one-third of participants were 
unemployed before taking out the loan while half were already 
employed and one-in-seven were students. The unemployed 
participants were not typical of the unemployed in general, being 
younger and better qualified. 
3) Work programmes and recruitment subsidies designed to 
directly increase the demand for labour. 
In the mid-1980s the Community Programme, providing 
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temporary work placements with public or voluntary agencies 
offering low skilled jobs in such areas as environmental work or 
social and community services, was the main employment programme 
offered by the Government. In the late 1980s emphasis was 
switched to training, but with project places still making up a 
significant chunk of provision offered under Training for Work 
and its predecessors. By 1994-95 only the small Community Action 
programme survived as a specific work programme and in Autumn 
1995 it was announced that this too would be phased out. From 
1996 the only specific work programmes outside of Northern 
Ireland will be those administered by local organisations, though 
from April 1996 the DfEE will be piloting in two areas a new work 
programme for those unemployed over two years. This Project Work 
will mix a voluntary jobsearch element with a compulsory work 
element for those not taking up any other programme after a 13 
week period. 
As an alternative to work places directly provided by public 
and voluntary agencies, the authorities can try to use 
recruitment subsidies to encourage private employers to take on 
more of the unemployed. The current UK subsidy is Workstart 
which was piloted in 1994-95 and remains a limited pilot scheme. 
In the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s a wide range of such 
subsidies were being used. In 1995-96 the Government was being 
pressed to expand the Workstart initiative but was resisting for 
reasons which are made clearer in section IV.3. 
The authorities can also provide subsidies to encourage the 
jobless to become self-employed and the current UK Business 
Start-up Scheme is discussed in section V.3 along with other 
initiatives which are the responsibility of the Departments of 
the Environment and Trade and Industry. Direct employment 
opportunities can also be offered specifically to the disabled 
through sheltered or subsidised employment schemes. These are 
not covered here as they are offered on a relatively small scale 
in the UK. 
4) Youth Programmes. 
Since the 1970s a number of schemes operating under 
different names have provided work and training opportunities to 
young people not participating in further education or in regular 
employment. These are discussed in section V.l. 
In 1994-95 Britain spent about one half of one per cent of 
GDP on these active labour market programmes. Spending on the 
Employment Service, at about one fifth of one per cent of GDP, 
was in line with other countries. Britain spent significantly 
less than other countries on training schemes and direct job 
creation aimed at the unemployed107. 
Since the late 1980s there has been a clear shift in 
resources away from training programmes and direct job creation 
towards the initiatives run by the Employment Service108. Over 
the period 1990-91 to 1993-94 spending on the Employment Service 
increased by nearly one half in real terms. Spending on training 
programmes aimed at the unemployed fell by over a quarter in real 
terms, and spending on Youth Training fell by a third although 
this latter trend mainly reflected the increase in enrolment in 
full time education (see section V.l). Some project placements 
71 
remain on offer through the TfW scheme but specific work 
programmes are in the process of being phased out entirely and 
the use of recruitment subsidies remains on a pilot basis only. 
What clearly distinguishes the Employment Service 
initiatives from training and work programmes and recruitment 
subsidies, is their significantly lower cost (Table 30). At a 
cost per place of around £50-200 versus £2000-3000 for the more 
expensive measures, the training and work programmes and 
recruitment subsidies would have to demonstrate significantly 
better outcomes in terms of participants successfully placed in 
work than the Employment Service initiatives in order to justify 
their much greater cost. Thus a major reason for the shift in 
resources which has taken place in recent years has been the 
response to the costs of different programmes in the context of 
constraints on public expenditure. At the same time the relative 
shift in resources towards the Employment Service programmes has 
also been a rational response to the results of research on the 
effectiveness of different active labour market policies and it 
is this research which section IV.3 explores. 
IV.3 Evaluations and discussion of labour market policy 
The case for active labour market policy has often been made 
on the basis of the macro-econometric finding that the long-term 
unemployed play no role in holding down wage inflation, so that 
an increase in their employment rates would generate no 
inflationary pressures. If employers used a recruitment subsidy 
to hire more of the long-term unemployed at the expense of the 
short-term unemployed or even by reducing their existing 
workforce, this would not matter. For a higher level of short-
term unemployment would reduce wage inflation, so allowing for 
an expansion of real demand, so that the workers who have been 
substituted against would all find work again, and relatively 
quickly before they become long-term unemployed. When a 
recruitment subsidy or a placement on a work programme finished, 
some of the previously long-term unemployed participants might 
obviously find themselves unemployed again. But because they are 
now short-term unemployed they too will place downward pressure 
on wage inflation, allowing for an expansion of real demand and 
an increase in employment sufficient to absorb them all. 
Thus one rationale for active labour market policy is based 
on this macro-econometric finding, that the long term-unemployed 
play no role in holding down wage inflation, but that the rate 
of short-term unemployment adjusts relatively quickly to its 
'equilibrium' rate109. However, it needs to be stressed that 
the robustness of this finding is disputed by some 
economists110. This might counsel caution about basing the case 
for active labour market policy on such a disputed finding. 
A complementary route for thinking about the role of active 
labour market policy is to look carefully at the micro-economic 
evaluations of specific programmes. Although macro-economic 
models can be used to suggest that countries which place heavy 
emphasis on active labour market policy may have a better outcome 
in terms of aggregate unemployment111, these models cannot show 
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what kinds of active policies might work best. Only microevaluations can tell us anything about the relative effectiveness 
of different active policies. 
Economic research has tried to assess how far different 
labour market programmes have significantly increased the chances 
of unemployed participants finding employment or obtaining higher 
earnings. It thus focuses primarily on the economic effects of 
these programmes, though employment programmes may bring social 
benefits as well. 
Simply recording the proportion of participants who obtain 
jobs at the end of a programme is in itself not very meaningful. 
Firstly, the 'job entry rate' is very sensitive to the economic 
cycle. More people leave programmes to enter jobs during periods 
of economic recovery than in periods of recession, but this tells 
us nothing about the quality of the programmes. 
More fundamentally many unemployed people are finding jobs 
all the time, so that to note that a certain proportion of people 
leave a programme to enter jobs is in itself meaningless unless 
we can know what proportion would have found work anyway - the 
'deadweight' of the programme. Also people on programmes may 
find work but only by 'substituting' for other jobseekers. 
Finally, direct job creation programmes may 'displace' work in 
other enterprises in the economy. 
It is possible to try and model the impact of programmes in 
order to assess their effectiveness, taking into account the 
economic cycle, and deadweight, substitution and displacement 
effects. Surveys of participants or of employers and programme 
providers can also help to shed light on the performance of a 
programme. 
However, the best way of taking into account the problem of 
'deadweight' is to conduct an 'experiment' where unemployed 
people are randomly assigned into two groups - an 'experimental' 
group which benefits from the programme, and a second 'control' 
group which receives no assistance. The two groups are then 
compared over time to see whether those on the programme have 
found jobs at a significantly higher rate than the control group. 
Even this approach cannot tell us whether those in the 
experimental group have found work by substituting for or 
displacing other jobseekers. The only major labour market 
initiative in the UK to have been tested using an experimental 
design is the Restart programme. 
Table 31 summarises the results of a range of research in 
the UK on the impact of different labour market programmes and 
the trade offs which have to be considered when addressing the 
case for these policies112. 
An experimental approach was used to investigate the effects 
of the Restart process in Britain113. It showed modest positive 
results for the initiative, with the average duration of 
unemployment reduced by about four weeks for those who went 
through Restart. Whether this was the result of the enhanced job 
search assistance and counselling offered by the Employment 
Service, or was the result of the impact of threatened benefit 
sanctions on those who did not demonstrate active job search, is 
a matter of some controversy. This illustrates the problem that 
although experimental and other evaluation approaches can help 
tell us whether a programme has worked, it might be a matter of 
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further interpretation as to why it has worked. It also neatly 
illustrates the tension between the 'assistance' and the 
'policing' aspects of these Employment Service programmes. 
There is evidence for the effectiveness of some of the other 
ES programmes including Jobplan114. An evaluation involving a 
randomly allocated control group found that 24 per cent of those 
referred to Jobplan were no longer registered unemployed 16 weeks 
later compared to 19 per cent of the control group. Two 
percentage points of the difference was accounted for by entry 
into jobs and the rest by entry onto TfW and other reasons. An 
evaluation of the '1-2-1' programme on the other hand failed to 
demonstrate that this programme was more effective than Jobplan 
though this has not prevented its extension to the Jobplan client 
group115. It is also possible that the plethora of job search 
initiatives may have become counter-productive. Once an 
individual has been through their third 'counselling ' or 'job-
search' course it is not clear how much value-added is being 
delivered. 
It is noteworthy that the only classic experimental design 
used to test a labour market programme in Sweden also found 
evidence for a positive impact on participants' job prospects 
from enhanced placement and counselling services"6. The 
results from controlled experiments in the US also sustain the 
case for viewing this form of active labour market policy as the 
most effective11"7. There is thus a stronger body of evidence on 
the beneficial effects of improved placement services and job 
search assistance on the subsequent job prospects of the 
unemployed than on any other component of active labour market 
policy. 
As far as the effects of training programmes are concerned 
the two most careful studies in the UK have not used an 
experimental design but have instead compared the subsequent 
employment and earnings of participants with a matched sample of 
unemployed people with similar backgrounds. One study found 
significant positive effects on the subsequent earnings and 
employment of participants on the relatively small scale Training 
Opportunities Programme (TOPs) which ran in Britain in the mid-
1980s, and which at its peak offered some 80,000 places118. 
This programme helped people gain qualifications which assisted 
them in gaining access to intermediate occupations such as 
clerical and secretarial and craft and technician jobs. 
A second more recent study of the programmes which were 
eventually merged to create the Training for Work scheme found 
that participants who benefited from an employer placement and/or 
gained a recognised qualification did have a better chance of 
gaining employment, but not higher earnings119. It is not clear 
therefore that it was the enhancement of human capital which 
improved their job prospects, rather than improved access to 
information on job opportunities as a result of being placed with 
an employer and with employers using the qualifications gained 
as a screening device. Off-the-job training on its own did not 
increase employment prospects and neither did a placement on a 
work project with a public or voluntary agency. 
An overall conclusion to draw from UK experience might be 
that small scale and relatively expensive programmes may be 
effective. TOPs cost over twice as much per place as the 
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Training for Work programme and seemed to deliver clearer 
positive results in terms of higher earnings for participants. 
The lack of positive results for the project placements 
(that is work programmes) in TfW is also important. Similar 
results were found for the Community Programme which ran in 
Britain in the mid-1980s where there was also no evidence for any 
significant impact on the flows out of unemployment for 
participants120. People participating voluntarily on such 
public work projects often welcome the experience, with the 
chance to meet new people and to make some contribution to the 
community. Such projects can help tide people over while the 
regular jobs market improves but there is no evidence that they 
significantly improve the chances of participants finding regular 
jobs. 
An economy which has very high unemployment is one which is 
likely to be running a large budget deficit, as in Britain in the 
early 199 0s. Inevitably then any work programme will need to 
have a low cost per place, and in order to avoid displacing 
regular work will need to be at the margins of socially useful 
activity. Labour market programmes are instituted because of the 
shortage of regular employment opportunities. But in order not 
to interfere with the regular workings of the labour market, such 
programme places must not look or feel like regular jobs. They 
have to offer relatively low rates of pay so that the incentive 
to obtain a regular job remains. This was the paradox faced by 
the Community Programme in Britain in the mid-1980s. This kind 
of work programme will always represent a stop-gap. 
How far this is implicitly recognised by those local 
organisations which have sponsored work programmes is unclear. 
The most celebrated example in the UK is the Wise group which has 
run a scheme offering project places to disadvantaged jobseekers 
in Glasgow121. They refer to their programmes as constituting 
an 'intermediate labour market' offering project places in the 
context of a regular labour market which is failing to deliver 
sufficient jobs. 
The results of the evaluation of the Workstart pilots in 
Britain are broadly in line with previous international 
experience122. This programme offered a recruitment subsidy 
over one year of £2340 to employers willing to take on people who 
had been out of work for over two or four years. Finding 
placements involved considerable administrative effort and 
expense on the part of the Employment Service. Just under half 
the jobs subsidised were deadweight and another third involved 
employers substituting the long term unemployed for other 
jobseekers. As the authors of the evaluation study point out 
this was the programme's intention. Recruitment subsidies do not 
create many new jobs. Rather their rationale is similar to that 
for some of the Employment Service programmes, that is the aim 
is to make a bigger share of employment opportunities available 
to especially disadvantaged jobseekers. So it makes sense for 
these subsidies to be administered by the Employment Service as 
an adjunct to other initiatives designed to improve job search. 
However, these subsidies are much more expensive than assistance 
with job search while it is not clear that they are significantly 
more effective. This would imply that their use has to be 
restricted to the most disadvantaged jobseekers, particularly the 
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very long term unemployed. 
It is worth asking why simple initiatives designed to 
enhance job search seem to be far more cost-effective than large 
training programmes? Surveys of employers constantly pick up 
concerns about the 'personal skills' and characteristics of job 
applicants, that is their motivation, ability to communicate and 
to get along with other employees, and so on. Generally the 
existence or not of those skills is a more important factor than 
possession of formal qualifications in determining recruitment, 
especially for the lower skill occupations123. Apparently 
simple interventions which have the effect of raising an 
individual's outward signs of motivation, or helping them to 
better compile a CV or handle an interview (which are the means 
by which an individual can best signal their possession of some 
of these 'personal skills'), might thus have a more significant 
effect on participants' job prospects than 'training' programmes. 
The recent movement of resources in Britain away from 
training and work programmes towards the initiatives run by the 
Employment Service is generally backed by the results of research 
in the UK and from across the OECD. Simple initiatives which 
offer improved placement services or assistance with job search 
can be shown to significantly boost participants' job prospects. 
The evidence for the effects of training and work programmes is 
much more mixed. 
Training programmes which offer some chance of success are 
likely to be relatively small but of high quality like the old 
Training Opportunities Programme in Britain. There is a separate 
issue of ensuring that unemployed people can undertake part time 
courses in mainstream further and higher education without 
threatening their benefit entitlement. 
This training provision should be clearly separated from any 
work programme. There is a strong social case for having such 
a programme offering places for the most disadvantaged 
jobseekers. It is the kind of programme which could be easily 
expanded to counter the effects of a modest recession. In the 
context of the 'speed limit' which may be imposed by the need to 
reduce unemployment gradually if wage inflation is to be avoided 
(see section 1.4 and 1.5) it can offer a stop-gap designed to 
tide people over until the aggregate labour market improves 
sufficiently. The phasing out of such programmes in the UK in 
the mid-1990s in the context of a still relatively high aggregate 
unemployment rate might have seemed premature. However, the 
benefits of such programmes should not be exaggerated. In the 
context of a labour market in Britain which in the mid-1990s was 
seen to be generating, in the eyes of some critics, too many 
temporary, part time, low paid and low skilled jobs, these 
schemes offer temporary, probably part time, inevitably low paid 
and low skilled jobs. 
The Employment Service might have the option to use 
recruitment subsidies to help place the very long term 
unemployed, to be used alongside the other placement/job 
search/counselling initiatives. But their use would have to be 
kept to a minimum as they are potentially expensive and require 
considerable administrative effort to secure places. The UK's 
experience with its Workstart scheme is informative. Finding 
some 1500 places in just over a year in four areas during the 
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Workstart pilot phase proved demanding. These jobs were 
overwhelmingly in very small enterprises. Grossing these 1500 
places up to represent all the labour markets in Britain would 
suggest the scope for up to 35,000 places on a national scheme, 
of which up to half would represent new opportunities for the 
very long term unemployed. This would be equivalent to about 
four per cent of those out of work for over two years in April 
1996. Its impact would thus be limited. 
Active labour market policy can play a role in helping to 
reduce unemployment but its impact should not be exaggerated. 
Indeed there can be a price to pay for exaggerating the role of 
labour market programmes, if it leads to the neglect of other 
policy instruments. Some writers can give the impression that 
a particular subsidy or scheme can by itself virtually eliminate 
unemployment and that no other policies are needed124. 
Programmes are sometimes sold as offering a possible free lunch 
in that no net cost is envisaged for the proposed policy. 
The rationale for such policies must also be made clear. 
The main aim is to improve the matching process in the labour 
market and to enhance the ability of disadvantaged jobseekers to 
obtain a higher share of the regular employment opportunities 
which are available. These policies do not create many new jobs 
themselves unless the specific aim is to create low productivity 
jobs through specific work programmes. Reference is sometimes 
made to the need to enhance the employment intensity of economic 
growth which by definition is the same thing as arguing for a 
reduction in productivity growth125. Such work programmes are 
presumably one means to this end. If this is the case then the 
discussion about the limits to these programmes is of importance. 
It is also necessary to come back to the question of the 
boundary between active and passive labour market policies and 
the tension between the 'policing' and the 'assistance' roles of 
the Employment Service. Much discussion in the UK revolves 
around the issue of 'workfare', which is usually taken as a 
short-hand for the goal of making participation on programmes 
effectively compulsory by ending the right to claim benefit after 
a period of time unless a place is taken up on a scheme. In 
practice it is not clear that this is a useful focus for the 
debate. Training programmes are only likely to work if 
participants are highly motivated to obtain new skills which they 
may not be if their participation is not voluntary. The public 
and especially the voluntary agencies which provide most work 
placements would be unlikely to do so if participation was not 
voluntary. Employers may not respond to recruitment subsidies 
where participants are being forced to take advantage of the 
scheme, as not unnaturally they might take this to indicate 
negative signals about those participants' personal 
characteristics, which are so important in the recruitment 
process. On the other hand high quality training programmes and 
genuine opportunities in the regular labour market are unlikely 
to struggle in finding willing recruits. 
Striking the right balance between the 'policing' and the 
'assistance' elements in the programmes run by the Employment 
Service is very difficult. However, given the significant 
tightening in the regime since 1986 (Table 29) it is not clear 
that lax administration of unemployment related benefits can any 
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longer be blamed for keeping unemployment at a high level in the 
UK. The policies introduced since 1986 have probably made a 
contribution to reducing unemployment, though how far this is due 
to the greater 'assistance' offered and how far to the tighter 
'policing' is a matter of continuing controversy. 
Restart and the other initiatives were primarily targeted 
on the long-term unemployed and so we should be able to discern 
their effect by looking for a break in the relationship between 
total unemployment and long-term unemployment after 1986. To see 
if this is the case we can refer back to Figure 13. There is no 
obvious evidence of any break. In particular the fact that the 
observations for 1983-83 and 1992-93 are almost exactly the same 
is suggestive that the simple linear relationship between total 
unemployment and long-term unemployment was constant through this 
whole period. This is not to argue that Restart and the other 
initiatives have had no effect on long-term unemployment, but 
rather that their effects have been at the margins. It also 
reiterates the point that for the UK long-term unemployment 
appears to respond very smartly to any general improvement in the 
aggregate labour market. Additional labour market policies can 
help but they play a supportive role. 
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V Other policies having an impact on the labour market 
V.1 Education and training 
Two key aspects of the education and training system can be 
distinguished in terms of their impact on labour market outcomes. 
Firstly, how well young people are prepared to enter the labour 
market following compulsory and further and higher education and 
initial training. Secondly, how far employers provide 
opportunities for training for their workforce. Each of these 
is considered below but with most weight given to provision for 
labour market entrants. Training for the unemployed was 
discussed in section IV. 
Education and training for labour market entrants 
From 1995 the Secretary of State at the new Department for 
Education and Employment (see section II.1) has had primary 
responsibility within Government for matters relating to 
education and training in England and Wales. The new Department 
has inherited a system which has seen very significant changes, 
especially since 1986. 
Compulsory schooling begins at the age of 5 and continues 
until 16, with a transfer from primary to secondary schooling 
usually taking place at ll126. From age 16 young people can opt 
to remain in full time further education (FE) in school or 
college, following either a general or a vocational education 
track. Alternatively they can opt to enter the labour market, 
either through obtaining a regular job (if available) or a place 
on the government sponsored Youth Training (YT) programme. This 
labour market route may involve access to vocational training and 
qualifications. Access to higher education (HE) is often from 
the age of 18 and predominantly from the full-time further 
education route. 
Since 1986-87 the proportion of the age cohort following 
these different tracks has changed significantly as young people 
have voted with their feet to stay on in full time further 
education in much greater numbers (Table 32). In 1986-87 less 
than half the cohort stayed on. By 1993-94 over 70 per cent were 
staying in full time education though the increase subsequently 
appeared to plateau. The proportion enrolling on Youth Training 
halved over the same period as did the proportion entering into 
regular jobs. The size of the small residual of the cohort not 
in education, training or employment is strongly cyclical, having 
halved during the late 1980s and then doubled again in the early 
1990s recession. The increase in enrolment in further education 
has been matched by increased participation in higher education. 
In 1986 14 per cent of the age group enrolled in higher education 
and by 1993 this had increased to 31 per cent127. 
There have been two strands to the reforms introduced by the 
Government, one relating to the curriculum and examinations, and 
the other to the structure of the education and training system. 
Implementation of these reforms was handled by two separate 
Departments, one (Education) responsible for general education 
and the other (Employment) responsible for aspects of vocational 
education and training. 
One clearly successful reform has been the introduction of 
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a new examination in 1986 - the General Certificate of Secondary 
Education (GCSE) - replacing the two sets of examinations usually 
taken at the end of compulsory schooling, at age 16. The first 
full cohort sat the new GCSE in 1988 and this is closely linked 
with the significant increase in the proportion of the age cohort 
staying on in further education after 16 outlined in Table 
32 . Indeed GCSE is probably the single most important reason 
for the increase in enrolment in further education as it led to 
improved attainment at age 16. 
From 1989 the Government began introducing a National 
Curriculum to cover compulsory schooling (age 5-16). A revised 
and substantially simplified version was introduced in 1995. 
Although some of the first cohort affected by part of the 
National Curriculum will have entered the labour market, its full 
effects will not be felt until the beginning of the next century. 
In 1986 the Government set up the National Council for 
Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ) to rationalise the system of 
vocational qualifications. From 1988 National Vocational 
Qualifications (NVQs) were made available and from 1992 General 
National Vocational Qualifications (GNVQs) were introduced. NVQs 
were meant to replace existing vocational qualifications on the 
labour market training route, including youth training. GNVQs 
were meant to replace existing vocational qualifications in full 
time education. A young person at age 16 would then face three 
qualification routes: the full-time general education route 
(mainly Α-levels, the traditional university entrance 
qualification), the full-time vocational education route (GNVQs) 
and the part-time, mainly employment-based, vocational training 
route (NVQs). This is what is meant when reference is made to 
the 'tripartite' system of post-compulsory education and 
training. 
In practice four routes remain in place because NVQs and 
GNVQs have not succeeded in replacing all traditional vocational 
qualifications and seem unlikely to do so. The national 
qualifications framework is shown in Table 33. NVQs are offered 
at five levels, which are held to be notionally equivalent to the 
attainment of the traditional general academic qualifications as 
shown. In practice the majority of NVQs have been attained only 
at levels one and two, typically giving access to jobs in the 
sales and the clerical and secretarial occupations and the 
personal service occupations such as hairdressing129. There has 
been more recent growth in the number of NVQs awarded at level 
3, but matched by a fall in the number of traditional vocational 
qualifications awarded at this level. GNVQs are offered at three 
levels only, whereas the traditional vocational qualifications 
are offered at all five levels. 
It is important to recognise that a wide range of vocational 
qualifications existed before NVQs and GNVQs were introduced. 
The proportion of the age cohort taking full time vocational 
qualifications was rising strongly before GNVQs were introduced 
nationally in 1993-94 (Table 32). GNVQs have not had any impact 
on the staying on rate, but have merely displaced existing 
vocational qualifications and the re-sitting of GCSEs, with some 
marginal impact on Α-level enrolment13 . Moreover, the 
successful completion rate for GNVQs is lower than for the 
qualifications they have displaced. 
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The reforms to the curriculum and qualifications have been 
matched by structural changes. Many schools now manage their own 
budgets. They can also opt out of the control of local education 
authorities, though only 1100 have done so covering fewer than 
one-in-ten of all school pupils. Training and Enterprise 
Councils (TECs) are responsible for the vocational training route 
including Youth Training. This means that for the 16-19 age 
range four different agencies are involved in decisions over 
resource allocation: the local education authorities, the Funding 
Agency for Schools which is responsible under the DfEE for those 
schools which have opted out of local control, the Further 
Education Funding Council responsible under the DfEE for all 
colleges, and finally the TECs. Although the merger of the 
Employment and Education Departments appears to bring more 
coherence to policy making at the central level, at the local 
level a multiplicity of agencies retain responsibilities. 
Youth Training remains a very diverse programme. Some 
companies use it as the basis for their apprenticeship schemes. 
Others use it to screen potential employees. Other YT placements 
cater for young people with special needs, and generally the 
programme caters for those young people with the poorest 
educational backgrounds. As such evaluating its impact is 
difficult131. It is not clear what would be in place if YT did 
not exist, though clearly much of the provision involves a 
'deadweight' element in that employers would, even in the absence 
of the programme, be recruiting some young people into the entry-
level craft, clerical and personal service jobs which form the 
core of YT. In 1994-95 just under half of participants completed 
their placement, with many exiting early into jobs. Around 
three-fifths of participants in 1994-95 exited to employment and 
two-fifths obtained a full qualification, mainly low-level NVQs, 
though traditional vocational qualifications were obtained as 
well. 
In 1988 the Government abolished the right of 16-17 year 
olds to claim unemployment-related benefits, matching this by a 
guarantee of a place on YT. This offers a natural experiment to 
test the impact of withdrawing the right to benefit entirely from 
a group of people. It can be seen from Table 32 that this 
benefit change did not have the desired impact of increasing 
enrolment on YT. The proportion of the age cohort not in 
education and employment was falling before the benefit change 
was introduced as a result of a strengthening aggregate labour 
market. As soon as the recession arrived in 1990 the size of 
this group increased again. This suggests that the benefit 
change may have had little impact. 
In 1994 the Government introduced 'Modern Apprenticeships' 
in order to raise the profile of the vocational training route. 
Modern apprenticeships aim for a higher standard of attainment 
than that typically achieved through YT, that is an NVQ at level 
3 or above rather than the level 2 NVQ typical under YT. In 
1991-92 nine per cent of 16-17 year olds entered apprenticeships 
either inside or outside the YT framework. It is entirely 
unclear how far modern apprenticeships will add to this or, like 
GNVQs, merely displace existing provision. 
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Training for the Workforce 
According to the Labour Force Survey, the proportion of 
employees reporting receiving training in the last four weeks 
rose steadily between 1984-90, before dipping in the recession 
and then rising in the recovery after 1993 (Figure 30). This is 
the only time series on the incidence of training which is 
regularly available though of course it says nothing about the 
focus or the quality of that training. 
There is no evidence from similar labour force surveys that 
employees in Britain report receiving less training in aggregate 
than employees in other industrial countries132. So there is no 
evidence from this survey that Britain's relatively less 
regulated labour market leads to a lower incidence of training 
or has prevented an increase in the incidence of training. On 
the other hand the increase in training incidence does not seem 
linked to any government policies. TECs were introduced in 1990, 
the number of NVQs awarded did not increase sharply until after 
1990 and the Government's flagship programme for improving the 
commitment of firms to training - Investors in People - was also 
introduced at this time. The rising incidence of training was 
firmly established before these initiatives. 
There are important inequalities in access to workplace 
training133. A higher incidence of training is found for higher 
paid individuals, those with better formal educational 
qualifications, those working in larger establishments and in 
workplaces where unions are recognised. On the other hand women 
now report receiving fractionally more training than men, 
temporary employees report receiving more training than permanent 
workers, and the gap in training received by full time and part-
time workers has narrowed significantly since 1984. 
The National Targets for Education and Training 
The ambitions of the Government for raising the achievement 
of qualifications by labour market entrants and the adult 
workforce have from 1991 been encapsulated in the National 
Targets (Table 34). These were originally a CBI initiative and 
have been endorsed also by the TUC. 
The Government has already more or less achieved its target 
for having one third of the age group entering higher education. 
However, the other targets and especially those for attainment 
at NVQ level 3 will probably not be met. 
It is not clear how seriously to view these targets134. 
One original target was for 50 per cent of the workforce to be 
working towards NVQs by 1996. As in 1996 only two-and-a-half per 
cent of the workforce was working towards NVQs this target has 
been quietly dropped. This tells us something about the 
unrealistic ambitions which were held for NVQs and their 
disappointing impact in practice. It also tells us something 
about the way the National Targets have been formulated. 
Throughout the whole education and training debate it has 
been left unclear what economic objectives are meant to be 
achieved as a result of hitting the targets for education and 
training. Much of the academic debate has focused on the 
possible links between education and training and productivity, 
and specifically the possible links between the attainment of 
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intermediate vocational qualifications and productivity135. 
This is separate from the debate on the possible links between 
education and training and unemployment and wage inequality. As 
was outlined in sections 1.2, 1.4 and IV.3, the exact weight to 
be placed on the attainment of formal qualifications as a 
'solution' to unemployment and widening wage dispersion is 
unclear. The trends in employment by occupation outlined in 
section 1.2 pointed to the significant net growth in managerial, 
professional and technical jobs. This would seem to point 
towards the need for more general higher educational attainment 
rather than narrow vocational qualifications. In terms of these 
employment trends an excessive focus in much of the debate on 
'vocational education' seems misplaced. 
The focus of the National Targets on qualifications may 
divert attention from consideration of the wider 'skills' which 
seem important in the recruitment process. As the National 
Targets only cover the top 85 per cent of the age group they 
would also seem to hold the threat of diverting attention and 
resources from the lowest attainers including those with special 
needs. 
The effectiveness of existing provision 
In 1996 reported skill shortages were running at 
historically low levels in the UK economy (Figure 31). The time 
series reported in Figure 31 is the only one which goes back over 
a long period and although it only refers to manufacturing there 
are reasons for believing that it proxies the trend for the whole 
economy136. In 1995-96 only one-in-ten manufacturing firms were 
reporting skill shortages as a constraint on output compared with 
over twice that proportion in 19 8 8 when the unemployment rate was 
last at around eight per cent. This is another indicator that 
lack of skills were not in the mid-1990s a major factor 
preventing further falls in unemployment. 
This might be an indication of the success of certain 
Government initiatives such as the GCSE which has played such an 
important role in boosting enrolment rates in further and 
subsequently higher education. GCSE is an example of a 
successful reform to general education. 
The evidence in Figure 2 9 suggests that UK firms have over 
time been increasing their provision of training regardless of 
any Government policies. Indeed the role of the state in 
boosting provision of workplace training seems primarily a pump-
priming one, which is precisely the focus of Government policy. 
In addition thought needs to be given to how to reduce 
inequalities in access to training. On the other hand the aim 
of delivering a unified system of vocational qualifications 
(NVQs) has not succeeded and a market clearly remains for the 
traditional qualifications. Indeed the notion of restricting 
choice in access to qualifications was always in contradiction 
to a market based approach. 
In terms of the options available to labour market entrants, 
the full-time education route offers a wide diversity of 
provision, but transfer between the general and vocational routes 
is difficult. Both full-time routes also suffer from 
uncomfortably high non-completion rates. Very few young people 
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now enter directly into jobs without training, but the quality 
of training available through YT and employment based provision 
remains variable. 
The size of the residual group of young people who are not 
in education or employment at age 16-17 does respond to 
significant improvements in the aggregate labour market. This 
group often exits the system at 16 with few or no qualifications 
and with an antipathy to state schemes. They appear mostly to 
want jobs and unskilled jobs would be available to many in a 
tight labour market. Indeed the composition of this group is not 
static. The eight per cent or so of 16-17 year olds not in 
education or employment in the Spring of 1995 will include people 
who have had jobs or YT places but have left them for various 
reasons. Some of them will take up jobs or YT places 
subsequently. They are not completely disconnected from the 
labour market. 
Reducing the size of the age group which leaves compulsory 
schooling with poor formal qualifications probably requires 
greater investment in the early years of compulsory schooling. 
Further remedial public measures after the age of 16 are likely 
to have only a modest impact. The UK devotes a similar 
proportion of its GDP to publically funded education when 
compared with other industrialised countries137. Within the 
education and training system then, it is important to draw up 
priorities for the allocation of resources. It is in the 
compulsory schooling system where the priorities might seem to 
be more urgent rather than in the post-compulsory system. 
V.2 The tax and benefits system and the labour market 
Introduction and key themes 
The interaction between benefits and taxation both for those 
in work and those out of work and the potential impact of those 
interactions on labour supply incentives is extremely complex and 
only a brief overview of the main issues can be offered here. A 
general conclusion reached by authors who have reviewed the 
system in depth is that the scale of disincentive problems should 
be kept in perspective, that they are related more to the 
benefits system rather than the tax system, that they affect 
specific groups only, and that modelling those effects is very 
difficult.138 
One key theme to bear in mind is that there are always 
trade-offs to be addressed with respect to any changes in the tax 
and benefits system as they affect low income households. In 
particular three objectives have to be balanced: the prevention 
of unacceptably low incomes; the prevention of serious 
disincentives to work or save; and the containment of the overall 
costs of the system. Only two out of three of these objectives 
at most can be satisfied by any one policy. Universal (non-means 
tested) benefits set at a high enough level to alleviate poverty 
will involve no disincentives to work for recipients, but can be 
costly. Selective (means-tested) benefits can effectively target 
low income households and at moderate cost, but can create 
significant disincentive problems. 
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The Conservative Government since 1979 has put great 
emphasis on containing the costs of the UK welfare state and on 
creating incentives to work. By definition these two objectives 
imply that the alleviation of poverty and income inequality has 
not been made a priority. Since 1979 income inequality has 
increased significantly in the UK139. In part this mirrors 
changes in the labour market, that is growing wage inequality and 
unemployment and inactivity. A progressive tax and benefits 
system would have acted to offset these changes in the primary 
distribution of income. In fact in the UK reductions in average 
tax rates for high income households combined with the failure 
to uprate all benefits in line with earnings has meant that 
growing inequalities in the primary distribution of income have 
been magnified so that the secondary distribution of household 
income has grown even more unequally. Indeed, changes to the tax 
and benefits system may have been more important than changes in 
the labour market in explaining growing income inequality across 
all households140. Far from compensating the losers in the 
process of labour market restructuring, tax and benefits policy 
has further rewarded the winners and failed to allow a 
significant minority of UK citizens to benefit from increased 
economic prosperity. 
Some relevant issues have been discussed already. Growing 
concerns over the increase in the numbers inactive due to 
disability has led to the introduction of incapacity benefit 
(section IV.1). The administration of unemployment benefit has 
since 1986 been significantly tightened (section IV.1), and in 
the case of 16-17 year olds the right to claim unemployment 
related benefits was withdrawn entirely in 1988 albeit not with 
the intended consequences (section V.l). 
The unemployment and poverty traps 
As was pointed out in section IV. 1, the generosity of 
unemployment related benefits has fallen significantly since the 
early 1980s mainly as a result of indexing those benefits to 
prices while average earnings have grown strongly. Assessing the 
trend in the 'average' replacement ratio over time is very 
difficult precisely because replacement ratios will vary 
significantly according to individual circumstances141. 
Nevertheless, one time series suggests that for a worker aged 40 
with a dependent spouse but no children and on two-thirds average 
earnings, the replacement ratio for unemployment insurance as a 
percentage of gross wages in previous employment had fallen from 
53 per cent in 1981 to 37 per cent in 1991142. The replacement 
ratio for Income Support (means tested social assistance) had 
also fallen. In comparison with most other EU countries the 1991 
ratios for both unemployment insurance and social assistance were 
quite low. 
However, the real wages of those 'entry jobs' which are 
taken by the unemployed have increased much more slowly than 
average earnings so that these calculations may overstate the 
decline in the replacement ratios faced by many unemployed 
people143. On the other hand empirical research has failed to 
find robust evidence that unemployment duration is very elastic 
with respect to the generosity of unemployment related 
benefits144. This implies that only drastic cuts in benefits 
85 
would have any significant impact on unemployment. Such a step 
would certainly increase incentives and reduce public expenditure 
but only at the cost of significant and presumably unacceptable 
increases in poverty, which is a neat illustration of the 
fundamental trade-offs involved in welfare policy. 
In practice the 'unemployment trap' (where income out of 
work might be higher than income in work) only affects certain 
groups145 . The majority of the claimant unemployed are single 
or are in childless couples and they face no significant 
incentive problems in moving into even quite low paid jobs 
(except those jobs with very limited hours). Heads of households 
with a very large number of dependents can face very high 
replacement ratios but they make up only a small fraction of the 
unemployed. The main incentive problems are faced by women, 
either as single parents or as the partners of unemployed men. 
Many of these women are likely to be classified as inactive 
rather than claimant unemployed. 
Single parents, especially those with young children, face 
acute problems because many can only access relatively low paid 
jobs while they face potentially high child care costs. The 
partners of unemployed men face a binding constraint in that if 
they take up any paid employment then beyond a modest income 
disregard the income from their wages will be deducted pound-for-
pound from their spouse's benefit. 
The main in-work benefit which is designed to alleviate the 
'unemployment trap' is Family Credit. This replaced Family 
Income Supplement (FIS) in 1988. FIS was introduced in 1971 
indicating that the UK now has a quarter of a century's 
experience with in-work benefits for families. It is sometimes 
alleged that the UK welfare system has stood still in the face 
of dramatic changes in the labour market. In section 1.2 the 
extent of the labour market changes was questioned. The notion 
that the welfare system has somehow stood still also needs to be 
qualified. 
Family Credit is available to low earning families with 
children where one parent is working at least 16 hours a week. 
Someone working at or above this hours threshold will have a 
significantly higher net income than if they remained out of 
work, thus 'solving' the unemployment trap. However, as earnings 
rise Family Credit is withdrawn at a rate of 70 per cent. When 
combined with taxes and other in-work benefits, particularly 
housing benefit, individuals who increase their earnings can find 
themselves facing composite marginal tax rates of over 90 per 
cent. This is the 'poverty trap', where extra earnings produce 
only limited gains in net income. 
There is a particularly difficult trade-off here in that 
Family Credit, while it alleviates the unemployment trap, does 
so at the expense of moving families into the poverty trap146. 
Before 1988 the administration of FIS involved some families 
facing composite marginal tax rates in excess of 100 per cent. 
The introduction of Family Credit alleviated this problem, but 
only by increasing the number of families facing marginal tax 
rates of between 60 and 90 per cent, another example of a 
difficult trade-off. 
On the other hand the actual impact of the poverty trap on 
hours worked is hard to discern, but may be small147. In 1995 
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an extra incentive was introduced for people on Family Credit to 
work over 3 0 hours. This change in the Family Credit regime is 
estimated to have had only a limited and possibly ambiguous 
impact on labour supply148. Many individuals, especially men, 
are unable to choose their hours anyway so that the impact of the 
tax and benefits regime on hours of work is irrelevant. The 
impact on the hours worked by women may be more significant, but 
perhaps still quite small. 
Nearly half of all Family Credit recipients are single 
parents. Nearly half of all recipients work in the personal 
service occupations covering such jobs as hairdressing and 
catering staff. Some 40 per cent of male recipients of Family 
Credit work in these occupations compared with only four per cent 
of all male workers who are in these jobs. As was discussed in 
section 1.2, this is the only area of less well paid and less 
skilled employment which is increasing its share of total 
employment. Family Credit has to be seen then in the context of 
these trends in the occupational structure of employment as well 
as the growth in wage inequality and in the number of single 
parent families. 
Families where the head of household is unemployed face a 
range of possibilities. If a job can be found with sufficient 
hours and paying a reasonable wage they can escape the benefits 
system altogether. Jobs which offer over 16 hours of work but 
with rather low gross earnings will involve the household moving 
onto Family Credit. Very low paid, low hour jobs can be taken 
up by, for example, single parents who can earn up to £15 a week 
before their income support benefit is reduced. However, other 
part-time jobs offering fewer than 16 hours will not allow access 
to Family Credit and any earnings above the modest income 
disregards for unemployment related benefits will result in 
benefit reductions on a pound-for-pound basis. This means that 
the head of household (and their partner if they have one) will 
not be able to access some of the lowest paid part-time jobs. 
Recent and suggested reforms 
Changes to Family Credit since 1988 have occured 
incrementally. From 1995 reforms were introduced to ease the 
transition from unemployment related benefits to in-work 
benefits, in response to the problem that heads of households 
might be reluctant to move into jobs because of uncertainty about 
what they would receive in terms of in-work benefits at a time 
when that transition might itself involve extra fixed costs in 
terms of travel-to-work or other in-work expenses. 
In 1994 a disregard in Family Credit for child care costs 
was introduced aimed particularly at single parents with young 
children who face some of the most serious disincentives. This 
reform will assist a small number of families at little extra 
cost, but more significant help with child-care costs would be 
very expensive if it was to make any major impact on the 
participation rates or hours of work of single parents149. 
Helping large numbers of single parents move from 'work to 
welfare' would always involve the Government incurring 
significant net costs. In other words reducing the disincentives 
for single parents to participate in the labour market while 
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boosting their net incomes would involve significant extra 
expenditure, thus illustrating the nature of the trade-offs 
discussed at the beginning of this section. 
Universal Child Benefit is paid to all families with 
children. A significant increase in its real value would benefit 
all families including those on Family Credit without the 
disincentive effects associated with that means tested benefit. 
However, the net costs of this would also be very high, again 
illustrating the nature of the trade-offs involved in any welfare 
reform. 
A similar set of issues relate to Housing Benefit which is 
paid to low income households in and out of work who are renting. 
Since the late 1980s there has seen a significant increase in the 
level of rents for all forms of both private and social housing 
as a result of policies designed to directly increase social 
rents and to allow for an increase in private rents150. As a 
result a much higher proportion of renters have become eligible 
for Housing Benefit which, as a means tested benefit, is 
associated with the unemployment and poverty traps. In 
particular the Government has reduced general subsidies for 
social housing which can be thought of as a reduction in a form 
of universal benefit. Households in social housing have become 
much more concentrated amongst the elderly, disabled, single 
parents and the unemployed. A reduction in rents (that is a 
switch back to a universal subsidy) would ease disincentive 
problems, but would involve a significant extra net cost. The 
gains in terms of a reduction in the extent of work disincentives 
would be modest, which is the same thing as saying that the 
increase in rents and in take-up of Housing Benefit have had only 
a modest impact in worsening disincentives. 
More generous income disregards for unemployment-related 
benefits could allow workless households to earn a little more 
from part-time or casual jobs before their benefits were reduced 
pound-for-pound. This would have particular relevance to lone 
parents and the partners of unemployed men who face the most 
binding disincentive problems. This might help alleviate the 
problem of low incomes associated with unemployment-related 
benefits and would not be costly. However, it might worsen the 
incentive to move into jobs offering longer hours and paying 
higher wages. Fundamentally, the only solution to the problem 
of 'no-earner' two-adult households is to get the head of 
household into a job offering more than 16 hours work. Once the 
head of household is in a job the immediate disincentive faced 
by their partner is removed though they might still face a 
poverty trap in that further hours worked by either partner may 
not result in significant increases in net income. 
From October 1996 the Government is to launch the Earnings 
Top-up Pilots to test the effects of paying in-work benefits to 
single people and couples without dependent children, in effect 
extending Family Credit to this group. The new benefit will be 
tested at two different levels with different rates for couples 
and single people. As with Family Credit an award will generally 
run at a fixed rate for 2 6 weeks. The pilot will extend over 
three years and about 20,000 people are expected to benefit. The 
rationale for extending Family Credit to single people and 
couples without children is not entirely clear as it is not 
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obvious that these groups face significant problems in terms of 
the unemployment trap. Indeed the Government's caution in 
piloting these changes may reflect uncertainly about the 
necessity of extending in-work benefits to these groups, a reform 
which could prove expensive with uncertain effects on labour 
supply. 
Employment taxes 
A great deal of concern is expressed about the burden of 
employment taxes, either in aggregate or in terms of their impact 
on low paid employment. In the UK social security taxes -
National Insurance Contributions - are formally paid by both 
employer and employee, though of course the true incidence of 
both types of taxes over the long run is likely to fall on the 
employee in the form of them accepting lower wages. Across a 
number of EU countries with similar living standards, even where 
the burden of social security contributions varies significantly, 
the final cost of employing labour varies only modestly, which 
seems to confirm the idea that the incidence of these taxes is 
borne mainly by labour151. 
This would mean that any general reduction in employment 
taxes would have very limited employment effects over the long 
run. If wages do respond in a way so as to offset the impact of 
a reduction in employment taxes, as net income in work will have 
been boosted this should nevertheless result in lower replacement 
ratios152. However, cutting employment taxes across the board 
would be a very expensive way of reducing replacement ratios as 
it would benefit all workers, including single people and 
childless couples who do not in general face significant 
incentive problems. This helps illustrate the general point that 
reductions in taxes are usually the least cost-effective way of 
alleviating any incentive problems precisely because they are 
hard to target. 
One way of achieving such targeting would be to confine 
reductions in employment taxes to the low paid only, by trying 
to make the incidence of these taxes more progressive. In fact 
the UK system is already quite progressive at the lower end of 
the earnings scale, more so as a result of reforms to the system 
in 1985, 1989 and 1994. Total average tax rates are quite modest 
on low earners and there are no barriers in the UK tax system to 
the creation of low paid and part-time jobs. In fact the 
opposite is the case in that the operation of the lower earnings 
threshold for National Insurance Contributions means that there 
is a large bunching of part-time employment at just below this 
threshold, though the extent of this bunching has diminished in 
recent years153. These less well paid part-time jobs are likely 
to be taken by young people and second earners (married women). 
So the structure of employment taxes in the UK does have an 
impact on the structure of employment, but not in terms of 
limiting the overall number of low paid part-time employment 
opportunities. Removing some of the remaining anomalies in the 
system would prove very expensive and the gains might be limited. 
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An approach to reform 
A single man in Britain aged 34 with a mortgage, working 
full time as a barman, with gross earnings at just 49 per cent 
of the male average placing him on the dividing line between the 
first and second deciles of the male earnings distribution, would 
be placed in the very middle of the income distribution for all 
households in the UK154. He would not face a significant 
unemployment trap if he lost his job, and does not face a poverty 
trap as he claims no in-work benefits. He is not in poverty or 
in a low income household. However, if he had dependent children 
the household would slip down to around the second decile of the 
income distribution and he would be claiming Family Credit, 
putting the household in the poverty trap. Depending on the 
number of children he might also face a high replacement ratio 
if he lost his job. 
As already discussed such a man with dependent children 
represents the typical male Family Credit recipient working as 
he does in a personal service occupation. Such jobs cannot be 
eliminated by oversees competition and will not be eliminated by 
technology. They are the only form of less skilled work which 
is increasing its share of total employment. And it is a form 
of employment which is only associated with low net household 
income if the head of household is responsible for dependents. 
It seems unclear what contribution education or training 
could make to improving the productivity of such a worker in his 
present job. In this case a minimum wage would also have no 
impact as this worker is above the threshold at which a minimum 
wage would be likely to be set in the UK. Reductions in taxation 
would be expensive in relation to any gains in net income for 
such a worker and would, like a minimum wage, be poorly targeted 
benefitting many young people and second earners. As a low net 
household income would only result if such a worker had 
dependents, benefits targeted on families with children would 
offer the best method of ensuring that the household always had 
an adequate income. The choice then is between universal Child 
Benefit and selective Family Credit with the usual trade-off 
between the expense of a universal benefit and the poverty trap 
disincentives created by a means-tested benefit. A more general 
point to make here is that because some of the changes in the 
primary distribution of income, particularly wage inequality, are 
ill-understood, a strategy of attempting to offset these changes 
through in-work benefits may be the only viable, second best, 
option. 
A significant increase in Child Benefit would benefit many 
families including those on Family Credit. A modest minimum wage 
would prevent the downward adjustment of gross wages which is an 
inevitable feature of the impact of any means-tested benefit. 
However, in-work means tested benefits would remain a significant 
feature of any system which tried to prevent unacceptably low 
incomes for members of the active population while containing 
total costs. Whatever the optimal package which was arrived at, 
the nature of the fundamental trade-offs between cost, incentives 
and poverty alleviation would remain. Interestingly, the Labour 
party appears to have exactly the same ordering of priorities as 
the Conservative Government in terms of putting the containment 
of cost and the creation of incentives to move from 'welfare-to 
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work' at the head of its list, which by definition means leaving 
the boosting of low incomes as the lower priority. 
The difficulties posed by the ever present trade-offs, the 
complexity of the system, and the uncertainty about the causes 
of the trends in the primary distribution of income, all argue 
for an incremental approach to reform. Uncertainty about the 
exact scale of the disincentive problems also counsels caution. 
In addition there is an argument for not allowing this debate 
over the possible impact of work disincentives to crowd out the 
more fundamental issue for the UK of ensuring that those who are 
not expected to work - the elderly and disabled - and who are 
dependent on state benefits do not get left further behind as 
their benefits are indexed only in line with inflation while the 
real incomes of most of the population increase over time. For 
this group the rhetoric of 'welfare-to-work' is irrelevant and 
only significantly improved transfers from higher income 
households can ensure that they participate in the growing 
prosperity which successful economic policy can engender. As 
there is little evidence that the reductions in marginal tax 
rates in the 1980s had significant beneficial effects on labour 
supply155, and as there are many reforms which could raise 
average tax rates without raising marginal rates anyway, the 
financing of extra transfers should not impose problems for the 
economy but would prove politically contentious. 
V.3 Industrial policy 
Government policy since 1979 
The term industrial policy can cover a very wide range of 
instruments, and the emphasis here is on exploring the 
interaction between industrial policy and labour market outcomes. 
It is important to identify the rationale which lies behind the 
approach of the UK Government is this area of public policy. In 
retrospect the year 1979 seems to mark a clear break in the 
approach to industrial policy, with the UK Government having 
since then pursued policies, most notably privatisation, which 
have attracted a wide range of interest. However, it might be 
misleading to paint a portrait of a Government setting out with 
a clear and detailed strategy. Privatisation was not mentioned 
in the election manifesto of the winning party in 1979; it was 
a policy and a term invented after the fact. 
Government policy since 1979 can best be characterised as 
consisting of a clear commitment to the promotion of private 
ownership, product market competition and free trade, tempered 
by a pragmatic approach to providing direct assistance to firms 
when such assistance can be shown to work and provided it does 
not cost too much. Indeed the degree of emphasis placed on 
providing direct assistance to firms has been influenced as much 
by the personality of the minister in charge of the Department 
of Trade and Industry as by any well thought through philosophy. 
One key theme to again emphasise is that this policy agenda 
has relevance to both the objective of boosting the rate of 
growth of productivity and the objective of trying to improve the 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation. The latter 
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objective is served if greater product market competition can 
help force firms to keep their prices down which in turn will 
oblige them to keep a tighter grip on costs. 
The commitment of the UK Government to the objective of 
increased product market competition explains their whole hearted 
support for the creation of the European Union's Single Market. 
The removal of internal trade barriers would serve the objective 
of increasing the competitive pressures on British firms to 
secure efficiency gains and to hold down costs. On the other 
hand the active promotion of the rationalisation of European 
firms to secure greater economies of scale might be contradictory 
to the promotion of greater product market competition, which 
explains the lukewarm approach of the British to this part of the 
European agenda. 
The approach of the UK Government would also support a 
position of the EU being in favour of greater openness to 
international free trade, hence the enthusiasm for the completion 
of the Uruguay round of GATT. The UK Government has been very 
supportive of foreign direct investment. This can be 
rationalised by the view that foreign firms might be more 
efficient at managing certain UK industries and more generally 
the presence of foreign companies would prove to be a competitive 
stimulus to domestic firms. 
With regard to product markets the UK Government has pursued 
a steady policy of deregulation, most notably in areas such as 
shop opening hours, the rules governing the operations of certain 
professions such as lawyers, and most comprehensively in the 
financial markets. However, the most celebrated departure was 
the rolling programme of privatisation, starting with firms such 
as British Airways which were already involved in fiercely 
competitive product markets, before moving on to the complex task 
of privatising the utilities. As these firms all had some degree 
of monopoly power their privatisation has had to be accompanied 
by complex regimes of regulation. Within the public sector 
services competitive tendering has introduced some market 
pressures with the aim of fostering greater efficiency 
Before 1979 the nationalised firms were heavily subsidised 
by the state. These subsidies were reduced and the process of 
rationalisation started before privatisation. More generally the 
phasing out of direct subsidies to firms has been another key 
break with past policy, motivated by the desire to reduce public 
expenditure and by the belief that such subsidies merely slowed 
down the necessary processes of adjustment and fostered 
inefficiency. In addition the Government has also significantly 
reduced the resources devoted to regional policy, abolishing 
automatic regional grants which were not felt to be cost-
effective and focusing on modest selective grants, often to aid 
foreign direct investment. However, at the same time the 
Government has responded pragmatically to the problems faced by 
disadvantaged urban areas by using a wide range of policy 
instruments and an equally wide range of agencies. This urban 
policy has largely supplanted traditional industrial and regional 
policy. 
Government pragmatism is also in evidence in the wide range 
of policy instruments and very wide range of agencies designed 
to help small and medium sized enterprises gain access to finance 
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and to assistance with premises, the development of business 
plans and so on. Key agencies here are the Training and 
Enterprise Councils which continue to compete and overlap with 
many other agencies (see section II.1). 
One significant element of 'active labour market policy', 
support for the unemployed in starting enterprises, is now the 
responsibility of the TECs under the direction of the Department 
of the Environment. It is thus now seen as part of 'industrial 
policy' aimed at fostering the growth of sustainable small 
enterprises. With the emphasis on helping businesses which show 
potential for growth, far fewer unemployed people have been 
helped by the Business Start Up Scheme which replaced the 
Enterprise Allowance Scheme in 1991156. Individuals can receive 
assistance under the scheme if they have been out of work for 
over six weeks. Recipients can receive between £2 0 and £9 0 per 
week for between 26 and 66 weeks. The scheme has very high 
levels of deadweight in that a high proportion of recipients (up 
to 84 per cent) would have started a business anyway, though the 
incentives may have brought forward their plans. Survival rates 
are quite high up, to 7 6 per cent after 18 months. However, the 
extent of displacement of the activities of existing enterprises 
is very difficult to ascertain. 
The effects of Government industrial policy 
A major problem in evaluating the impact of this agenda is 
that the direct evidence on the relationship between product 
market competition and productivity growth is rather thin157. 
It is very difficult to find measures which can show how far 
product market competition has increased since 1979. It is often 
not possible to disentangle the effects of enhanced product 
market competition on productivity from the effects of labour 
legislation or recessionary shocks, as was discussed in section 
II.2. 
Nevertheless, there is a general tendency for economists to 
be supportive of policies designed to foster greater product 
market competition. It is only possible to infer from the 
evidence that the UK's productivity performance has improved 
since 1979 (section II.2), that increased product market 
competition has played a role. There is some direct case study 
evidence in support of specific policies. Foreign direct 
investment in the car industry has helped secure a dramatic 
turnaround in productivity performance158. Privatised firms 
such as British Steel, stripped of industrial subsidies and 
operating in competitive markets have registered especially 
impressive turnarounds. The former nationalised industries were 
frequently the source of significant industrial unrest so that 
privatisation may have played a role in securing more quiescent 
industrial relations, though in the steel and coal industries 
union power was curtailed before privatisation. Deregulation of 
shop hours may have helped foster the creation of more employment 
in the retailing sector in the context of a relatively 
deregulated UK labour market which has always allowed firms to 
secure a wide range of working practices. 
There have been specific criticisms of UK industrial policy. 
From the perspective of those who have been broadly supportive 
of the general thrust of policy have come criticisms that not 
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enough competition has been fostered through privatisation, or 
that too permissive an approach to takeovers can allow firms to 
stifle competition159. Other critics offer more general 
criticism of the lack of an 'industrial strategy' designed to 
help UK manufacturing industry160. However, such critics tend 
to offer little evidence which contradicts the notion of a 
turnaround in UK productivity performance since 1979, especially 
in manufacturing, and little evidence that their proposed policy 
instruments would work any better than the instruments which came 
under the heading of 'industrial strategy' before 1979. 
There is therefore a strong predilection amongst many 
economists to be broadly supportive of the Government's approach 
to industrial policy, on the grounds of the general commitment 
of most economists to the advantages of competitive markets, a 
view that the aggregate picture of UK industrial performance is 
promising, that some limited direct evidence exists of the 
beneficial effects of certain policies, and a pragmatic 
scepticism with respect to the effects of traditional 'industrial 
strategy'. 
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VI The national debate: policy perspectives 
The purpose of this last section is to draw together some 
of the analysis contained in the body of the report in order to 
assess the impact of public policy on the labour market in the 
UK. Suggestions will be made as to the lessons to be learned 
from UK experience and what an optimal approach to policy might 
be given the objective of wanting to bring about significant 
reductions in unemployment. The approach of the social partners 
to labour market policy will be scrutinised in the light of this 
analysis. 
The objectives of economic policy 
In the introduction three dimensions of economic performance 
were outlined which will be related to a significant extent to 
the performance of the labour market. In 1979 unemployment in 
the UK, according to the claimant count, seasonally adjusted and 
consistent with current coverage, stood at four per cent of the 
labour force, but with inflation accelerating. In the first half 
of 1996 it stood at just below eight per cent of the labour 
force, but declining at a steady rate without as yet any sign of 
an acceleration in inflation. There is no consensus on whether 
or not the NRU has fallen. Since 1979 productivity growth in UK 
manufacturing has been at an impressive rate when considered both 
historically and relative to the trends in other countries, and 
growth rates in whole economy productivity have been reasonably 
good relative to the 1970s and also in relation to other 
countries. On the other hand wage inequality has grown 
significantly and this has been one factor, though not 
necessarily the main one, in explaining the significant growth 
in income inequality in the UK since 1979. 
Overall then there is one clear positive - improved 
productivity growth, one clear negative - increased wage and 
income inequality, and one ambiguous result - there is no 
consensus that the sustainable rate of unemployment is lower than 
that inherited in 1979. In the introduction it was pointed out 
that there might be trade-offs between these objectives and some 
of the analysis has pointed to such possible trade-offs. The 
shock of the early 1980s recession probably played a major role 
in explaining the productivity breakthrough, but also brought in 
its wake large scale unemployment. Reforms in the field of 
industrial relations may have contributed to improved 
productivity growth but reductions in union coverage have also 
contributed to increased wage inequality. Whether one approves 
of these outcomes since 1979 will depend on how one subjectively 
ranks these different dimensions of economic performance. 
It will also depend critically on whether you believe that 
the sustainable rate of unemployment is now lower as a result of 
supply side reforms or remains unacceptably high, that is whether 
you believe the natural rate 'optimists' or 'pessimists' whose 
estimates of the NRU were outlined in section 1.5. It is the 
wide range of such estimates which makes it difficult at first 
sight to come to an overall judgement on the impact of the 
Government's strategy for labour market reform. This wide range 
of estimates also makes it impossible to judge how much of the 
remaining UK unemployment is 'cyclical' in nature and therefore 
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capable of being eliminated through expansionary macroeconomic 
policy and how much is 'structural' in nature implying the need 
for further significant supply side reforms. 
Macroeconomic policy and unemployment 
Unemployment rose sharply in the UK during two recessions 
which were initiated by tight monetary policy designed to bring 
about a reduction in inflation. In this sense the impact of 
macroeconomic policy on unemployment over the short to medium 
term seems obvious. However, if the natural rate of unemployment 
is very high then most if not all unemployment can be considered 
'structural' in nature implying only a limited role for 
macroeconomic policy in achieving reductions in unemployment. 
Given the very wide range of estimates of the NRU it would 
seem unwise to base macroeconomic policy on any one estimate of 
where the NRU might be. Rather macroeconomic policy has to be 
robust to different estimates of where the NRU is. In addition 
the rate at which unemployment falls towards the NRU may be 
important. Rapid reductions in unemployment may result in short-
term capacity constraints or skill shortages emerging which can 
put upward pressure on inflation. Putting these two factors 
together suggests the case for a modestly expansionary 
macroeconomic policy which pushes the actual unemployment rate 
down slowly towards whatever the NRU might be. Since 1992 
Britain has had just such a modestly expansionary policy. 
This analysis also suggests that the absence of any 
discussion of the role of macroeconomic policy in reducing 
unemployment in the conclusions of the Essen meeting of the 
European Council was not warranted. 
Microeconomic reforms and unemployment 
In section 1.5 a list of the main causal factors which have 
been put forward to explain why the NRU may have risen were 
outlined. The main body of the report has reviewed the evidence 
on the impact of Government reforms on many of these supply side 
factors, and this should now allow some summary of whether there 
is compelling evidence that these factors remain important as 
explanations of a high NRU. 
Clearly the supply shocks of the 1970s are past history. 
The sharp increase in the share of income from employment in GDP 
which occured in the mid-1970s following these shocks has been 
fully reversed and in the 1990s commodity prices remain subdued. 
The period 1979-84 saw a dramatic acceleration in the rate of job 
loss in manufacturing. However, this is the only compelling 
direct evidence of an acceleration in the pace of structural 
change which might have led to some labour market mismatch. 
Since 1984 the pace of change in the structure of employment by 
industry and occupation does not seem to have been out of line 
with historical experience. At the same time educational reforms 
have been associated with significant decreases in the proportion 
of the working age population holding no qualifications. 
Unemployment rates and pay differentials by qualification show 
no clear sign of having widened dramatically, though there are 
measurement problems here. Reported skill shortages in 1996 were 
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at historically low levels. Regional unemployment rates were 
more equal in the mid-1990s than at any point in the last 70 
years. 
The significant decline in the coverage of trade unions and 
in collective bargaining does not suggest that organised labour 
could be held responsible if the NRU does remain high in the 
1990s. There might remain some concern that there is not enough 
coordination in the wage bargaining process. Such coordination 
was a feature of some economies which appeared to cope relatively 
well with the supply side shocks of the 1970s. But then the 
relevance of such institutional mechanisms seems most apparent 
in the circumstances of adverse shocks. Future shocks may see 
the UK labour market no better placed to cope, but in the absence 
of shocks it is not clear why the UK pay bargaining system should 
stand in the way of further falls in unemployment. 
There is no evidence that either the modest employment 
protection legislation in place in 1979 or the modest minimum pay 
rates associated with the Wages Councils had any significant 
impact on employment. Such evidence implies that the abolition 
of minimum wage protection will not have contributed to any 
reduction in the NRU, but will have contributed to the increase 
in wage inequality. In terms of the overall range of individual 
employment rights there has been no net deregulation since 1979, 
with some reduction in employment protection offset by increased 
rights in relation, for example, to equal pay. There is no 
evidence that the equal pay legislation in the 1970s harmed 
employment and no suggestion that it has done so since 1979. 
There was never compelling evidence that high personal tax 
rates had very serious effects on labour supply or that 
employment taxes had a large impact over the long run. The UK 
has a uniquely progressive system of social security 
contributions at the lower end of the earnings scale. 
Assessing the impact of the benefits system (and its 
interaction with taxation) on unemployment is very difficult. 
However, it is hard to see how unemployment related benefits 
could be considered to be more generous and/or more loosely 
administered than in 1979. Average replacement ratios have 
fallen since 1979, and even at the lowest end of the labour 
market seem likely to have declined. The administration of 
unemployment related benefits has been significantly tightened 
since 1986 while the unemployment trap affects only a small 
proportion of the unemployed. Greater disincentives are faced 
by single parents and the partners of the claimant unemployed, 
many of whom are likely to be counted as inactive. 
The long-term unemployment rate demonstrates a stable 
relationship with the total unemployment rate. As total 
unemployment falls, long-term unemployment falls in the same way 
as it rises when total unemployment rises. The finding that the 
long-term unemployed play no role in holding down wage inflation 
is not robust. There is evidence that some of the initiatives 
run by the Employment Service have helped to increase the rate 
at which unemployed people find work. However, assessing their 
aggregate impact is difficult. 
There has been an increase in product market competition but 
assessing its impact on labour market outcomes is also difficult. 
Capacity constraints may be important over the short-term but 
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investment does respond quite quickly to such constraints so that 
their existence may place a limit on how quickly unemployment can 
fall but do not affect the NRU itself. 
Even when it is difficult to assess directly the impact of 
some of the supply side reforms, all the factors outlined in 
section 1.5 have either been moving in the right direction or had 
little explanatory power to begin with. It may be that the 
combined contribution of some of the Government's supply side 
reforms has been greater than the measurable contribution of the 
individual parts. It has hard to believe that the NRU is not 
lower than in 1979, but it is not possible to judge how low it 
might be. However, the trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation in the mid-1990s looks significantly better than during 
the early and mid-1980s. The estimate offered by Sentance in 
section 1.5 that unemployment could fall on a sustainable basis 
to a range between 4-6 per cent does not seem unduly optimistic. 
In terms of further supply side reform, the uncertainty 
about where the NRU might be coupled with the analysis that all 
the factors have been moving in the right direction should 
counsel a cautious approach. There seems little rationale for 
further drastic changes. Rather there is a case for looking 
carefully at the merits of further specific incremental reforms 
in such areas as education and training or the tax and benefits 
system, based on a careful analysis of the empirical case and of 
the impact of past reforms. Drastic reforms, such as abolishing 
the right of the long-term unemployed to draw benefit while 
giving them access to large scale active labour market 
programmes, run the risk of significant adverse side-effects in 
terms of the income distribution and seem to draw few lessons 
from past experience. 
At the same time there is a good case for cautiously 
reversing some of the changes with respect to employment 
protection legislation and minimum wage regulation, given the 
evidence that the regimes which existed in 1979 had no 
significant adverse impact on employment. The codifying of 
individual employment rights which has continued since 1979 in 
part due the impact of the EU does not appear to be incompatible 
with the operation of an efficient labour market, providing that 
the right balance is struck. Modern trade unions also have a 
role to play in terms of helping to enforce and improve those 
rights, and in other areas such as training and employee 
participation where the presence of unions seems to have a 
positive impact. 
A market based economy on its own will almost certainly not 
deliver a desirable outcome in terms of the overall distribution 
of income. The main objective of the tax and benefits system is 
to ensure that those households which have little or no market 
income can nevertheless enjoy a standard of living acceptable to 
society as a whole, and can enjoy rising real incomes along with 
the rest of society. Given the ill-understood nature of the 
increase in wage inequality and the relative weakness of the 
instruments available to directly affect the primary distribution 
such as a minimum wage and training, a strongly redistributive 
tax and benefits system is the only sure instrument available to 
offset these changes in the primary distribution and is the only 
instrument of any relevance to the elderly and disabled on state 
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benefits. 
It is possible then to come to some conclusions about the 
importance of different policies in terms of their impact on 
labour market outcomes and wider social goals. To what extent 
is there any consensus amongst the 'social partners' over either 
the objectives or the instruments of labour market policy? 
The 'social partners' and labour market policy 
Although the term the social partners is not in heavy use 
in the UK, with no formal mechanisms for dialogue in existence, 
it is the case that the TUC and the CBI do talk to each other and 
do produce documents which state their case with respect to the 
objectives and instruments of labour market policy. However, it 
should be borne in mind that neither organisation can be said to 
represent all opinion from the two sides of industry. 
1) The objectives of policy. The TUC and more especially the 
CBI often obscure how they rank the different objectives by 
referring to the need to 'improve competitiveness'. The TUC is 
clear that full employment should be the prime objective for 
economic policy, though the unions will also be deeply concerned 
about the growth in wage inequality161. By definition therefore 
increased productivity growth must be a lower priority, although 
the TUC usually argues that higher productivity and greater 
equality are not in conflict. The CBI clearly places higher 
productivity as its priority and warns that attempts to reduce 
unemployment or tackle inequality would not gain business support 
if they interfered with the efficiency of UK firms162. As such 
it seems to accept the ordering of objectives implicit in 
Government policy. Thus at the most critical level of the 
objectives of labour market policy there are differences, though 
exactly along the lines which one would expect. 
2) Macroeconomic policy. The TUC has expressed considerable 
scepticism about estimates of the NRU, making the same points as 
in this report in noting the wide range of such estimates. As 
a result they are also clearer that macroeconomic policy may have 
a significant role to play in reducing unemployment. The CBI 
tends to echo the views of the 'natural rate pessimists' and 
favours a very cautious approach to macroeconomic policy, though 
one with a greater emphasis on public investment in areas such 
as the transport infrastructure. The CBI has also endorsed the 
case for a more independent Bank of England. 
Interestingly, the TUC itself has endorsed EMU, though many 
individual unions remain sceptical. The CBI has not taken a 
strong position, probably wisely as there is no other economic 
issue which is more divisive across industry and across the 
political spectrum. 
3) Collective industrial relations. The CBI has, 
retrospectively, endorsed the Government's programme of reform, 
though they never really pressed for it. Given that the reforms 
aimed to tilt the balance of power towards employers, their 
support is not surprising. Neither was the opposition of the TUC 
to each piece of legislation, although the unions have 
pragmatically accepted much of this new legal framework and it 
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is not clear that there would be any significant pressure on a 
Labour Government to roll the reforms back. Rather the TUC wants 
to see further legislation which would create a statutory trade 
union recognition procedure designed to make union organisation 
easier with the aim of turning the tide with respect to the 
coverage of union membership and collective bargaining. The TUC 
is deeply sceptical of the impact of 'human resource management' 
techniques in the absence of a trade union presence and believes 
that 'social partnership' in the workplace is the best route to 
higher productivity growth. Needless to say any agenda involving 
statutory intervention would be fiercely opposed by management. 
4) Individual employment rights. There is strong agreement on 
the regulation of health and safety and the promotion of equal 
opportunities, those relatively less contentious areas of policy, 
though the TUC does not believe that equal opportunities policy 
goes far enough. The TUC, although voicing concern about the 
large tail of long working hours in the UK labour market and 
support for the EU Directive on working time, does not believe 
that lower working hours would have much impact on unemployment. 
Generally this is not an issue in the UK. Neither the TUC or CBI 
is in favour of reducing productivity growth in order to increase 
the 'employment intensity of economic growth'163. 
There is disagreement on the minimum wage with the CBI 
formally opposed in principle. However, the CBI has hinted that 
a very low minimum wage would not in practice pose problems for 
its members. The CBI is strongly opposed to the Social Chapter 
on principle. Basically the CBI supports the status quo as it 
now exists with respect to labour market legislation. The TUC 
wants to see the extension of basic minimum rights which 
collective bargaining can then enhance. The TUC is strongly 
committed to the Social Chapter. Since 1988 the unions have seen 
the EU as a mechanism to enhance employment rights. Shut out 
from influence by the UK Government they are keen on the 
influence potentially available to them through the institutions 
of the EU. 
5. Passive and active labour market policy. The TUC has argued 
that the balance between the 'assistance' and the 'policing' role 
of labour market policy has tilted too much towards coercion. 
Both the CBI and the TUC view active labour market policy 
favourably, with the latter in favour of significantly enhanced 
resources for training and work programmes run on a much larger 
scale. 
6. Education and training. Everyone is in favour of more. The 
CBI was responsible for developing the National Targets for 
Education and Training, which were subsequently endorsed by the 
TUC and the Government. Whether the aim of these targets is to 
improve productivity growth or to reduce unemployment has never 
been made clear by anyone. However, the TUC would like to see 
statutory obligations on employers to provide training, to which 
the CBI is implacably opposed. So although there is agreement 
on ends there is a division over means. 
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7. Tax and benefits. There is much common ground in terms of 
concern about the possible impact of disincentives on 
unemployment and hours of work. The CBI is enthusiastic about 
Family Credit as an alternative to the minimum wage. Neither 
organisation has ever spelt out how it would address the 
fundamental trade-offs in this area of public policy, though the 
reluctance to spend much more money would narrow the CBI's 
options down to a straightforward trade-off between incentives 
and poverty alleviation. More generally both organisations have 
voiced concerns about the overall growth in income inequality, 
though identifying the relative losers in any redistributive 
package is never made explicit. The CBI worries about employment 
taxes and other Government imposed non-wage labour costs and is 
always and everywhere in favour of the reduction of business 
taxes. The TUC accepts that reductions in employment taxes would 
have little impact on employment. 
8. Industrial policy. The CBI has been broadly in favour of 
Government policy though it has always argued that tax incentives 
for firms are not generous enough. The TUC has been sceptical 
of the impact of policies aimed at small and medium sized 
enterprises. It is far more critical of the reduction in 
resources for regional policy, of the absence of a tougher regime 
with respect to takeovers, and is more generally supportive of 
the more far reaching criticisms of the absence of any 
'industrial strategy.' 
Few of the policy positions outlined above will prove 
surprising. Where there is agreement it is in areas such as 
education where the desirable direction of reform seems clear. 
On the minimum wage and Social Chapter there is less common 
ground. Both in terms of the objectives of labour market policy 
and the possible trade-offs between those objectives, and in 
terms of the more contentious instruments of labour market 
policy, there is limited common ground between the CBI and the 
TUC even though they engage in a dialogue which is usually a 
civil one. 
The position of the Labour opposition on all these matters 
is unclear, in part because there are obvious differences within 
the Party. In terms of objectives the Deputy Leader of the party 
is representative of those who wish to make full employment an 
explicit over-riding aim of economic policy, while the Leader and 
Shadow Chancellor rarely mention full employment and instead, 
like the Government, put most emphasis on the growth in 
productivity and living standards. 
In terms of policy Labour seems committed to a macroeconomic 
framework which would be more cautious than the Government's, a 
stance heavily influenced by the 'natural rate pessimists'. EMU 
is as contentious an issue as it is within the Conservative 
Party. It wants more education and training, but apparently 
without a statutory framework for employer provided training. 
It is in favour of more active labour market policy. It is in 
favour of a minimum wage and the Social Chapter. It is in favour 
of tax and benefit reforms though the overwhelming emphasis on 
containing costs means that in practice its position with respect 
to the trade-offs in this area of policy are the same as those 
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of the Government. It may pursue a more active industrial 
policy, though consisting of what is unclear. 
Conclusions: unemployment, macroeconomic and labour market 
policies 
Whatever labour market policies are pursued by any 
Government, they need to be based on a clear understanding of 
what the main trends in the labour market are, a clear idea of 
what the objectives of policy should be and of the possible 
trade-offs between those objectives, and a clear understanding 
of the role and limits of different policy instruments. 
UK experience in this respect can be set alongside the five 
action areas which were emphasised in the conclusions of the 
Essen meeting of the European Council (see introduction). 
a) In terms of the goal of promoting investment in vocational 
education, the UK has seen a significant expansion in the 
proportion of young people and adults obtaining vocational and 
general education qualifications. It is unclear why there should 
be specific emphasis on vocational qualifications when the net 
increase in a range of service sector jobs would seem to place 
more weight on the need for more general education 
qualifications. 
b) The objective of increasing the employment intensity of 
growth must imply trying to lower productivity growth. In the 
context of the UK experience where improved productivity growth 
is the one unambiguous sign of a better functioning labour 
market, this objective seems ill-founded. 
c) Reductions in non-wage labour costs may have little impact 
on employment in the long run if the incidence of these costs is 
passed onto workers in the form of lower wages, which the 
evidence suggests is the case. The UK already has a reasonably 
progressive structure of employment taxes. 
d) The emphasis in labour market policy in the UK has shifted 
decisively away from large scale work and training programmes to 
the programmes operated by the Employment Service. This shift 
seems entirely in line with the evidence on the relative 
effectiveness of different programmes. 
e) Unemployment rates amongst disadvantaged groups, including 
the young, ethnic minorities and the long term unemployed, are 
all very sensitive to aggregate employment conditions. When 
total unemployment is on a firmly downward trend so are the 
unemployment rates for all disadvantaged groups. Other polices 
can play a supporting role. 
An obvious gap in this list is the lack of any mention of 
the role of macroeconomic policy and the need for growth in 
aggregate output and employment. The UK's experience of falling 
unemployment since 1993 is a product of the success of some 
supply side reforms and of a macroeconomic policy which since the 
end of 1992 has been supportive of an expansion in employment. 
A reasonably optimistic assessment would be that by the year 
2 000, in the absence of any shocks, a continuation of such 
policies may see unemployment in the UK fall on a sustainable 
basis to around 5-6 per cent of the workforce. This would be 
approximately half the unemployment rate in 1993, when the 
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European Commission's White Paper advocated the objective of 
halving unemployment in Europe by 2000. The UK may well come 
close to fulfilling that objective. One of the main unresolved 
issues in the UK will be how to address the widening gap in the 
distribution of income which emerged in the 1980s. 
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Table 
Age and gender distribution of the population aged 16 and over, 1979-95 
1979 
1984 
1990 
1995 
1979-84 
1984-90 
1990-95 
Thousands 
All aged 
16+ 
41146 
42720 
43962 
44381 
Annual ised 
% change 
0.77 
0.48 
0.19 
% 
Female 
52.2 
52.0 
51.7 
51.4 
Percentage of total 
16-19 
-
8.4 
7.0 
5.8 
20-24 
-
10.3 
9.9 
8.6 
25.99 
-
41.5 
44.3 
46.5 
50-59(W) 
50-64 (W) 
-
17.5 
16.4 
16.7 
60+ (W) 
65+ (M) 
-
22.4 
22.4 
22.4 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 
Table 2 
The net impact of migration, 1981 - 92 
Country of last or 
next residence 
European Union 
Rest of Europe 
Commonwealth 
United States 
Rest of World 
Total 
(Thousands) 
1981-87 
Inflow 
51.9 
8.4 
88.6 
25.3 
45.2 
219.6 
Outflow 
44.6 
8.0 
72.6 
30.3 
33.7 
189.2 
Balance 
7.3 
0.4 
16.1 
-5.0 
11.5 
30.4 
1988-92 
Inflow 
62.5 
14.2 
100.4 
25.3 
40.6 
243.0 
Outflow 
58.3 
12.0 
87.4 
34.2 
35.8 
227.9 
Balance 
4.2 
2.2 
13.0 
-9.0 
4.7 
15.1 
Note: Excludes migration with the Irish Republic 
Source: International Passenger Survey, Social Trends 1995 
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Table 3 
Age and gender distribution of the labour force aged 16 and over, 1984-96 
1979 LFS 
1984 LFS 
1984 ILO 
1990 
1993 
1996 
1979-84 
1984-90 
1990-93 
1993-96 
Thousands 
Total Labour 
Force 
25836 
26590 
26768 
28346 
27859 
27959 
Annual i sed 
% change 
0.86 
0.98 
-0.57 
0.12 
Percentage 
Female 
39.5 
41.2 
41.3 
43.0 
43.7 
44.0 
Percentage of total 
16-19 
-
-
9.4 
7.9 
5.8 
5.9 
20-24 
-
-
13.4 
12.8 
11.7 
10.1 
25-49 
-
-
54.5 
58.6 
61.8 
62.8 
50-64 (M) 
50-59 (F) 
-
-
19.7 
17.8 
17.8 
18.5 
65+ (M) 
60+ (F) 
-
-
2.9 
2.8 
2.8 
2.8 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 
Table 4 
Labour Force Projections by gender, 1996 - 2006 
1994 
2001 
2006 
1996-2001 
2001 -2006 
Thousands 
All aged 16+ 
27964 
28669 
29271 
Annualised % change 
0.5 
0.4 
% 
Female 
44.0 
44.6 
45.3 
Labour Force Participation Rate 
for those of working age (%) 
Male 
84.7 
84.1 
82.8 
Female 
71.2 
72.6 
74.2 
Total 
78.3 
78.7 
78.7 
Note: Assumes unemployment at 2.15 million as in December 1995 
Source: * British Labour Force Projections: 1996 - 2006' 
Labour Market Trends, May 1996 
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Table 5 
Age and gender distribution of the employed workforce, 1984 - 96 
1979 
1983 
1984 
1990 
1993 
1996 
1979-83 
1983-90 
1990-93 
1993-96 
Thousands 
Total 
Employment 
24369 
23103 
23626 
26421 
24949 
25646 
Annualised % 
change 
-1.3 
2.1 
-1.9 
0.9 
Percentage 
Female 
39.1 
40.9 
41.4 
43.1 
44.9 
44.8 
Percentage of total 
16-19 
8.3 
7.5 
5.2 
5.3 
20-24 
12.5 
12.5 
10.9 
9.6 
25-49 
55.7 
59.2 
62.9 
63.5 
50-64 (M) 
50-59 (F) 
20.4 
17.9 
18.0 
18.7 
65+ (M) 
60+ (F) 
3.1 
2.9 
3.2 
2.9 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 
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Table 6 
Total Employment by Standard Region, 1979 - 95 
South East 
East Anglia 
South West 
West Midlands 
East Midlands 
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
North West 
North 
Wales 
Scotland 
N. Ireland 
Total Employment, thousands (% change over previous period) 
1979 
8181 
785 
1775 
2386 
1675 
2149 
2902 
1332 
1162 
2248 
598 
1983 
7873 (-3.8) 
786 (-) 
1767 (-0.5) 
2139 (-10.4) 
1594 (-4.8) 
1950 (-9.3) 
2546 (-12.3) 
1149 (-13.7) 
1011 (-13.0) 
2063 (-8.2) 
563 (-5.9) 
1990 
9019 (14.6) 
970 (23.4) 
2177 (23.2) 
2483 (16.1) 
1835 (15.1) 
2245 (15.1) 
2816 (10.6) 
1280 (11.4) 
1185 (17.2) 
2250 (9.1) 
627 (11.4) 
1993 
8075 (-10.5) 
937 (-3.4) 
2052 (-5.7) 
2272 (-8.5) 
1725 (-6.0) 
2106 (-6.2) 
2655 (-5.7) 
1232 (-3.8) 
1125 (-5.1) 
2233 (-0.8) 
635 (1.3) 
1995 
8387 (3.9) 
986 (5.2) 
2159 (5.2) 
2292 (0.9) 
1773 (2.8) 
2151 (2.1) 
2621 (-1.3) 
1257 (2.0) 
1165 (3.6) 
2217 (-0.7) 
682 (7.4) 
Source: Workforce in Employment Series, June 
Table 7 
Changes in the industrial structure of employment in Britain, 1979 - 96 
Primary/Utilities 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Distribution/ 
Transport 
Business and 
Financial 
Services 
Public/Social 
% of total employment 
1979 
5.5 
29.5 
6.3 
25.1 
7.0 
26.5 
1984 
5.2 
23.5 
6.4 
26.6 
9.2 
29.2 
1984* 
4.8 
23.3 
8.2 
26.6 
10.5 
26.7 
1990 
3.8 
21.1 
8.3 
26.5 
13.2 
27.1 
1996 
3.0 
19.4 
6.9 
26.3 
14.0 
30.4 
Annualised percentage point 
change 
1979-84 
-0.06 
-1.20 
+0.02 
+0.30 
+0.44 
+0.54 
1984-90 
-0.17 
-0.37 
+0.02 
+0.02 
+0.45 
+0.07 
1990-96 
-0.13 
-0.28 
-0.23 
-0.03 
+0.13 
+0.55 
Sources: 1971-1984 Workforce in employment series, SIC (80). 
* 1984-1996 Labour Force Survey, Spring, SIC (92) 
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Table 8 
Changes in the occupational structure of employment, 1979-1996 
Occupation 
1 .Managers/ 
Administrators 
2. Professional 
3. Associate Prof. 
& Technical 
'Professional/ 
Managerial/ 
Technical' 
4. Clerical/ 
Secretarial 
6. Personal/ 
Protective 
Services 
7. Sales 
'Service' 
5. Craft and 
Related 
8. Plant and 
Machine 
Operatives 
9. Other 
Occupations 
'Manual' 
% of total employment 
1979 
24.1 
16.8 
6.6 
6.3 
29.7 
46.2 
1984 
12.5 
8.9 
7.7 
29.1 
16.1 
7.3 
7.0 
30.4 
17.7 
11.6 
11.3 
40.6 
1990 
13.8 
9.2 
8.8 
31.8 
17.0 
7.5 
7.5 
32.0 
16.0 
10.7 
9.6 
36.3 
1996 
15.9 
10.7 
9.6 
36.2 
14.9 
10.7 
8.0 
33.6 
12.4 
9.6 
8.2 
30.2 
Annualised percentage point 
change 
1979-84 
+1.00 
-0.14 
+0.14 
+0.14 
+0.14 
-1.12 
1984-90 
+0.22 
+0.05 
+0.18 
+0.45 
+0.15 
+0.03 
+0.08 
+0.27 
-0.28 
-0.15 
-0.28 
-0.72 
1990-96 
+0.35 
+0.25 
+0.13 
+0.73 
-0.35 
+0.53 
+0.08 
+0.27 
-0.60 
-0.18 
-0.23 
-1.01 
Source: 1979-1996 Labour Force Survey, SOC classification. Data for 1984-90 reclassified 
to SOC using mapping provided by Peter Elias from the Institute of Employment 
Research, Warwick University. 
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Table 9 
The highest qualifications held by the working age population, 1984-1995 
Education group 
(4) Higher education 
(3) Α-level or equivalent 
(2) O-level or equivalent 
(1) Other qualifications 
(0) No qualifications 
Did not know/did not say 
% of working ; 
1984 
12.2 
21.8 
15.5 
8.7 
40.0 
(1.8) 
ige population 
1989 
13.5 
24.0 
17.7 
12.0 
32.0 
(0.9) 
1995 
19.7 
25.1 
18.4 
15.5 
21.0 
(0.3) 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 
Table 10 
The highest qualifications held by employed people of working age, 1984-1995 
Education group 
(4) Higher education 
(3) Α-level or equivalent 
(2) O-level or equivalent 
(1) Other qualifications 
(0) No qualifications 
Did not know/did not say 
% of all those in employment of working age 
1984 
14.9 
24.8 
14.7 
8.6 
35.2 
(1.7) 
1989 
15.7 
26.5 
18.1 
11.8 
27.0 
(0.9) 
1995 
23.5 
26.5 
18.8 
15.3 
15.6 
(0.3) 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring 
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Table 
Actual qualifications held by the workforce in 1984 and 1994 and the predicted 
qualifications held based on the changes in the occupational structure of employment 
Education group 
(4) Higher education 
(3) Α-level or equivalent 
(2) O-level or equivalent 
(1) Other qualifications 
(0) No qualifications 
% of total employment 
Actual 
1984 
15.19 
25.27 
15.00 
8.77 
35.77 
Predicted 
1994 
18.20 
25.05 
15.43 
8.44 
32.89 
Actual 
1994 
23.63 
26.63 
16.87 
15.44 
17.43 
Note: Excluding those who did not know or did not report their qualifications. Excluding 
students. 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Spring. 
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Table 12 
Unemployment rates by Standard Region, 1979-95 
South East 
East Anglia 
South West 
West Midlands 
East Midlands 
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
North West 
North 
Wales 
Scotland 
Northern Ireland 
United Kingdom 
Absolute 
difference 
between highest 
and lowest region 
Ratio between 
highest and lowest 
region 
Annual average unemployment rate 
1979 
2.5 
3.1 
3.9 
4.0 
3.3 
4.0 
5.0 
6.4 
5.3 
5.7 
7.9 
4.0 
5.4 
3.2:1 
1981 
5.4 
6.2 
6.6 
10.0 
7.4 
8.8 
10.2 
11.7 
10.4 
10.0 
12.6 
8.1 
7.2 
2.3:1 
1986 
8.2 
8.5 
9.2 
12.8 
9.9 
12.4 
13.7 
14.6 
13.7 
13.5 
16.8 
11.1 
8.6 
2.0:1 
1988 
5.3 
5.1 
6.0 
8.8 
7.1 
9.3 
10.3 
11.8 
9.9 
11.2 
15.0 
8.0 
9.9 
2.9:1 
1990 
3.9 
3.7 
4.3 
5.7 
5.1 
6.6 
7.6 
8.7 
6.7 
8.2 
12.8 
5.8 
8.9 
J . J . I 
1993 
10.2 
8.1 
9.5 
10.8 
9.5 
10.2 
10.7 
11.9 
10.3 
9.7 
13.8 
10.3 
5.7 
1.7:1 
1995 
7.9 
6.2 
7.0 
8.4 
7.7 
8.8 
8.8 
10.6 
8.5 
8.2 
11.4 
8.2 
5.2 
1.8:1 
Source: Claimant court. Seasonally adjusted and consistent with current coverage 
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Table 13 
The highest qualification held by the unemployed of working age, 1984-95 
Education group 
(4) Higher education 
(3) Α-level or equivalent 
(2) O-level or equivalent 
(1 ) Other qualifications 
(0) No qualifications 
Did not know/did not say 
% of the unemployed 
1984 
5.8 
18.4 
14.3 
12.0 
48.1 
1.4 
1989 
6.2 
19.5 
14.9 
13.5 
44.8 
1.0 
1995 
10.8 
23.5 
17.8 
19.8 
27.7 
0.4 
Source: LFS, Spring 
Table 14 
Unemployment rates by highest qualification held, for those of working age 1984-95 
Education group 
(4) Higher education 
(3) Α-level or equivalent 
(2) O-level or equivalent 
(1) Other qualifications 
(0) No qualifications 
Total 
ILO unemployment rate 
1984 
4.7 
8.4 
10.6 
15.3 
15.3 
11.8 
1989 
2.7 
5.3 
5.9 
8.0 
11.2 
7.1 
1995 
4.3 
7.9 
8.4 
11.1 
14.6 
8.8 
Source: LFS, Spring 
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Table 15 
Male unemployment rates by qualification, 1975-93 
Total unemployment 
rate 
1. Rate for those with 
A-levels/Higher 
education 
2. Rate for those with 
no qualifications 
Ratio(2):(l) 
Male unemployment rates % 
1975-78 
4.4 
2.0 
6.4 
3.2 
1979-82 
7.7 
3.9 
12.2 
3.1 
1983-86 
10.5 
4.7 
18.2 
3.9 
1987-90 
7.5 
4.0 
13.5 
3.4 
1991-93 
11.4 
6.3 
17.4 
2.8 
Source: General Household Survey, Nickell and Bell (199'5) 
Table 16 
Labour force participation and reasons for inactivity for prime age adults, 25-54 
Men, 25-54 
Participation rate 
Number inactive (1000s) 
Due to: Sickness 
Retirement 
Other 
Women, 25-54 
Participation rate 
Number inactive (1000s) 
Due to: Sickness 
Retirement 
Other 
1971 
97.8 
216 
101 
10 
106 
54.0 
4529 
92 
4437 
1981 
97.2 
287 
158 
13 
116 
61.4 
3885 
120 
12 
3753 
1991 
94.2 
647 
431 
35 
181 
70.2 
3362 
386 
46 
2930 
Source: Censuses of Population, Robinson, 1994a 
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Table 17 
The changing composition of all employment, 1979-96 
Full-time employees 
- Full-time permanent 
- Full-time temporary 
Part-time employees 
- Part-time permanent 
- Part-time temporary 
Full-time self-
employed 
Part-time self-
employed 
Percentage of all in employment 
1979 
76.7 
16.1 
6.5 
0.7 
1984 
69.7 
67.4 
2.3 
18.8 
16.5 
2.3 
9.4 
1.9 
1990 
67.1 
64.8 
2.3 
19.4 
17.2 
2.2 
11.3 
2.1 
1996 
65.2 
61.9 
j . j 
22.1 
19.2 
2.9 
10.2 
2.5 
Note: Excluding those on Government schemes and unpaid family workers. 
Source: Labour Force Survey 
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Table 18 
Length of time in present employment (employees of working age) 1975 - 93 
Men 
< 6 months 
6-12 months 
1 -2 years 
2-5 years 
5-10 years 
10-20 years 
20+ years 
Median (years) 
Women 
< 6 months 
6-12 months 
1-2 years 
2-5 years 
5-10 years 
10-20 years 
20+ years 
Median (years) 
1975 
5.5 
7.5 
6.8 
18.2 
20.9 
21.6 
19.6 
7.9 
9.1 
12.1 
11.2 
27.9 
21.8 
12.5 
5.5 
3.9 
1984 
7.4 
7.3 
7.5 
18.4 
22.0 
22.6 
14.0 
7.1 
11.2 
10.3 
10.9 
24.6 
23.5 
16.0 
3.6 
4.1 
1989 
8.8 
8.1 
10.1 
18.4 
16.8 
23.7 
14.1 
6.4 
12.9 
11.2 
13.7 
23.0 
17.3 
17.7 
4.2 
3.6 
1993 
7.0 
6.8 
8.4 
22.2 
19.8 
21.9 
13.9 
6.4 
8.7 
8.7 
11.6 
27.7 
21.8 
16.9 
4.6 
4.3 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995 
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Table 19 
Duration of jobs by employment status, 1992-3 
Full time permanent 
Part time permanent 
Full time temporary 
Part time temporary 
Full time self employed 
Part time self employed 
Duration (years) 
All 
6.2 
3.0 
0.8 
0.8 
3.6 
0.8 
Men 
6.3 
1.4 
0.8 
0.7 
3.6 
0.7 
Women 
6.1 
3.4 
0.8 
0.9 
2.4 
0.9 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995 
Table 20 
Number of people making at least one claim for unemployment-related benefits 
Five year period 
1985-89 
1986-90 
1987-91 
1888-92 
1989-93 
1990-94 
1991-95 
Millions 
9.7 
9.47 
9.64 
9.76 
9.79 
10.22 
10.39 
% of working age 
population 
26.0 
25.3 
25.8 
26.2 
26.3 
27.4 
27.3 
Source: Bank of England Inflation Report, February 1996 
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Table 21 
The changing composition of employment entered by formerly unemployed people, 
1979-94 
Full-time employees 
- Full-time permanent 
- Full-time temporary 
- Full-time on 
Government scheme 
Part-time employees 
- Part-time permanent 
- Part-time temporary 
- Part-time on 
Government scheme 
Full-time self-
employed 
Part-time self-
employed 
1979 
53.4 
41.2 
2.5 
1.2 
1985 
49.2 
38.4 
7.9 
1.8 
40.7 
26.1 
10.6 
3.6 
6.2 
3.6 
1994 
47.0 
35.1 
9.1 
2.4 
40.9 
26.7 
8.7 
5.0 
7.9 
4.2 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996 
Table 22 
Pay by qualification for men, 1974-94 
Ratio of hourly wages for men with higher education to men without qualifications 
1974-76 
1977-79 
1980-92 
1983-85 
1986-88 
1989-91 
1992-94 
1.73 
1.63 
1.66 
1.66 
1.64 
1.72 
1.70 
Source: General Household Survey 
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Table 23 
Estimates of the natural rate of unemployment in Britain in the mid 1990s 
Natural rate of 
unemployment as 
a % of the labour 
force (claimant 
count) 
Minford 
3.5 
Sentance 
4-6 
Congdon 
6-7 
Currie 
6.5-7.5 
Brittan 
7-8 
Davies 
7-8 
Sources: The Panel of Independent Forecasters, November 1995 Report, HM Treasury. 
Sentance, Α., 1995, 'Are we entering a new golden age of economic growth?' 
London Business School Economic Outlook, November 1995. 
Table 24 
Estimates of the natural rate of unemployment in Britain over the period 1969-73 to 
1995-96 
NRU - range 
- average 
Actual rate of 
unemployment 
(average) 
Number of 
estimates 
1969-73 
1.6-5.6 
2.9 
2.5 
11 
1974-80 
4.5-7.3 
5.7 
3.8 
13 
1981-87 
5.3-9.9 
7.0 
10.1 
15 
1988-90 
3.5-8.1 
6.1 
6.8 
5 
1995-96 
3.5-8.9 
6.7 
8.2 
9 
Sources: The Panel of Independent Forecasters, November 1995 Report, HM Treasury. 
Cromb, R. 1994. Yhe UKNAIRU', Government Economic Service Discussion 
Paper No. 124 
Barreli, R., Pain, N., and Young. G., 1995. 
Nickell, S., 1996. 
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Table 25 
Main independent medium term forecasts for the British economy to 1998 
Un-
employment 
(millions) 
Inflation 
(annual % 
change) 
PSBR 
(% GDP) 
Current 
Account 
(% GDP) 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1995-6 
1996-7 
1997-8 
1998-9 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Britton 
2.31 
2.18 
2.08 
2.02 
2.8 
2.4 
2.6 
2.7 
4.2 
3.5 
2.7 
2.1 
-1.2 
-0.9 
-0.6 
-0.3 
Currie 
2.32 
2.10 
1.93 
1.84 
2.9 
3.1 
2.8 
2.5 
3.6 
2.7 
2.1 
1.6 
-0.8 
-0.4 
-0.6 
-0.5 
Davies 
2.31 
2.27 
2.13 
2.04 
2.9 
3.1 
3.2 
3.2 
3.7 
2.8 
1.8 
1.1 
-1.1 
-0.6 
-0.8 
-1.1 
Godley 
2.2 
2.1 
2.1 
2.1 
3.1 
3.3 
3.6 
3.5 
6.8 
6.0 
5.3 
4.2 
-1.5 
-1.5 
-1.4 
-1.7 
Congdon 
2.32 
2.11 
1.89 
2.8 
1.7 
2.0 
4.0 
2.9 
2.3 
-0.5 
0.3 
-0.5 
Minford 
2.30 
1.99 
1.48 
1.11 
2.7 
2.1 
2.2 
2.2 
3.7 
2.8 
2.2 
0.7 
-0.5 
0 
0.1 
0 
Average 
2.3 
2.1 
1.9 
1.8 
2.9 
2.6 
2.7 
2.8 
3.8 
2.9 
2.2 
1.4 
-0.9 
0.5 
-0.6 
-0.7 
Notes: 1. Retail Price Index (-mortgage interest payments) except for Godley (consumer price index) 
2. Public Sector Borrowing Requirement except for Godley (General Government Financial 
Deficit). Actual outturn for 1995-6 was 4.5% GDP 
Source: Panel of Independent Forecasters, November 1995 report. HM Treasury 
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Table 26 
Forecast of regional unemployment rates in 2001 
South East 
East Anglia 
South West 
West Midlands 
East Midlands 
Yorkshire and Humberside 
North West 
North 
Wales 
Scotland 
Northern Ireland 
UK 
Forecast 
2001 
7.5 
6.0 
6.9 
8.6 
7.0 
8.3 
8.7 
10.0 
7.9 
7.9 
11.8 
7.9 
Actual 
January, 1996 
7.5 
6.1 
6.8 
7.8 
7.3 
8.4 
8.2 
10.0 
8.1 
7.8 
11.4 
7.9 
Source: 'Review of the Economy and Employment: Regional Assessment ' Institute for 
Employment Research, Warwick, 1994. 
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Table 27 
Productivity growth rates in the UK and other industrialised countries, 1960-94 
Growth of output per 
hour in manufacturing 
-UK 
- average for 11 
countries* 
Growth of output per 
person employed in 
whole economy 
-UK 
- Average for EU-15 
% growth rate 
1960-73 
4.1 
6.1 
2.8 
4.4 
1973-79 
1.0 
3.9 
1.3 
2.3 
1979-89 
4.1 
2.8 
1.9 
1.7 
1979-94 
4.0 
2.8 
1.7 
1.6 
Notes: *11 countries: US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. 
Sources: Manufacturing: US Bureau of Labour Statistics 
Whole Economy: OECD Historical Statistics 
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Table 28 
Employee's preferences for working more or fewer hours in 1989 
Usual 
hours 
worked 
10-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61 + 
All men 
All women 
All persons 
(Row percentages) 
Would prefer to work: 
More Less 
13 
7 
-> 
J 
-
-
4 
5 
4 
2 
9 
30 
41 
67 
67 
36 
24 
30 
Even if it meant less pay: 
Yes No 
2 
7 
8 
7 
9 
12 
5 
9 
7 
1 
2 
20 
31 
48 
53 
29 
12 
21 
Happy with 
present hours 
84 
84 
67 
56 
60 
71 
65 
Notes: Employees usually working 10 hours or more each week, Great Britain. 
Excluding small number of don't know/no answer responses 
Source: 1989 British Social Attitudes Survey 
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Table 29 
Main changes in regulations affecting receipt of unemployment beneits since 1979 
Year Change in regulations 
1982 Abolition of compulsory registration at Jobcentres/ 
introduction of availability for work testing 
1986 Introduction of compulsory Restart interviews (held every 
six months from 1988) 
Extension of period for which benefit can be disallowed 
from 6-13 weeks) 
1988 Extension of period for which benefit can be disallowed 
(from 13-26 weeks) 
Benefits removed from 16-17 year olds 
All new claimants interviewed 
Availability test every 6 months 
1989 Claimants required to show that they are 'actively seeking 
work' 
New claimants required to complete a Back to Work plan 
and attend a review after 13 weeks. After this time cannot 
refuse a job outside their normal occupation and rate of 
pay. 
1996 Jobseekers' Allowance replaces Unemployment Benefit/ 
Income Support for unemployed people. Non-means 
tested element reduced from 12-6 months. 
Source: Based on Figure 9, House of Commons Employment Committee, 1996. 
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Table 30 
The scale and cost of the main employment and training programmes 
in England and Wales, 1995-96 
Employment Service programmes 
Jobclubs 
Jobfinders' Grant 
Job Interview Guarantee 
Jobplan Workshop 
Job review workshop 
Job search seminar 
One-to-one 
Restart courses 
Travel-to-interview 
Work Trials 
Workwise 
Training programmes 
Training for Work 
Career Development Loans 
Work programmes 
Community Action 
(being phased out) 
Recruitment Subsidies 
Workstart 
(original pilot) 
(not including adimn costs) 
Youth programmes 
Youth Training 
Number of places 
243,000 
25,000 
243,300 
167,500 
31,100 
61,900 
94,000 
107,100 
55,000 
30,000 
29,300 
214.000 
13,000 
28,700 
1,200 
Cost per place 
£172 
£200 
£3 
£104 
£61 
£57 
£64 
£84 
j j 
£57 
£195 
£2523 
£2400 
£2440 
£2340 
247,900 £2830 
Notes: The figure for the Job Interview Guarantee is for Job Preparation Courses only. 
The figure for Work Trials does not include ES costs. 
Source: Department for Education and Employment : Departmental Report, 1996. 
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Table 31 
The trade-offs in active labour market policies aimed at the unemployed 
Policy 
Employment Service: 
placement assistance 
and job search 
Training programmes 
Work programmes 
Recruitment subsidies 
Benefits for the 
unemployed 
Significant, but 
modest in scale. Can 
benefit target group at 
expense of others 
Hard to substantiate 
for large programmes. 
Modest significant 
effects for smaller 
programmes 
Benefits while on 
program, but little 
effect on subsequent 
job prospects 
Net employment 
effects small. Can 
benefit target group at 
expense of others 
Gross costs per 
place 
Very low 
High for quality 
programmes 
Moderate 
Depends on 
scale 
of subsidy 
Comments 
Work better in 
relatively tight labour 
markets 
Small, high quality 
programmes might be 
effective, but are 
expensive. 
Has to offer a 
moderate cost per 
place to 
accommodate large 
numbers. By 
definition work of 
marginal social 
value. 
Work better in 
relatively tight labour 
markets. Require 
considerable 
administrative effort 
to find places. 
Source: Robinson, 1995a 
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The National Qualifications Framework 
(1) 
NVQ Level 
3 
4 
(2) 
Academic 
4 or fewer GCSE/CSE/ 
O-level passes 
5 or more GCSEs/ O-levels 
at grades A-C 
2 or more A-levels 
First Degree 
(3) 
GNVQ 
Foundation 
Intermediate 
Advanced 
* 
(4) 
Traditional Vocational 
Qualifications 
BTEC General Certificate 
BTEC First Diploma 
Ordinary National 
Certificate/Diploma 
Higher National 
Certificate/Diploma 
(5) 
Typical Occupations 
Operatives 
Sales assistants 
Personal service 
Clerical 
Basic craft 
Advanced craft 
Junior Management 
Teclinician 
Management 
Professional 
ω 
-p. 
Higher Degree MBA Senior Management 
Senior Professional 
Note: * GNVQs are currently available only at the first three levels. Typical occupations are drawn from the Standard Occupational Classification. 
Source: Robinson 1996c 
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Table 34 
The National targets for education and training 
Targets for Lifetime Learning 
(1 ) % of the workforce at NVQ level 3 
(2) % of the workforce at NVQ level 4 
Actuai (%) 1995 
40.9 
23.9 
Target (%) 2000 
60 
30 
Targets for Foundation Learning 
(1 ) % of young people at NVQ level 2 
(3) % of young people at NVQ level 3 
67.5 
44.4 
85 
60 
Targets for Higher Education 
(1 ) % of the age group entering higher education 
(Government target for the APR) 
Note: APR - Age participation ratio 
Source: NACETT, 1996 
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Labour force participation rates, 1979­96 
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Labour force participation rates by age 
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Total employment, 1979-96 
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Figure 4 
Employment rates 1979-96 
All of working age (16-59/64), by gender 
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Employment rates by age, 1984-96 
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Figure 6 
Part-time employment as a proportion of all 
employment, 1984-96 
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Temporary employees as a proportion of all 
employees, 1984-96 
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Figure 8 
Self­employment as a proportion of total 
employment, 1979­96 
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Figure 9 
Alternative measures of unemployment 
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Figure 10 
Male and female unemployment rates, 1979­96 
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Figure 11 
Unemployment rates by age, 1984-96 
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Figure 12 
The long-term unemployment ratio, 1979-96 
(Those unemployed for over 1 year as % of total) 
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Figure 13 
The unemployment and long-term unemployment 
rates, 1979-96 
Source: Claimant Count, Spring 
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Ethnie and white unemployment rates, 1971-96 
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Figure 15 
Unemployment, discouraged workers and 
involuntary part­time employment, 1984­96 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Involuntary FT employ, rate ILO unemployment rate Discouraged worker rate 
Source: LFS Spring 
Figure 16 
Unemployment, non-employment and workless 
households, 1979-96 
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Figure 17 
The 'Beveridge curve' 1979-95 
Note: Unemployment and vacancies as a proportion 
of the workforce, seasonally adjusted, 
consistent and revised 
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Figure 18 
Average earnings growth and unemployment 
in Britain, 1981-96 
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Figure 19 
Average earnings growth and underlying inflation 
in Britain, 1981-96 
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Figure 20 
The growth in real take­home pay 
for those in work, 1981­95 
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Figure 21 
The share of income from employment in GDP 
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Figure 22 
The share of income from employment and self­
employment in GDP 
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Figure 23 
The "Phillips curve" - Average earnings growth 
and unemployment, 1981-96 
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The dispersion of real hourly earnings for men 
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The dispersion of real hourly earnings for women 
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Figure 26 
Departments responsible for labour market issues in England 
Department Department for 
Education and Employment 
Department for 
Social Security 
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Trade and Industry 
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Notes: FE + HE + YT: Further and Higher Education and Youth Training; NACETT: National Advisory Council for Education and Training Targets; 
NCVQ: National Council for Vocational Qualification; TECs : Training and Enterprise Councils; 
CRE: Commision for Racial Equality; EOC: Equal Opportunities Commission; ACAS: Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service; 
HSE: Health and Safety Executive. 
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Total membership of trade unions in Britain, 
1975-94 
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Figure 28 
The number of working days lost per 1000 
employees in Britain, 1975-95 
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Figure 29 
Distribution of usual hours worked, 1984­95 
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Figure 30 
The proportion of employees receiving job 
related training in last four weeks, 1984-94 
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Figure 31 
The proportion of manufacturing firms citing 
shortage of skilled labour as constraint 1960-96 
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